ROBERT L. JONES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
v.
J. WAYNE GARNER, CHAIRMAN, STATE BOARD OF PARDONS AND PAROLES, ET AL., DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES

11th Cir. | 2000-05-10
No. 97-9009
Before BIRCH and BARKETT, Circuit Judges, and HANCOCK, Senior District Judge.
211 F.3d 1225 Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit (2000) Negative Treatment
Cited by 16 cases

Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM:

PER CURIAM: In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Garner v. Jones, — U.S. -, 120 S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000), we remand the case for further proceedings. In its decision the Supreme Court noted that: The Court of Appeals’ analysis failed to reveal whether the amendment to Rule 475-3-05(2), in its operation, created a significant risk of increased punishment for respondent.

Respondent claims he has not been permitted sufficient discovery to make this showing. The matter of adequate discovery is one for the Court of Appeals or, as need be, for the District Court in the first instance-The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion. Id. at 1371. We thus remand the case to the district court to determine, after permitting sufficient discovery, whether the amendment to Ga. Rules & Regs., Rule 475-3-05(2) (1985) in its operation created a significant risk of increased punishment for Robert L. Jones. SO ORDERED.


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Cited By (16 total)

  • Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327 (U.S. 2007)
    …n for certiorari. Then-applicable Eleventh Circuit precedent foreclosed any argument that §2244’s statute of limitations was tolled by the pendency of a petition for certiorari seeking review of a state postconvietion proceeding. See Coates v. Byrd, 211 F. 3d 1225,1227 (2000) (per curiam). Accordingly, the District Court concluded that Lawrence had only one day to file a federal habeas application after the Florida Supreme Court issued its mandate. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. 421 F. 3d 1221 (2005). We gran…
  • DAY v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 198 (U.S. 2006)
    …ending.” §2244(d)(2). Under Eleventh Circuit precedent, that tolling period does not include the 90 days in which a petitioner might have sought certiorari review in this Court challenging state-court denial of postconviction relief. Coates v. Byrd, 211 F. 3d 1225, 1227 (2000). In the case before us, the State’s answer to the federal habeas petition “agree[d] the petition [was] timely” because it was “filed after 352 days of untolled time.” App. 24. Inspecting the pleadings and attachments, a Federal Magist…
  • Steed v. Head, 219 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000)
    …3d 1209, 1211 n. 4 (11th Cir.1998). We affirm on the issue of whether the statute of limitations tolling provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) includes the time for seeking certiorari review by the United States Supreme Court based on Coates v. Byrd, 211 F. 3d 1225 (11th Cir.2000) (holding that “the time during which a petition for writ of certiorari is pending, or could have been filed, following the denial of collateral relief in the state courts, is not to be subtracted from the running of time for 28 U.S.C…

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