MORRILL
v.
JONES
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A Treasury Department regulation that restricted duty-free importation of breeding animals to only "superior stock" exceeded the Secretary of the Treasury's authority, as the statute Congress enacted imposed no such limitation and allowed duty-free entry for all animals specially imported for breeding purposes. The Supreme Court held that the Secretary could only regulate the mode of implementing revenue laws, not alter their substantive scope through regulations.
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Mr. Chief Justice Waite,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The Secretary of the Treasury cannot by his regulations alter or amend a revenue law. All he can do is to regulate the mode of proceeding to carry into effect what Congress has enacted. In the present case we are entirely satisfied the regulation acted upon by the collector was in excess of the power of the Secretary. The statute clearly includes animals, of all classes. The regulation seeks to confine its operation to animals of “ superior stock.” This is manifestly an attempt to put into the body of the statute a limitation which Congress did not think it necessary to prescribe. Congress was willing to admit duty free all animals specially imported for breeding . purposes; the Secretary thought this privilege should be confined to such animals as were adapted to the improvement of breeds already in the United States. In our opinion, the object of the Secretary could only be accomplished by an amendment of the law. That is not the office of a treasury regulation.
It has-been argued here, that as it appears from the testimony, which has been incorporated into the bill of exceptions, that the importation in this case was from Prince Edward Island, it was not from “ beyond the seas,” and therefore that the. judgment below was right. It is a sufficient answer to this objection that no such point was made below. The court' was not asked to rule on any such question. Oúr examination is confined to such exceptions as were taken to the rulings actually made on the trial and incorporated in some form into the record, “an authenticated transcript” of which is returned with our writ of error. Judgment affirmed.
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