HERBERT JOSEPH HENRY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1964-04-16
No. E-392
STURGIS, C. J., and WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ., concur.
163 So. 2d 24 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1964) Positive Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

The Florida District Court of Appeal recalled its prior decision and dismissed an appeal because the appeal was not filed within the required 90-day period, following a Florida Supreme Court ruling that clarified the timeliness requirement.


Holding

No, the appeal was not timely filed. The court granted the appellee's motion to dismiss.


Key Quotes

“It appearing that since the filing of our decision dated December 10, 1963, Henry v. State, Fla.App., 158 So. 2d 807, denying appellee's motion to dismiss this cause, which motion was based on the ground that the appeal was not filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the judgment appealed, as required by Rule 6.2, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A., in the case of State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, (Fla.) 160 So. 2d 518, the Florida Supreme Court rendered an opinion, the effect of which is to reject the rule announced by our said decision in this cause, and it being made to appear that our decision is not in conformity with the rule laid down in State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, supra, and that said motion to dismiss was well taken.”

Explains the reason for recalling the prior decision and granting the motion to dismiss, citing the impact of a Florida Supreme Court ruling.

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Facts & Procedural History

The appellant filed an appeal, and the appellee moved to dismiss it, arguing the appeal was untimely because it was filed more than 90 days after the …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

It appearing that since the filing of our decision dated December 10, 1963, Henry v. State, Fla.App., 158 So.2d 807, denying ap-pellee’s motion to dismiss this cause, which motion was based on the ground that the appeal was not filed within ninety (90) days from the date of the judgment appealed, as required by Rule 6.2, Florida Appellate Rules, 31 F.S.A., in the case of State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, (Fla.) 160 So.2d 518, the Florida Supreme Court rendered an opinion, the effect of which is to reject the rule announced by our said decision in this cause, and it being made to appear that our decision is not in conformity with the rule laid down in State ex rel. Ervin v. Smith, supra, and that said motion to dismiss was well taken.

It is thereupon ordered that our said decision and judgment filed herein on December 10, 1963 be and it is hereby recalled, set aside and held for naught.

It is further ordered that the said motion of the appellee to dismiss this appeal for failure to file notice of appeal within ninety (90) days from the date of the entry of the judgment sought to be appealed be and the same is hereby granted and said appeal is hereby dismissed.

It is so ordered.

STURGIS, C. J., and WIGGINTON and RAWLS, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. COX, 481 So. 2d 517 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985)
    …is injuries is known. See also Edelman v. Kolker, 194 So. 2d 683 (Fla.3d DCA 1967) (insurer’s property damage suit brought subsequent to plaintiff’s successful personal injury suit did not violate rule against splitting); Emmco Ins. Co. v. Bankston, 163 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla.3d DCA 1964) (where insured had sued defendant for personal injuries arising from car accident, rule against splitting did not prevent insurer as subrogee from suing defendant, since such a suit “is not unjust to the wrongdoer, who is there…
  • Holyoke Mut. Ins. Co. IN Salem v. Concrete Equip., Inc., 394 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
    ….210(a); Rosenthal v. Scott, 150 So. 2d 433, 436 (Fla.1961) (rehearing); Indian River State Bank v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 46 Fla. 283, 328, 35 So. 228, 244 (1903); Rebozo v. Royal Indemnity Company, supra; Emmco Insurance Company v. Bankston, 163 So. 2d 24 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). Accord, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company v. Robbins, 237 So. 2d 208 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970); Morgan v. General Insurance Company of America, 181 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). This rule of law is challenged by Concrete…
  • Anderson v. Anderson, 333 So. 2d 484 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976)
    …ought about by some subsequent change in her financial circumstances. The order appealed from is affirmed in part and reversed in part and the divorce judgment modified, as and in the respects set forth above. . Anderson v. Anderson, Fla.App.1963, 163 So. 2d 24. Certiorari was denied by the Supreme Court, on the ground of absence of conflict jurisdiction, Anderson v. Anderson, Fla.1964, 164 So. 2d 3. . Anderson v. Anderson, Fla.App.1965, 180 So. 2d 360. . Anderson v. Anderson, Fla.1967, 194 So. 2d 906.…

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