IRMA OVALLES, PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, RESPONDENT-APPELLEE.

Citator

Cited By

• Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2019)
• Ovalles v. United States, 905 F.3d 1231 (11th Cir. 2018)
  …rjacking offense constitutes a "crime of violence" within the meaning of § 924(c)(3) had to be answered using the categorical approach. See Ovalles v. United States , 861 F. 3d 1257, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2017), reh'g en banc granted, opinion vacated , 889 F. 3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2018). Second, though-and notwithstanding its application of the categorical approach-the panel held that Johnson did not invalidate § 924(c)(3)'s residual clause because, it said, the definition of "crime of violence" in § 924(c)(3)(B)…

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• Solomon v. United States, 911 F.3d 1356 (11th Cir. 2019)
  …9 of 13 was void for vagueness and thus unconstitutional. Id. at 1210-11, 1213-16, 1218- 23. After the Supreme Court issued its decision in Dimaya, this Court vacated the opinion in Ovalles I and granted rehearing en banc. Ovalles v. United States, 889 F. 3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2018). On rehearing en banc, this Court expressly considered the effect, if any, of Johnson and Dimaya on § 924(c)(3)(B)’s residual clause which, like § 16(b), defines a crime of violence as “an offense that is a felony” and that “by its…