GLENS FALLS INSURANCE COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
EVELYN EDGERLY ET AL., APPELLEES

Fla. 1st DCA | 1964-06-11
No. F-36
WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and RAWLS, J., concur., McNATT, Associate Judge, specially concurs.
165 So. 2d 240 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1964)

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Synopsis

The appellate court affirmed a lower court's decision, holding that the insured's daughter was not a resident of the insured's household under the terms of an insurance policy. The court relied on a prior Supreme Court decision interpreting "residence" to mean legal residence or domicile.


Holding

No, the insured's daughter was not a resident of the insured's household for the purposes of the insurance policy.


Key Quotes

“In view of the conflicting evidence in the record, and the conflicting inferences which may be reasonably drawn therefrom, we are not persuaded that the chancellor erred as a matter of law in holding that the insured's daughter was not a resident of the insured's household at the critical period of time involved herein within the meaning and intent of the insurance policy which forms the basis of this action.”

This quote establishes the court's finding that the lower court did not err in its determination of residency based on the evidence.

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Facts & Procedural History

The case involves an insurance policy dispute concerning whether the insured's daughter was a resident of the insured's household at a critical time. …

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This cause was orally argued before the Court and the briefs and record on appeal have been read and given full consideration. In view of the conflicting evidence in the record, and the conflicting inferences which may be reasonably drawn therefrom, we are not persuaded that the chancellor erred as a matter of law in holding that the insured’s daughter was not a resident of the insured’s household at the critical period of time involved herein within the meaning and intent of the insurance policy which forms the basis of this action. Our opinion in this regard is largely controlled by the recent decision of the Supreme Court in the Florence M. Miclder guardianship case,1 which affirmed the decision rendered by this Court in the same case.2 In each of these decisions it was held that F.S. Section 744.11, F.S.A., which fixes the venue for the institution of guardianship proceedings and which provides that venue shall be in the county where “the incompetent resides,” the quoted language shall be construed to mean the legal residence or domicile of the incompetent, and not the place where the incompetent may be living or residing.

Appellant having failed to demonstrate reversible error, the decree hereby appealed is affirmed.

WIGGINTON, Acting C. J., and RAWLS, J., concur.

McNATT, Associate Judge, specially concurs.

McNATT, Associate Judge

(specially concurring).

On the prior appeal in this case, the “summary decree” was reversed because the Court held that there was an issue of fact (on equally reasonable and conflicting inferences to be drawn from the evidence) as to whether Mrs. Cone was “a resident of the same household” with Mrs. Edgerly within the meaning of the insurance policy involved. Glens Falls Insurance Company v. Edgerly (Fla.App.) 155 So.2d 649. On remand, the Chancellor found as a fact that Mrs. Cone was not “a resident of the same household.” As the prior decision settled the proposition that there was an issue of fact for the Chancellor, his findings on the “conflicting evidence” and “conflicting inferences” should not be disturbed on a second appeal. 2 Fla.Jur. 795-802.

For this reason, I concur in the affirmance of the decree.

Concurrence
McNATT, Associate Judge

McNATT, Associate Judge

(specially concurring).

On the prior appeal in this case, the “summary decree” was reversed because the Court held that there was an issue of fact (on equally reasonable and conflicting inferences to be drawn from the evidence) as to whether Mrs. Cone was “a resident of the same household” with Mrs. Edgerly within the meaning of the insurance policy involved. Glens Falls Insurance Company v. Edgerly (Fla.App.) 155 So. 2d 649. On remand, the Chancellor found as a fact that Mrs. Cone was not “a resident of the same household.” As the prior decision settled the proposition that there was an issue of fact for the Chancellor, his findings on the “conflicting evidence” and “conflicting inferences” should not be disturbed on a second appeal. 2 Fla.Jur. 795-802.

For this reason, I concur in the affirmance of the decree.


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