POTT
v.
ARTHUR

U.S. | 1881-10-01
104 U.S. 735 Supreme Court of the United States (1881) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 26 L. Ed. 909 · SCDB 1881-111 · 1881 U.S. LEXIS 2070
Cited by 10 cases

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Synopsis

In 1874, importers James Pott, Edwin Young, and James B. Young challenged a tariff assessment by New York customs collector Arthur, who had levied a twenty-five percent duty on imported books when they claimed only a 22.5 percent duty should apply under a statutory reduction provision. The Supreme Court affirmed that books were expressly excepted from the tariff reduction for "paper and manufactures of paper," holding that legislative intent to except books from the duty reduction was unmistakable based on the language's origin in prior tariff legislation and the principle that statutory language should be construed to effectuate Congress's intent rather than to achieve grammatical purity.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Bradley

Mr. Justice Bradley delivered the opinion of the court.

This was an action brought by James Pott, Edwin Young, and James B. Young, against Arthur, the collector of customs of New York, to recover back duties paid on books imported in August,-1874. A duty of twenty-five per-cent ad! valorem was exacted ; whilst the plaintiffs claim that they should have been required to pay only ninety per cent of that amount, or twenty-two and a half per cent ad valorem.

As the law stood at the time, in sect. 2504, schedule M, of the Revised Statutes, a duty of twenty-five per cent ad valorem. was imposed óu “books, pamphlets, blank books, &e.” But by sect. 2503 it was provided that, on the goods enumerated therein," only ninety per cent of the duties imposed by the said schedules should be levie'd and collected; and amongst the articles enumerated for the reduction were those contained in the following specification: “ All paper and manufactures of paper, excepting unsized printing paper, books and other printed matter, and excepting sized or glazed paper suitable only for printing paper.”-

Of course the articles expressly 'excepted in this clause are not entitled to the proposed reduction. The question is whether, by the words used, books are excepted from the general class of articles designated as paper and manufactures of paper, intended to be benefited, or whether they are enumerated as independent ai’ticles entitled to the reduction. The plaintiffs contend that they are not embraced in the exception because they do not properly belong to the class of articles designated as “ paper and manufactures of paper ; ” and cannot, therefore, be excepted therefrom. A thing that is excepted, they argue, must necessarily belong to the class of things from which it is excepted. This, of course, is true, as a general proposition, but the question is whether it applies to the clause of the act in question. No man of literary culture, it is true, would call a book paper or a manufacture of paper, any more than he would designate a masterpiece of Raphael as canvas or a manufacture of canvas. By a license of speech,.it is true, he might say. that a' particular book was mere waste paper, or rubbish, or that a particular picture was nothing but a piece of spoiled canvas ; but speaking seriously, and in accordance with good usage, he would not make such an application of terms. All this, however, has little .to do. in construing the act in question. If Congress had reduced the duty on all manufactures of wood and leather except cutlery, we should be obliged to regard cutlery as excepted in the particular case, from the manufactures of wood and leather intended to be benefited by the law. Our duty is to get at the intent of the law : we are not responsible for its style. And in the present case the intent seems to be unmistakable. The language under consideration first appeared in the act of June 6, 1872, c. 315, and was not accompanied by the concluding exception, but read as' follows : “ On all paper and manufactures of paper, excepting unsized printing paper, books, and other printed matter.” The additional exception was added in the revision. It can hardly be doubted that, as' the words were used in that act, “ books and other printed matter” were included in the exception. We have no doubt that such is the intent and meaning of the same words in the Revised Statutes. In transferring the language, it is to be presumed that it was intended to transfer the sense.

Judgment affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (U.S. 1983)
    …solidate and collect all federal statutes and laws in the Revised Statutes, 18 Stat. 113, it expressed no intention to change the meaning of the laws, although minor changes in language were made to accommodate the consolidation. Cf. Pott v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 735, 736 (1881). Although the provisions dealing with interference with federal judicial proceedings and state judicial proceedings now appear together in § 1985(2), they were separated by other material in the original version of § 2. See Appendix to…
  • Versie Kimble v. D. J. McDUFFY, Inc., 648 F.2d 340 (5th Cir. 1981)
    …change the meaning of the laws even though it made minor changes in language to accommodate the consolidation. “In transferring the language [to the Revised Statutes], it is to be presumed that it was intended to transfer the sense.” Pott v. Arthur, 104 U.S. 735, 736, 26 L.Ed. 909 (1881). The Revised Statutes were republished, with minor corrections and some additions, in 1878. At that time, Congress made it clear that discrepancies between the original acts and the Revised Statutes were to be resolved by c…
  • …to give existing licensees just that right. This portion of the Radio Act was reenacted in the form of Section 402(b) of the 1934 Act and we can presume that the language was used in the latter Act in the same sense as in the former. Pott v. Arthur, 104 U.S. 735, 736, 26 L.Ed. 909. 48 Stat. 1093, 47 U.S.C.A. § 402(b) (2). See Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App.D.C. 240, 242, 66 F. 2d 220, 222. Cf. Telegraph Herald Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 62 App.D.C. 240, 66 F. 2d 220. It says: “Unqu…

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