LANAHAN
v.
SEARS

U.S. | 1880-10-01
102 U.S. 318 Supreme Court of the United States (1880) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 26 L. Ed. 180 · 1880 U.S. LEXIS 2041 · SCDB 1880-042
Cited by 3 cases

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Synopsis

A Texas homestead was protected from forced sale under the state constitution except for purchase-money, taxes, and labor costs, and the Supreme Court held that a mortgage holder could not circumvent this protection by bringing an ejectment action in federal court instead of foreclosure in state court, as forced dispossession through ejectment is equally prohibited as forced sale. The Court affirmed that the state constitution's homestead exemption extended to all forms of compulsory disposition of the property, whether denominated as sale, ejectment, or otherwise.


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Opinion of the Court
Mb. Justice Field

Mb. Justice Field delivered the opinion of the court.-

The premises described in the complaint are in - the city of Waco, in the State of Texas. They have been the homestead of - the' complainants from the time of their purchase, in May, 1870. The conveyance to Robertson in 1873'was accompanied by a defeasance from him, stating that the deed was executed as security for certain promissory notes of the husband. The two documents — the deed, which was absolute .in form, and the defeasance — are, therefore, to be taken together as if forming one instrument. They together constitute a mortgage, and as such would be treated in the courts of Texas.

By the Constitution of that State of 1868, which was in force when the notes were given and the mortgage executed, the homestead of a family was not subject to forced sale for debts, except for the purchase-money, or for taxes, and for labor and materials expended thereon. The premises in question, therefore, could not be sold under any decree in a suit for the foreclosure of the mortgage. The prohibition of the Constitution extended to any species of compulsory disposition of the homestead, whether denominated a sale or otherwise. A similar prohibition in the Constitution of 1845 was so construed by the Supreme Court of the State in Sampson & Keene v. Williamson, contained in the'6th of Texas Reports.' In that case Chief Justice Hemphill said that “ the Constitution obviously intended that the homestead should be exempted from the operation of any species of execution, Or from any forced disposition of the property, whether partial-or total, which would disturb' the family in the quiet and uninterrupted possession of their home, with the property thereto attached. • The-beneficence of the provision has a much wider range than to protect the family from a sale which-would utterly extinguish all right in the property. . It shields them alsb from any extents or deliveries of the property, or from any forcible appropriation of its rents, issues, and profits; It protects the domestic sanctuary from every species of intrusion which, under color of law, would subject the property, by-any disposition whatever, to the payment of debts.”

The appellant is the owner of the mortgage in this case, and aware — so states his counsel — that he could not enforce it. against the homestead in the State courts, as thex-e mortgages can only be enforced by a decree of sale, commenced an action of ejectment for the premises in the Circuit Court of the United States, contending that the mortgage passed the legal title as against the mortgagors, and that, as its owner, he had a right to recover the possession of the premises for default in the payment of the notes secured. He sought, in other words, to get around the State Constitution by the form of his procedure .in the Feddral court. We do not think that its wise and beneficent purpose of securing a home to the family against the vicissitudes of fortune can be thus easily evaded. A forced. dispossession in ejectment is as much within the prohibition as a forced sale under judicial process. We think, therefore, that the decree in the suit, enjoining the action of ejectment, was properly rendered upon the undisputed facts stated in the complaint; and it is accordingly

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992)
    …d to encompass any judicially compelled disposition of the homestead, whether denominated a “sale” or not. Cf. 40 Am.Jur.2d Homestead § 92 (1968) (any compulsory disposition of the homestead is contrary to the homestead exemption); Lanahan v. Sears, 102 U.S. 318, 322, 26 L.Ed. 180, 181 (1880) (“A forced dispossession [of a homestead] in ejectment is as much within the prohibition [of forced sale of a homestead] as a forced sale under judicial process.”). Although an order of forfeiture is less a sale to the…

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