SILLIMAN

v.

UNITED STATES; UNITED STATES V. SILLIMAN

Mr. Justice Harlan,

after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

The barges in question were delivered by claimants to the government under the original charter-parties, binding the latter to pay for their use at an agreed rate, during such period as they were retained in its service. The government was as much bound by the terms of the contracts as were the claimants, and no alteration thereof could-take place without the assent of both contracting parties.

The quartermaster’s department demanded that the claimants should execute new charter-parties, containing stipulations, essentially different as to compensation, from those embodied in the contracts under which the government obtained possession of the barges. It announced its purpose to retain possession, and withhold all compensation, unless and until the claimants executed the proposed new charter-parties.. In other words, the department informed claimants that it would not comply with the provisions of the original contracts unless the claimants would submit to material ’ alterations against their interests and to the advantage of the government. Claimants distinctly refused to give their assent to the proposed alterations, and asked that the barges be returned. But this reasonable request was not complied with by the agents of the government. Their conduct was in plain violation of the rights of the claimants. -

Had the claimants stood upon their contract rights it is perfectly clear that the government could have been compelled to pay the amount stipulated in the original contracts to be paid for the use of the barges. The claimants could have sued for each instalment of rent as it became due, or when the government returned the barges they could have sued, as they now sue, for the whole amount due under the original charter-parties. They had a full and complete remedy by suit against the government in the Court of Claims for the enforcement of their rights under those contracts. That court had then, as it has now, jurisdiction to hear and determine all claims founded upon contracts, express or implied, with the United States. Its final judginents, sustaining such claims, were then as now made-payable out of any general appropriation by law for the satisfaction of private claims against the government.

Instead, however, of seeking the aid of the law, claimants, with a full knowledge of their legal rights, executed new charter-parties, and, from time to time, received payments according to the rates prescribed therein — protesting, when the new agreements were signed, that they were executed against their wishes and under the pressure of financial necessity. They now seek the aid of the law to enforce their rights under the original charter-parties, upon the ground that those last signed were executed under such circumstances as amounted, in law, to duress. Duress of, or in, what? Not of their persons, for there is no pretence that a refusal, on their part, to accede to the illegal-demand of the quartermaster’s department would have endangered their liberty or their personal security. There was no threat of injury to their persons or to their property, to avoid which it became necessary to execute new charter-parties. Nor were those charter-parties executed for the purpose, or as a means of obtaining possession of tbeir property. They yielded to the threat or demand of the department solely because they required, or supposed they required, money for the conduct of their business or to meet their pecuniary obligations to others. Their duty, if they expected to rely upon the law for protection, was to disregard the threat of the department, and apply to the courts for redress against its repudiation of a valid ..contract.

We are aware of no authority in the text-books or in the adjudged cases to justify us in holding that the last charter-parties were executed under duress. There is present no element of duress, in the legal acceptation of that word. The hardships of particular cases should not induce the courts to disregard the long-settled rules of law.

The case is one which in some aspects appeals strongly to the sense of justice of the government, which cannot afford to reap the fruits of an arbitrary abrogation by its officers, of valid, binding contracts made in its name with the citizen. If, in view of the condition of the country during the recent war, the claimants were unwilling to embarrass or imperil the operations of the government by contests in the courts as to property which, possibly, was needed by the military department for supplying the necessities of our army, these facts only strengthen their claim to relief. But that relief must come from the legislative, and not from the judicial department.

We perceive no error in the judgment, and it is, as to all parties,

Affirmed.