FLORIDA EAST COAST RAILWAY COMPANY, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
WALTER W. HARDEE, APPELLEE
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Florida East Coast Railway appeals from a jury verdict in a Federal Employers' Liability Act case where the trial court admitted a Railroad and Public Utilities Commission safety rule and instructed the jury that violation of the rule constituted prima facie evidence of negligence. The appellate court reverses and remands for a new trial, finding error in the prima facie evidence instruction and also holding that work life expectancy tables should have been admitted.
The court held that while the safety rule was properly admitted into evidence as material to the alleged injury, the instruction that violation of the rule constituted prima facie evidence of negligence was error. The court also held that the Smith-Griffin Railroad Employees' Work Life Expectancy Tables should have been admitted into evidence when the nature of the injury was a permanent condition.
“the giving of the charge which instructed that violation of this rule constituted prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad was in error”
Establishes that while the safety rule was admissible, instructing the jury that its violation alone constitutes prima facie negligence is improper
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWalter Hardee, an employee of Florida East Coast Railway, was injured when alighting from a moving train while performing his duties into a right-of-w…
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The appellant, defendant in the trial court, appeals from an adverse final judgment rendered upon a jury verdict in an F.E.L.A. case. The principal point relied on, as constituting error, was the permitting into evidence of a rule promulgated by the Railroad and Public Utilities Commission,1 and the giving of a charge on said rule, as follows:
“You are instructed that if you find from the evidence in this- case that a safety rule or regulation of the Florida Railroad & Public Utilities Commission has been violated, it is prima facie evidence of negligence. I charge you that the mere fact that the defendant may have violated the said rule does not in itself establish negligence unless such violation contributed in whole or in part to the injury, if any.”
4= 4= * * * *
*706It is also contended that the trial court erred in failing to permit into evidence the Smith-Griffin Railroad Employees’ Work Life Expectancy Tables.
We find no error in the admission into evidence of the safety rule promulgated by the Florida Railroad & Public Utilities Commission-. It is apparent from the wording of the rule that same was material to the alleged injury, to wit: the plaintiff-appellee alighting from a moving train, in the performance of his duties, into a right-of-way which was in a hazardous condition through lack of maintenance. We find, however, that the giving of the charge which instructed that violation of this rule constituted prima facie evidence of negligence on the part of the railroad was in error. See: Florida East Coast Railway Company v. Pollack, Fla.App.1963, 154 So.2d 346; Chesapeake & O. R. Co. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587, 49 S.Ct. 442, 73 L.Ed. 861; Davee v. Southern Pacific Company, 58 Cal.2d 572, 25 Cal.Rptr. 445, 375 P.2d 293.
In view of the fact that this cause will be returned to the trial court for the purposes of a new trial, we have inquired into the propriety of the failure of the trial judge to permit into evidence the Smith-Griffin Railroad Employees’ Work Life Expectancy Tables, and hold that they should have been permitted into evidence, in accordance with the following authorities, when the nature of the injury complained of was of a permanent condition: Dixon v. United States, S.D. New York 1954, 120 F.Supp. 747; McCray v. Illinois Central R. R. Co., 12 Ill.App.2d 425, 139 N.E.2d 817.
Therefore, for the reasons- above stated, the final judgment here under review is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court for the purposes of a new trial.
Reversed and remanded with directions.
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Authorities Cited
- Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Stapleton, 279 U.S. 587 (U.S. 1929)
- Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. Pollack, 154 So. 2d 346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1963)