CHARLES L. HAMMOND, APPELLANT,
v.
THE TIMES PUBLISHING CO., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND MILTON BECKERMAN, APPELLEES
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In this libel action, the court affirmed the trial court's vacation of a default judgment against the newspaper defendants and its entry of judgment on the pleadings in favor of the defendants. The court held that the complained-of article was not libelous per se because, under the applicable test, eliminating the allegedly faulty material would not change the ordinary reader's conclusions about the article's meaning.
The trial court properly exercised its discretion in vacating the default judgment. Additionally, the complained-of article does not constitute libel per se because, applying the proper test, eliminating the allegedly faulty material would not change the conclusions an ordinary reader would reach from the article.
“A workable test is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced.”
Establishes the controlling test for determining whether an article constitutes libel per se
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe appellant, Charles L. Hammond, filed a libel action against The Times Publishing Co. and Milton Beckerman. The defendants initially failed to plea…
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This was a libel action. The appellant, plaintiff in the trial court, appeals a final judgment entered on the pleadings and urges two errors: 1. The vacation of a default originally entered against the appellees-de-fendants for failure to plead an amended complaint; 2. Error in the entry of the judgment on the pleadings.
As to the vacation of the default judgment, it is incumbent upon the appellant to demonstrate that the trial judge committed error in the entry of the order. See: People’s Realty Co. v. Southern Colonization Co., 78 Fla. 628, 83 So. 527; Chaney v. Headley, Fla.1956, 90 So.2d 297. This record fails to demonstrate that the trial judge abused his discretion and, therefore, this action on his part should be affirmed on appeal. See: Benedict v. W. T. Hadlow Co., 52 Fla. 188, 42 So. 239; Stevens-Davis Co. v. Stock, 141 Fla. 714, 193 So. 745; Chaney v. Headley, supra. As to the second proposition of the judgment on the pleadings in favor of the appellees-de-fendants, the cause of action sounded in libel, per se. Therefore, the sufficiency of the complaint to warrant relief being granted to the appellant must be tested by the principles announced in McCormick v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, Fla.App. 1962, 139 So.2d 197. Measuring this complaint by the test laid down therein, to wit: “[4] A workable test is whether the libel as published would have a different effect on the mind of the reader from that which the pleaded truth would have produced. Greenberg v. Winchell, Sup., 136 N.Y.S.2d 877.”, it is apparent that even if the alleged faulty material were eliminated from the complained of article, it would not change the conclusions which would be reached by the ordinary man. Therefore, the complained of article is not libelous, per se. The complaint of the appellant bottomed solely on the article being libelous, per se. And, not meeting the test announced in the case of McCormick v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, supra, the appellant has failed to demonstrate error in the complained of ruling of the trial judge. Therefore, he has failed to overcome the presumption of correctness with which all trial orders enter the appellate courts. See: Tampa Transit Lines v. Rodriquez, Fla.App.1958, 100 So.2d 676; Dean v. Marineways, Inc. of Fort Lauderdale, Fla.App.1962, 146 So.2d 577.
The judgment here under review is affirmed.
ALLEN, Acting C. J., concurs.
WHITE, J., concurs specially.
(concurring specially).
Upon careful study of this case, which has been very capably argued by respective *683counsel, I am constrained to concur m the conclusion that the matter published by the defendant was not per se defamatory of the plaintiff. It was, however, an obloquy closely approaching a form that would make it actionable.
WHITE, Judge
(concurring specially).
Upon careful study of this case, which has been very capably argued by respective counsel, I am constrained to concur m the conclusion that the matter published by the defendant was not per se defamatory of the plaintiff. It was, however, an obloquy closely approaching a form that would make it actionable.
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Firestone v. Time, Inc., 305 So. 2d 172 (Fla. 1974)…). I dissent. In my opinion, there is no conflict jurisdiction. The District Court, in reversing the trial court, properly applied McCormick v. Miami Herald Publishing Company, 139 So. 2d 197 (Fla.App.1962), and Hammond v. Times Publishing Company, 162 So. 2d 681 (Fla.App.1954).…1 / 3
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Smith v. Cuban Am. Nat'l Found., 731 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)…ve produced.’ ” Id.; Woodard, 616 So. 2d at 503; Early, 354 So. 2d at 352; Bishop v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 235 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 3d DCA 1970); Hill v. Lakeland Ledger Publ’g Corp., 231 So. 2d 254, 256 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Hammond v. Times Publ’g Co., 162 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964); McCormick, 139 So. 2d at 200. The Florida standard jury instructions on defamation do not explicitly include an instruction on substantial truth. See In re Standard Jury Instructions (Civil Cases 89-1), 575 So. 2d 194 (Fla.…
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Early v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., 354 So. 2d 351 (Fla. 1977)…the common mind of the reader than that which the truth would have, then the jury is authorized to return a verdict for the plaintiff. McCormick v. Miami Herald Publishing Co., 139 So. 2d 197, 200 (Fla.2d DCA 1962); Hammond v. Times Publishing Co., 162 So. 2d 681, 682 (Fla.2d DCA 1964); Layne v. Tribune Company, 108 Fla. 177, 146 So. 234, 238 (1933); Johnson v. Finance Acceptance Co., 118 Fla. 397, 159 So. 364 (1935); Joopanenko v. Gavagan, 67 So. 2d 434 (Fla.1953); Campbell v. Jacksonville Kennel Club, 66 S…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Almon C. McCORMICK v. The Miami Herald Publ'g Co., 139 So. 2d 197 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Benedict v. W. T. Hadlow Co., 52 Fla. 188 (Fla. 1906)
- Chaney v. Headley, 90 So. 2d 297 (Fla. 1956)
- Dean v. Marineways, 146 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Stevens-Davis Co. v. Otto F. Stock, 141 Fla. 714 (Fla. 1940)
- Peoples Realty Co. v. S. Colonization Co., 78 Fla. 628 (Fla. 1919)
- Tampa Transit Lines, Inc. v. Delfina Rodriguez and Sam Rodriguez, 100 So. 2d 676 (Fla. 2d DCA 1958)
- Paxton v. Foley Lumber Co., 141 Fla. 662 (Fla. 1940)