MARCIA BONAVIA SAMUELS
v.
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
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The court held that the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert was improper because it failed to account for the claimant's bipolar disorder, and therefore the VE's testimony was not substantial evidence.
[1] An administrative law judge must consider the episodic nature of bipolar disorder when determining a claimant's residual functional capacity.
[2] A hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert must accurately describe all of a claimant's mental restrictions to constitute substantial evidence.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarcia Bonavia Samuels applied for disability benefits due to bipolar disorder. The ALJ denied benefits, finding she could perform other work. The dis…
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2 Before MARTIN, GRANT, and LAGOA, Circuit Judges. MARTIN, Circuit Judge: Marcia Bonavia Samuels appeals the District Court’s order affirming the Commissioner of Social Security’s (the “Commissioner”) denial of her application for disability insurance benefits. Ms. Samuels applied for disability benefits based on her bipolar disorder. In this appeal, Ms. Samuels first claims the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred at the fourth step of the disability analysis by failing to give her treating physician’s opinion the proper weight and by discounting her own testimony. She also argues the ALJ erred at the fifth step of the analysis by relying on testimony from a vocational expert in response to a hypothetical question that omitted her impairments. We vacate the judgment of the District Court and remand to the Commissioner for further proceedings. The ALJ did not have the benefit of our decision in Schink v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 935 F. 3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019) (per curiam), which may alter the fourth step of the ALJ’s disability analysis. Additionally, we agree with Ms. Samuels that the ALJ’s hypothetical to the vocational expert did not sufficiently communicate her limitations from bipolar disorder.
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I. BACKGROUND
Ms. Samuels began receiving treatment for bipolar disorder in 2004. Since that time, she has been prescribed a variety of medications that have changed over the course of her treatment. Her medication “works reasonably,” but she suffers side effects and deals with the up-and-down nature of her bipolar disorder. These cycles include a constant feeling of depression combined with manic episodes characterized by symptoms of aggression, difficulty getting along with others, and insomnia. Ms. Samuels has a bachelor’s degree in biology as well as a Juris Doctor degree. She worked as an attorney until 2009, when she attempted suicide. Although she worked on some legal cases after her suicide attempt, she couldn’t concentrate and was not paid for her work as an attorney after that date. Ms. Samuels also lost interest in her hobbies, including gardening and talking to friends. She stayed in bed, communicated only with her mother and children, and skipped showering; she had no appetite and lost weight; and had suicidal thoughts. Indeed, to this day, and despite taking her medication, Ms. Samuels has daily suicidal thoughts. Based on these symptoms from her bipolar disorder, Ms. Samuels applied for disability insurance benefits on December 24, 2012, with an onset date of January 1, 2008. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) initially denied her
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
When an ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, “we review the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision.” Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F. 3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001). “[W]e review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based.” Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F. 3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam). But we review the Commissioner's decision "only to determine whether it is supported by substantial evidence." Id. “Substantial evidence is . . . such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Id. Our limited review does not allow us to "decid[e] the facts anew, mak[e] credibility determinations, or re-weigh[] the evidence." Id. We also review de novo the judgment of the District Court. Ingram v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F. 3d 1253, 1260 (11th Cir. 2007).
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III. DISCUSSION
In making disability determinations, the Commissioner engages in a five step process. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). A claimant applying for disability insurance benefits bears the burden of proving that she is disabled. See Doughty, 245 F. 3d at 1278. At the first two steps, which are not at issue here, the claimant must show that she is not currently engaged in substantial gainful activity and that she has a severe impairment. See § 404.1520(a)(4)(i)–(ii). Third, also not at issue here, the claimant has the opportunity to show that the severity and duration of the impairment meets or equals the criteria contained in the Listing of Impairments. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iii). If the claimant’s impairments do not meet or equal those listed in the regulations, the Commissioner must determine her RFC before proceeding to the fourth step. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4) & (e). A claimant’s RFC is “an assessment, based upon all of the relevant evidence, of a claimant’s remaining ability to do work despite [her] impairments.” Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F. 3d 1436, 1440 (11th Cir. 1997); see also §§ 404.1520(e), 404.1545(a)(1) & (3)–(4). At the fourth step, the ALJ considers the claimant’s RFC and past relevant work to determine if she has an impairment that prevents her from performing her past relevant work. See id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv) & (e). As we said in Schink, the ALJ must consider the episodic nature of bipolar disorder. See 935 F. 3d at 1267.
See Winschel, 631 F. 3d at 1181. The Commissioner must address and resolve this issue on remand.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on this record, and in accordance with our precedent, we VACATE the judgment of the District Court and REMAND to the Commissioner for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. In particular, the Commissioner must account for the episodic nature of Ms. Samuels's bipolar disorder in determining her RFC and whether there are jobs in the national economy that Samuels can perform. [fn 1]: Examples of nonexertional mental impairments include “difficulty maintaining attention or concentration” and “difficulty understanding or remembering detailed instructions.” Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F. 3d 1072, 1078 (11th Cir. 1996) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 404.1569a(c)(ii) & (iii)).
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Raper v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 89 F.4th 1261 (11th Cir. 2024)…Appeals Council denies review, ‘we review the ALJ's decision as the USCA11 Case: 22-11103 Document: 38-1 Date Filed: 01/03/2024 Page: 10 of 34 10 Opinion of the Court 22-11103 Commissioner's final decision.” Samuels v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 959 F.3d 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274, 1278 (11th Cir. 2001)). “[W]e review de novo the legal principles upon which the Commissioner's decision is based." Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 2005) (per curiam)…
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Flowers v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin., 97 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2024)…e ALJ's decision, and Flowers appealed. II. Standard of Review When, as here, “an ALJ denies benefits and the Appeals Council denies review, we review the ALJ's decision as the Commissioner's final decision.” Samuels v. Acting Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 959 F.3d 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 2020) (quotation omitted). The factual findings of the Commissioner are "conclusive" if "substantial evidence” supports them. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). "We review de novo both the Commissioner's legal conclusions and the district court's…
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Escarra v. Bisignano (M.D. Fla. 2025)…reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Falge, 150 F.3d at 1322 (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)); see also Biestek v. -7- Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97, 103 (2019); Samuels v. Acting Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 959 F.3d 1042, 1045 (11th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). It is not for this Court to reweigh the evidence; rather, the entire record is reviewed to determine whether "the decision reached is reasonable and supported by substantial evidence." Cornelius v. Sullivan…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Winschel v. Comm'r OF Soc. Sec., 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011)
- Foote v. Chater, 67 F.3d 1553 (11th Cir. 1995)
- Hans Schink v. Comm'r OF Soc. Sec., 935 F.3d 1245 (11th Cir. 2019)
- Christi L. Moore v. Barnhart, 405 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2005)
- Doughty v. Apfel, 245 F.3d 1274 (11th Cir. 2001)
- Jackson Lewis v. Callahan, 125 F.3d 1436 (11th Cir. 1997)
- Ingram v. Comm'r OF Soc. Sec. Admin., 496 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2007)
- Wolfe v. Chater, 86 F.3d 1072 (11th Cir. 1996)