WILLARD J. RASH, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Willard Rash sought post-conviction relief claiming constitutional violations including arrest without warrant, lack of arraignment and preliminary hearing, six-month delay before preliminary hearing, and lack of counsel at the preliminary hearing. The Florida appellate court affirmed the trial court's denial of relief, finding that Rash was represented by counsel at trial and sentencing, and that any lack of counsel at the preliminary hearing did not constitute prejudicial error because the preliminary hearing was not a critical stage of the proceeding.
The court held that although it does not affirmatively appear from the record that Rash was represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing, any such lack of representation did not constitute grounds for post-conviction relief because: (1) the preliminary hearing was not a critical stage of the proceeding, and (2) Rash showed no prejudice from the alleged deprivation; and (3) Rash was represented by counsel at trial and sentencing where he received a fair trial on his not guilty plea.
“It is clear from the decided cases that counsel must be secured or understandingly waived for every critical state of a criminal proceeding.”
Establishes the general constitutional principle that counsel must be provided or waived at critical stages
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRash was charged with lewd, lascivious and indecent assault on a child under 14 years of age and committing such an act in the presence of a male chil…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 cases and more on FLexlaw
The appellant, seeking post-conviction relief under Criminal Procedure Rule One, F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix, alleged in substance as follows:
1. He was charged with a lewd, lascivious and indecent assault on a *312child under 14 years of age, and with, committing a lewd, lascivious and indecent act in the presence of a male child under 14 years of age.
2. He was arrested without a warrant and booked in the Dade County Jail.
3. He was not afforded an arraignment or preliminary hearing, contrary to Florida Statute 901.23, F.S.A.
4. He was held in jail approximately six months before being afforded a preliminary hearing.
5. He was not afforded counsel at his long-delayed preliminary hearing.
The trial judge denied the petition and found as follows:
1. The petitioner at time of arraignment, trial and sentencing was represented by the Public Defender of Dade County, Florida.
2. The remaining allegations of petitioner’s motion do not constitute grounds upon which relief can be granted under Criminal Procedure Rule One.
The record supports the trial judge’s finding that petitioner was represented at trial and sentencing by the public defender. It does not affirmatively appear that he was so represented at arraignment or at the preliminary hearing. It is clear from the decided cases that counsel must be secured or understandingly waived for every critical state of a criminal proceeding. Petitioner’s allegations that he was not represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing does not suggest that he was in any way prejudiced. On the other hand it appears from the record that the preliminary hearing was not in this instance a critical stage of the proceeding.1
This appeal is upon appellant’s second petition for post-conviction relief under Criminal Procedure Rule One. No appeal was taken from the trial court’s denial of the first petition. The record here does contain the order denying the first petition. We mention this order because a finding of the trial court therein may explain petitioner’s long stay in jail prior to trial. The trial court, after the appointment of the public defender as counsel for the defendant, referred the defendant to the circuit court. The circuit court pursuant to statute requested an examination of the defendant by Dr. J. L. Anderson, a recognized psychiatrist. The doctor made a report to the circuit court that the defendant was sane and responsible for his acts.
The record now before us reveals that shortly before trial petitioner’s plea of “not guilty by reason of insanity” was withdrawn and he went to trial upon a plea of “not guilty.”
We are at a loss to understand the basis upon which petitioner now claims that he was deprived of a constitutional right by the delay in his trial. If he had confessed or plead guilty he might now say that he did so because of his confinement and in order to secure a trial, although this ground was not fruitful in Milton v. Cochran, Fla.1962, 147 So.2d 137.
We need not consider the applicability of the Milton decision because here petitioner received a trial on the “not guilty” plea and second, he received the benefit of the medical examination in order to gauge the effect of his plea of “not guilty by reason of insanity.”
Affirmed.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Miller v. State, 246 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 3d DCA 1971)…78. Prior to Coleman, it was held that preliminary hearings in Florida were not a “critical stage” in a criminal proceeding. Cf. Baugus v. State, Fla.1962, 141 So. 2d 264; Williams v. State, Fla.App.1967, 202 So. 2d 821; Rash v. State, Fla.App.1964, 162 So. 2d 311; and DiBona v. State, Fla.App.1960, 121 So. 2d 192. But see Montgomery v. State, supra. Assuming arguendo that this is fundamental error, does Coleman command reversal in this appeal? We think not for two reasons. First, Judge Spector speaking for…
-
Frisby v. State, 167 So. 2d 335 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)…judge not to constitute a valid ground for collateral attack (assuming but not deciding that it otherwise could be), where at the time of arraignment, when the defendant pleaded guilty, he was represented by counsel. See Rash v. State, Fla.App.1964, 162 So. 2d 311; Webster v. State, Fla.App.1963, 156 So. 2d 890; Blake v. State, Fla.App.1964, 163 So. 2d 20. Affirmed.…
-
Porter v. State, 196 So. 2d 455 (Fla. 2d DCA 1967)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed under the authority of Rash v. State, Fla.App.1964, 162 So. 2d 311; Smith v. State, Fla.App.1964, 168 So. 2d 585; Coleman v. State, Fla.App. 1965, 172 So. 2d 854; Francis v. State, Fla.App.1964, 168 So. 2d 684, and Dancy v. State, Fla.App. 1965, 175 So. 2d 208. ALLEN, C. J., and SHANNON and PIERCE, JJ., concur.…
Authorities Cited
- Milton v. Cochran, 147 So. 2d 137 (Fla. 1962)
- Blake v. State, 163 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964)