DARLENE STEIL, A MINOR, BY HER FATHER AND NEXT FRIEND, ARTHUR STEIL, AND ARTHUR STEIL, INDIVIDUALLY, APPELLANTS,

v.

CARLOS O. STARLING, APPELLEE

Citator

Cited By

• McNEELY v. State, 186 So. 2d 520 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966)
  …ing some evidence was taken besides that secured by the search, [in the case at bar an admission] and this pointed very strongly [*524] to the violation of the terms of the suspended sentence.” (Emphasis supplied) Phillips v. State, 1964, Fla.App., 165 So. 2d 246, is cited, holding a sentence issued in revoking a probation is invalid when there is no hearing. There is great difference between no hearing and an alleged no hearing because the inquiry is informal. While the former is in fact not a hearing at al…
• Hooks v. State, 207 So. 2d 459 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968)
  …angle between the Court and counsel, winding up with both the probationer and his lawyer being sentenced to jail by the Judge. The statutory requirement of a “full hearing” is a condition precedent to a revocation. Phillips v. State, Fla.App. 1964, 165 So. 2d 246; Brill v. State, 1947, 159 Fla. 682, 32 So. 2d 607; McNeely v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 186 So. 2d 520. And that, of course, presupposes a hearing upon the grounds of violation. Due process of law demands such a hearing, without which the revocation or…
• van Cleaf v. State, 328 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
  …at a probationer’s lack of counsel at a proceeding at which probation is revoked and sentence is imposed voids the sentence but not the order of revocation itself. See Bryant v. State, Fla.App.1967, 194 So. 2d 21-22; Phillips v. State, FIa.App.1964, 165 So. 2d 246, 247. The United States Supreme Court, however, has since ruled that such lack of counsel renders the entire proceeding subject to collateral attack, ‘whether it be labeled a revocation of probation or a deferred sentencing.’ Mempa v. Rhay, 1967, 38…