ANNA A. KRIVITSKY
v.
RUTH W. GERLACH
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The Florida Supreme Court granted a motion to quash a writ of error because the lower court's judgment, which dissolved a writ of garnishment, was not a final judgment. The court allowed the plaintiff to seek a final judgment in the lower court to preserve their right to appeal.
No, the order dissolving the writ of garnishment was not a final judgment because it did not explicitly state that the plaintiff take nothing by her writ. Therefore, it could not support a writ of error.
“the motion to quash the writ of error in this case, was granted because the judgment entered in the court below was not such a judgment as will support a writ of error in that it was not a final judgment.”
Establishes the reason for quashing the writ of error.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe plaintiff, Anna A. Krivitsky, sought a writ of error to review a judgment from the lower court. The judgment in question dissolved a writ of garni…
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The motion to quash the writ of error in this case, was granted because the judgment entered in the court below was not such a judgment as will support a writ of error in that it was not a final judgment. The effect of the judgment was merely to dissolve a writ of garnishment, *771and there was no final judgment “that the plaintiff take nothing by her said writ of garnishment.”
It is considered that the order quashing the writ of error heretofore entered in this Court shall be without prejudice to the plaintiff in error procuring the entry of a final judgment in this regard in the court below and prosecuting writ of error for review of such judgment in this Court should she be so advised.
It is so ordered.
Whitfield, C. J., and Terrell, Brown, Buford and Davis, J. J., concur.
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Slatcoff v. Dezen, 72 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1954)…his court for review by direct appellate proceedings. We have concluded that this case should be governed by our opinion in Saffran v. Adler, 152 Fla. 405, 12 So. 2d 124, and not by our conclusion and judgment in Krivitsky v. Gerlach, 120 Fla. 770, 163 So. 134, 135. It is true, as in the latter case, that the order sought herein to be quashed, although it dissolves the writ of garnishment, does not contain the customary wording of a final judgment in that there is no recitation to the effect “ 'that the…
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Crawford v. Rehwinkel, 121 Fla. 449 (Fla. 1935)…land that it will thereby be protected from reassessments for the same tax and that the court may decree a title upon specific land should the assessment as alleged be duly admitted or proved. See: Anderson v. Northern Investment Co., 120 Fla. 894, 163 Sou. Rep. 134. The bill of complaint does not allege facts showing the assessment on the land was made according to one of the methods provided by the statute. The order denying the [*457] motion to dismiss the bills is reversed and the cause is remanded for app…
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Hillsborough Cnty. v. Hwy. Eng'g & Constr. Co., Inc., 94 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1938)…, rendered the inadvertent use of “29” for “28” immaterial and harmless, and made the assessment sufficiently definite and certain to constitute a legal description and basis for the certificates. Anderson v. Northern Inv. Corporation, 120 Fla. 894, 163 So. 134; Inter-City Sec. Co. v. Barbee, 106 Fla. 671, 143 So. 791; Trust Co. of Florida v. Tampa, 103 Fla. 628, 138 So. 73. In addition to the plat itself, which on its face inexorably identified the land to be assessed as in section 28, appellant offered…