MORRISON
v.
STALNAKER
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In a dispute over pre-emption rights to public land in Colorado, the Supreme Court held that Stalnaker was entitled to perfect his claim through proof and payment within eighteen months after filing his declaratory statement, as required by the Act of July 14, 1870, rather than within one year as provided by a different statute applicable only to lands subject to private entry at the time of settlement. The Court affirmed the lower court's decision that Stalnaker had timely complied with the applicable statutory requirements.
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Mr. Justice Miller,
after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.
The errors assigned here may be divided into two, substantially.
The first is that the court erred in refusing to hold that Stalnaker, after having in due time filed his declaratory statement, did not, In making his application to-the register and receiver of the. land-office to enter the land, offer to prove his citizenship, and the' other facts necessary to establish his right of: pre-emption. To this the only answer necessary is that the officers declined.to receive from him any proofs or money, because they decided that he came too late, and Was hot, for that reason, entitled to enter the land, although his proofs in other respects might be perfect.
The.second assignment is that the court erred in deciding that he had the right to perfect his claim by proofs twelve months after the date of his settlement.
The land was not subject to private entry when Stalnaker settled upon it and filed his declaratory statement.
The argument of counsel for plaintiff in error is that the case' does not come within sect. 2267 of the Revised Statutes, because the land was surveyed and had once been' proclaimed for sale. Sects. 2265 and 2266 prescribe rules of pre-emption for lands surveyed but not proclaimed, and for unsurveyed lands; and sect. 2267 declares that all claimants of pre-emption rights under , these two sections shall", when no shorter period is prescribed, make their proofs, within thirty months, after the date prescribed for filing the declaratory statement. As this land had been surveyed and at one time proclaimed, the argument .is that the time for making proof is not governed by sect. 2267, but by sect. 2264, which requires the person asserting a pre-emption right to land subject at the time to private entry, to make the proof Avithin one year after the date of his settlement. But' this land, at the date of 'Stalnaker’s settlement, Ayas not subject to private entry.
We find, however, that, at that time sect. 2 of . the act of •July 14, 1870, c. 272 (16 Stat. 279), Avas in force'. The first section of that act extends certain laws for the sale and survey of public lands to the Territory of Colorado. The second section, however, is more general, and, among other things relating to settlers on lands reserved for railroad purposes, enacts that “ all claimants of pre-emption rights shall hereafter, when no shorter period of time is now prescribed by law, make the proper proof and payment-for the lands claimed within -eighteen months after the date prescribed for filing their declaratory notices shall have expired.”
All Stalnaker’s proceedings took place while this law was in force. It gave him eighteen months from the time limited for his declaratory statement, namely, from the eighteenth day of April, 1871, to make payment and. proof. He offered his money and his proof several months within the time which this statute allowed.
The Supreme Court of Nebraska, therefore, did not err in-refusing to hold that his right expired within one year from the date of his settlement.
Judgment affirmed.
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