LAWRENCE C. ANDREWS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1964-02-11
No. 63-484
Before CARROLL, HORTON and HENDRY, JJ.
160 So. 2d 726 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1964) Positive Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

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Synopsis

An inmate convicted of assault with intent to commit rape and sentenced to 20 years wrote a letter to the trial judge claiming he was denied counsel at his preliminary hearing in violation of Gideon v. Wainwright. The circuit court summarily denied the letter as a habeas corpus petition for failure to comply with procedural rules. The appellate court reversed, holding that pro se motions by prisoners must be liberally construed and afforded procedural benefits equivalent to habeas corpus applications.


Holding

The court reversed, holding that the prisoner's letter should have been treated as a motion under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 rather than a habeas corpus petition, and that pro se motions by prisoners must not be scrutinized for technical pleading deficiencies but should be afforded the same liberality historically granted to habeas corpus applications.


Key Quotes

“In processing a motion under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, it must always be borne in mind that such motions filed by a prisoner pro se should not be scrutinized for technical niceties, since a prisoner is almost always unskilled in the law and cannot be held to a high standard of pleading.”

Establishes the standard of review for pro se prisoner motions requiring liberal construction

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Facts & Procedural History

Lawrence Andrews was convicted by jury of assault with intent to commit rape and sentenced to 20 years in the state penitentiary. While imprisoned at …

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Opinion of the Court
HENDRY, Judge.

HENDRY, Judge.

This appeal is from an order of the-Circuit Court for Dade County denying appellant post conviction relief.

The petitioner, a prisoner in Rafford,. wrote a letter to the trial judge who had sentenced him to 20 years in the State-Penitentiary pursuant to a jury verdict-finding him guilty of assault with intent to commit rape.

The letter was entitled, “Petitipn of Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus — • Criminal Court Procedure Rule No. 1, 155-U. S. Supreme Court”. In the body of the-letter it was stated under oath that he had been denied counsel at his preliminary-hearing in violation of his constitutional *727rights under Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct. 792, 9 L.Ed.2d 799 and that the court should set aside his conviction and grant his application for habeas corpus.

Following the receipt of the letter trial judge entered an order reciting,

“The petitioner herein having failed to comply with Criminal Court Procedure Rule #1, the application for Writ of Habeas Corpus is hereby denied.
“DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, Dade County, this 23rd day of May, 1963.”

From this order, it is apparent that the prisoner’s ambiguous letter was treated by the Circuit Court as a petition for habeas corpus. We think it was error to construe the letter as a petition for habeas corpus rather than a motion for relief under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1. As was stated in Ashley v. State, Fla.App. 1963, 158 So.2d 530, 531.1

“In processing a motion under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, it must always be borne in mind that such motions filed by a prisoner pro se should not be scrutinized for technical niceties, since a prisoner is almost always unskilled in the law and cannot be held to a high standard of pleading. * * * It must further be borne in mind that in order to effectuate the announced purposes of Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, as expressed in Roy v. Wainwright * * * (Fla.1963, 151 So.2d 825), the procedure and remedy so prescribed must be such that a prisoner may be afforded every procedural benefit available under habeas corpus and necessary to a meaningful investigation of his claim. The courts have the task, therefore, of adapting the procedure to the peculiarities and irregularities of motions which obviously state valid claims. Thus, as a matter of pleading, such motions should be treated with the same liberality as that historically granted by courts in entertaining applications for habeas corpus.”

The order appealed from is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court with directions as follows: •

Unless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon the prosecuting attorney of the court, grant a prompt hearing thereon, determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto.

Reversed with directions.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Dykes v. State, 162 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 1st DCA 1964)
    …are), I would apply the liberal rule recognized recently by both of our sister district courts of appeal (the Second District Court of Appeal in Ashley v. State, 158 So. 2d 530, 531 (1963) and the Third District Court of Appeal in Andrews v. State, 160 So. 2d 726), as follows : “In processing a motion under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1, it must always be borne in mind that such motions filed by a prisoner pro se should not be scrutinized for technical niceties, since a prisoner is almost always unskilled i…
  • Crusoe v. State, 183 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
    …U.S. Supreme Court Term only 38 of 1093 in forma pauperis petitions for certiorari were granted and out of 44 in pauperis appeals, all but one were summarily dismissed). . Hall v. State, Fla.App.1964, 160 So. 2d 527; Andrews v. State, Fla.App.1964, 160 So. 2d 726. . This extended opinion is written largely to illustrate the multitude of practically identical motions which, without any factual basis therefor, have literally clogged both the trial and appellate Courts since adoption of Criminal Procedure Rule…
  • Ellis Dixon v. State, 163 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)
    …al court should, in determining the sufficiency of a pro se motion, extend broad latitude in compliance with form and detail. Roy v. Wainwright, Fla.1963, 151 So. 2d 825; Ashley v. State, Fla.App.1963, 158 So. 2d 530; Andrews v. State, Fla.App.1964, 160 So. 2d 726. See Dykes v. State, supra, (dissenting opinion). Additionally, the trial court may, in its discretion, “adopt any appropriate means for inquiry * * * in order to ascertain all possible grounds upon which the prisoner might claim * * relief.” Sander…

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