ST. LOUIS

v.

KNAPP COMPANY

Mr. Justice Harlan,

after stating the facts, delivered the opinion of the court.

Upon the hearing of the demurrer two questions were considered by the court: First, whether the bill, upon its face, shows that the construction of the run-way will intrude upon the city’s rights and cause special damage; second, whether, upon its allegations and in advance of the construction of the work, á decree to prevent its completion should be rendered in favor of the city.

The court, in disposing of the demurrer, waived a final decision of the first question, expressing, however, some doubt whether the case was within the general rule that a suit in equity to enjoin or abate a public nuisance .must be brought by one who has sustained, or is in, danger of sustaining, individual special damages, apart from those suffered by the community at large.

Touching the second question, the court below remarked, it was Very clear that a public navigable stream must remain free and unobstructed;" that no private individual has a right to place permanent structures within the navigable channel; and that if the proposed run-way, when completed, proved to be a material obstruction to the free navigation of the river, or a special injury to the rights of others, it might be condemned and removed as a nuisance. It was, however, of opinion that the case presented was one of á threatened nuisance only, and that the reasons assigned for interference by injunction, in advance of the construction of the run-way, were not sufficient.

We are of opinion that the demurrer should have been overruled, and the defendant required to answer. The bill makes a prima facie case, not only-'of the right of the city to bring the suit, but'for granting the relief asked. It distinctly avers' what the defendant proposes to do, and that averment is accompanied by the general charge or statement that the driving of the piles in the bed of the river, and. the construction of the run-way, will not only cause a diversion of: the river from its natural course, but will throw it east of its natural location, from along the river-bank north and south of the proposed runway and piling, creating in front of the city?s-improved wharf a deposit of mud and sediment, and rendering it impossible for boats and vessels engaged in the navigation of the Mississippi River to approach or land at the improved wharf north and south of defendant’s premises. This is not, as ruled by the Circuit Court, merely the expression of an opinion or apprehension upon the part of the city, but a sufficiently certain, though general, statement of the^ essential ultimate facts upon which the complainant rests its claim for relief. It was not necessary, in such a case, to aver all the minute circumstances which may be proven in support of the general statement or charge in the bill. While the allegations might have been more extended, without departing from correct rules of pleading, they distinctly apprise the defence of the precise case it is required to meet. There are some cases in which the same decisive and categorical certainty is required in a bill in equity as in a declaration at common law. Cooper, Eq. Pl. 5. But, in most cases, general certainty is sufficient in pleadings in equity. Story, Eq. Pl., sects. 252, 253. Let the case go back for preparation and hearing upon the merits. If if should be again brought here, we may find it necessary to discuss the numerous authorities cited by counsel. In its present condition, we do not deem it wise to shy more than we have in this opinion.

The decree will be reversed, with directions to overrule the demurrer, and for further proceedings according to law; and it is

So ordered.

Mr. Justicb Gray did not sit in this case.