RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
ALABAMA

U.S. | 1879-10-01
Mr. Justice Swayne dissented., Mr. Justice Strong took no part in deciding this case.
101 U.S. 832 Supreme Court of the United States (1879) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 25 L. Ed. 973 · 1879 U.S. LEXIS 1992 · SCDB 1879-156
Cited by 24 cases

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Synopsis

The Supreme Court held that Alabama's repeal of a statute permitting suits against the State on its contracts was constitutional because the original statute, like Tennessee's comparable law, did not provide an effective remedy for enforcing judgments against the State. Since Alabama's constitutional requirement that money be drawn from the treasury only pursuant to legislative appropriations meant the State could refuse to appropriate funds to pay a judgment, the repealed statute granted no enforceable right that the State impermissibly took away.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Chief Justice Waite

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. This case, like that of Railroad Company v. Tennessee (supra, p. 337), presents the question of the constitutionality of a law taking away the right to sue a State on its contracts. The Constitution and laws bearing on the question are much the same in Alabama as in Tennessee; but in Alabama it was provided “that if judgment should be rendered against the State, it was the duty of the comptroller, on the certificate of the clerk of the court, together with that of the judge who tried the cause, that the recovery was just, to issue his warrant for the amount, but no certificate could issue until six months after the recovery of the judgment.” Code 1867, sect.

2536. It was also the duty of the treasurer to pay all warrants drawn on him by the comptroller under the authority of law (Code, sect. 422) ; but the Constitution, in force then and now, provided in express terms that no money should be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law. Const., 1834 and 1870, art. 2, sect.

24.

The proceedings in this case were begun while these laws were in force; but before final hearing the laws were repealed, and thereupon, on. motion, of the State, the suit was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The Supreme Court affirmed this decision ; and the question is, therefore, directly presented by this writ of error, whether the repealing statute is valid-and constitutional as against this plaintiff in error, so far as it affects the present cause of action, which accrued while the right to sue existed. We are unable to see any substantial difference between this case and that of Railroad Company v. Tennessee, supra. Under both the Tennessee and Alabama statutes the courts are made little else -than auditing boards. If funds are not voluntarily provided to meet the judgment, the courts are not invested with power to supply them. In Alabama; a warrant for the payment may be secured, but the State may stop payment by withhold ing an appropriation. Perhaps the judgment creditor may take one step further towards the collection in Alabama than he can in Tennessee; but both States may refuse to pay, that is, may refuse to make the necessary appropriation, and the courts. ar,e powerless to compel them to do so. In neither State has there been granted such a remedy for the enforcement of the contracts of the sovereignty as may not, under the Constitution of the United States, be taken away. Judgment affirmed.

Mr. Justice Swayne dissented.

Mr. Justice Strong took no part in deciding this case. Note. — Ata subsequent day of the term a petition for rehearing was filed. Mb. Chiee Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court. We have examined with care the cases in Alabama referred to in the elaborate brief filed with this petition, and are unable to see that they decide more than that a judgment creditor is entitled to his warrant on the treasury for the amount of his recovery. No case has gone beyond this. The treasurer must pay the warrant when issued, if he has funds ir. his hands appropriated for that purpose; but if there has been no appropriation, he' cannot any more pay a warrant issued on a judgment than one lawfully issued without a judgment. Take this case as an illustration. The demand made by the railroad company is an extraordinary one, and Involves a large amount of money. Should a recovery be had, and the warrant paid without reference to the specific appropriations, which had been made by the legislature, of the funds in the treasury, it would almost of necessity •embarrass the government in its daily operations. The constitutional provision referred to in our former opinion was, among other things, intended to meet just such a state of facts. Knowing what appropriations are made, the legislature provide the funds to meet them. If, from any cause, an unusual claim arises, the parties must wait for the payment until the legislature can provide the money. The case is precisely like that of a judgment in the Court of Claims against the United'States. By the Constitution of the United States no “ money shall be drawn from the treasury but in cons'equence of appropriations made by law.” Art. 1, sect.' 9.

Hence the party who gets a judgment must wait until Congress makes an appropriation before his money can be had. Petition denied.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1890)
    …ditions upon which the suits might still be allowed to proceed. In exercising this power the State violated no contract with the parties.” The same doctrine was held in Railroad Company v. Tennessee, 101 U. S. 337, 339 ; Railroad Company v. Alabama, 101 U. S. 832; and In re Ayers, 123 U. S. 443, 505. But besides the presumption that no anomalous and unheard-of proceedings or suits were intended to be raised up by the Constitution — anomalous and unheard of when the Constitution was adopted — an additional r…
  • Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (U.S. 1934)
    …on. DeGroot v. United States, [*582] 5 Wall. 419, 432. Compare Darrington v. State Bank, 13 How. 12, 17; Beers v. Arkansas, 20 How. 527-529; Gordon v. United States, 7 Wall. 188, 195; Railroad Co. v. Tennessee, 101 U.S. 337; Railroad Co. v. Alabama, 101 U.S. 832; In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 505; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 17; Baltzer v. North Carolina, 161 U.S. 240; Baltzer & Taaks v. North Carolina, 161 U.S. 246.12 The sovereign’s immunity from suit exists whatever the character of the proceeding or the…
  • Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (U.S. 1909)

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