EX PARTE NORTON
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In a dispute over mortgage foreclosure proceeds, the Supreme Court held that a decree terminating all litigation between the parties and leaving only execution of the judgment to be completed constitutes a final, appealable decree. The Court ruled that Norton's appeal was properly taken because the lower court's decree settled every question at issue and required only that the foreclosure sale proceed and any surplus proceeds be paid to Norton after satisfying the mortgage debt owed to Frellsen.
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Mr. Chief Justice Wáite delivered the opinion of the court.
We have had occasion at the present term, in Bostwick v. Brinckerhoff, 106 U. S. 3; Grant v. Phœnix Mutual Life Ins. Co., 106 U. S. 429; St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Co. v. Southern Express Co., ante, 24, to state the rule applicable to the determination of the question here involved, and we there say:
“ A decree is final for the purpose of an appeal .... when it terminates the litigation between the parties, and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.”
Under this rule, we think, this appeal was well taken. The decree settled every question in dispute between the parties, and left nothing to be done but to complete the sale under the proceedings in the State court for foreclosure, and hand over to Norton any surplus of the proceeds there might be after satisfying the debt due Frellsen as stated in the process under which the sale ‘ was made. The case stands precisely as it would if Erellsen were proceeding in the district court for the foreclosure of his mortgage, and a decree had been entered establishing his rights, ascertaining the amount due to him, and ordering a sale of the property and the payment to Norton of the surplus after discharging the mortgage debt. Here the bill was filed by Norton to set aside the proceedings for foreclosure and obtain a conveyance of the mortgaged property. The court refused to set aside the proceedings or to order a conveyance, but did-order the sale to go on, and that the proceeds, after the mortgage was satisfied, be paid to Norton. It adjudged the case on the merits in favor of Frellsen as against Norton, and in favor of Norton as against Hood. The bill was not dismissed in form because it asked relief both as against Frellsen and Hood, and relief was granted as against Hood. It was in legal effect dismissed as to Frellsen when the decree was entered in his favor on' all the questions in which he was interested.
The writ of mandamus ashed-for is granted, hut without cojsts.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Keystone Manganese & Iron Co. v. Martin, 132 U.S. 91 (U.S. 1889)…f an appeal, in Ray v. Law, 3 Cranch, 179 ; Whiting v. Bank of the United States, 13 Pet. 6; Forgay v. Conrad, 6 How. 201; Bronson v. Railroad Co., 2 Black, 528; St. Louis Iron Mt. &c. Railroad v. Southern Express Co., 108 U. S. 24; Ex parte Norton, 108 U. S. 237; Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker, 109 U. S. 180. In The Palmyra, a prize case, the captors had filed a libel in [*94] the District Court, and that court had dismissed it, without costs and damages against the captors. The Circuit Court affirmed the dec…
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Bd. OF Pub. Instruction OF Duval Cnty. v. Daly N. Braxton and Sharon Braxton, 326 F.2d 616 (5th Cir. 1964)…h a final decision as is within the terms of 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291. A decision is final for the purpose of an appeal when it terminates the litigation and leaves nothing to be done but to enforce what has been determined. Ex parte Norton, 108 U.S. 237, 2 S.Ct. 490, 27 L.Ed. 709; Winthrop Iron Co. v. Meeker, 109 U.S. 180, 3 S.Ct. Ill, 27 L.Ed. 898; Milton v. United States, 5th Cir. 1941, 120 F. 2d 794; Smith v. Kincade, 5th Cir. 1956, 232 F. 2d 306. This is true even though the merits of the cause may have bee…
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Dainese v. Kendall, 119 U.S. 53 (U.S. 1886)…do but to execute the decree.it has already entered. Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U. S. 3; Grant v. Phœnix Ins. Co., 106 [*55] U. S. 429, 431; St. Louis & Iron Mountain & Southern Railroad v. Southern Express Co., 108 U. S. 24, 28 ; Ex parte Morton, 108 U. S. 237, 242; Mower v. Fleteher, 114 U. S. 127. The motion to dismiss is gra/nted.…
Authorities Cited
- Bostwick v. Brinkerhoff, 106 U.S. 3 (U.S. 1882)
- Grant v. Phœnix Ins. Co., 106 U.S. 429 (U.S. 1882)
- Buffington v. Harvey, 95 U.S. 99 (U.S. 1877)
- Ex parte Bradstreet, 7 Pet. 634 (U.S. 1833)
- Frederick J. and Samuel W. Barnard and Henry Q. Hawley v. Gibson, 7 How. 650 (U.S. 1849)
- Ex parte Hoard, 105 U.S. 578 (U.S. 1881)
- Ex parte Schwab, 98 U.S. 240 (U.S. 1878)
- Verden v. Coleman, 18 How. 86 (U.S. 1855)