BADGER

v.

RANLETT

Mr. Justice Blatcheord,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The plaintiff in error contends that the court charged the jury, in substance, that if the goods were, and were known as, cotton-ties, they could not be at the same time band iron ; and that this was error. The argument is, that the term “ band iron” may include an article known as a “cotton-tie;” that to say that one sort of band iron is known by the name of “ cotton-tie ” is not to say that necessarily it is no longer band iron; that all that was done to the band iron was to cut it into lengths of eleven feet and blacken it; and that this is not to make a manufacture of iron not otherwise provided for, within the statute.

The charge complained of must be considered in connection with all that occurred at the trial, as shown by the record. The “ note of evidence and statement of facts ” says that the only issue disputed by the defence, and the only question to be decided, was, whether the articles “described in the'petition” are dutiable as hoop, band, or scroll iron,” or as “manufactures of iron not otherwise provided for.” The description in the petition says that the articles are iron cotton-ties, in strips, each “ cut to the required length of eleven feet,” with a buckle to each strip.

The record shows that there was evidence given on the trial by witnesses for both parties, but on what subject does not appear, except that some evidence was given as to “ mercantile usage.” Evidence may have been given as to whether the strips were cut in lengths from merchantable band iron, or cut in lengths in the process of original manufacture . The agreed issue was as to whether the articles, so far the strips were concerned, were “ band iron,” or “ manufactures of iron not otherwise provided for.” The court placed the issue before the jury as being whether the articles, so far as the strips were concerned, were “band iron” or “cotton-ties.” Of course, the buckles were not band iron. The charge was to the effect that if the articles were known in commerce as “ cotton-ties,” and were not known in commerce as “ band iron,” they were subject to a duty of thirty-five per cent ad valorem, as “ manufactures of iron not otherwise provided for,” and not to duty as “ band iron.”

The petition avers that the cotton-ties, composed of the strips and buckles, “ constitute a manufacture of iron for a special and important purpose.” It is to be assumed that this fact was proved under the general' issue pleaded. The verdiet distinctly finds that the articles were “ cotton-ties,” which is to be taken as a finding that the articles were not “ band iron.” Not being “ band iron,” they could not, under the issues tried, have been other than “ manufactures of iron not otherwise provided for.” The substance of the whole charge was, that if the jury found that the articles were “ band iron,” the correct duty had been imposed and the plaintiffs could not recover. The strips not being band iron, and the buckles, certainly, not being band iron, the proper duty was thirty-five per cent ad valorem.

The plaintiff in error further contends that the court erred in charging that if the articles were not “ band iron ” they were subject to a duty of thirty-five per cent ad valorem. The contention is, that if what appears to have been done in respect of the strips, to produce the article, amounted to a manufacture, it brought the'-article within the duty of one cent and one-fourth per pound, as falling under the head of “ all other descriptions of rolled or hammered iron, not otherwise provided for.” But, by the “ note of evidence and statement of facts ” the defendant admitted that the only question which he raised was whether the articles were “ band iron,” and so dutiable at one'cent and one-half per pound, or whether they were dutiable at thirty-five per cent ad valorem, as “ manufactures of iron not otherwise provided for.” This is shown by the record to have been the only question tried. The plaintiff in error cannot here raise the question as to a duty of one cent and one-fourth per pound, because it does not appear that he raised it on the trial. The bill of exceptions distinctly states that his only contention was that the articles were dutiable as “ band or hoop iron.”

Judgment affirmed.