SCHREIBER & OTHERS
v.
SHARPLESS

U.S. | 1884-01-07
110 U.S. 76 Supreme Court of the United States (1884) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 28 L. Ed. 65 · 3 S. Ct. 423 · SCDB 1883-107 · 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1660
Cited by 94 cases

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Synopsis

Schreiber sued Charles L. Sharpless for copyright infringement penalties under federal statute, but Sharpless died before judgment; the District Court quashed a writ of scire facias seeking to continue the action against Sharpless's executors. The Supreme Court affirmed that actions for penalties and forfeitures under federal law do not survive the death of the defendant and therefore cannot be prosecuted against the defendant's personal representatives, regardless of state law provisions to the contrary.

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Opinion of the Court
Me. Chief Justice Waite

Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.

The petitioners sued Charles L. Sharpless in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania to recover certain penalties and forfeitures claimed under the provisions of sec. 4965 of the Revised Statutes, for the infringement of a copyright.' Sharpless' died after issue joined, but before judgment. After his death had been suggested by his attorney in the cause, the petitioners sued out a scire facias against Anna R. Sharpless, executrix, and Charles W. Sharpless, executor of his will, requiring them to appear and become parties to the action, or show cause why they should not be made parties, by order of the court. Before this ivrit Avas served, the attorney for Sharpless during his life, moved that the writ be quashed. After argument the motion' was granted, on the ground that the cause of action terminated with the death of the defendant, and did not survive as against his legal representatives.

The petitioners now ask for a rule on the District Court to shoAV cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue requiring it to reinstate the writ of scire facias and proceed Avith the case.

Without considering whether a writ of mandamus may issue, directly from this court to a District Court to enforce procedure in a case Avhere the final judgment of the District Court is subject to revieAv in the Circuit Court, Ave deny the rule asked for, because we are entirely satisfied with the action of the district, judge. He was asked to send out a Avrit of scire facias to bring in and make parties to a qui tarn action the personal representatives of a deceased defendant, who .had been sued to recover the penalties and forfeitures Avhich it Avas alleged he had subjected himself to, under an act of Congress, by the infringement of a copyright. The suit was not for the damages the plaintiffs had sustained by the infringement, but for penalties and forfeitures recoverable under the act of Congress for a violation of the copyright law. The personal representatives of a deceased party to a suit cannot prosecute or defend the suit after his death, unless the cause of action, on account of which the suit was brought, is one that survives by law. Rev. Stat. § 955. At common law actions on penal statutes do not survive (Com. Dig. tit. Administration, B. 15), and there is no act of Congress which establishes any other rule in respect to actions on the penal statutes of the United States. The right to proceed against the representatives of a deceased person depends not on forms and modes of proceeding in a suit, but on the nature of the cause of action for which the suit is brought. If the cause of action survives, the practice, pleadings, and forms and modes of proceeding in the courts of the State may be resorted to in the courts of the United States for the purpose of keeping the suit alive and bringing in the proper parties. Rev. Stat. §.

914. But if the cause of action dies with the person, the suit abates and cannot be revived. Whether an action survives depends on the substance of the cause of action, not on the forms of proceeding to enforce it. As the nature of penalties, and forfeitures imposed by acts of Congress cannot be changed by State laws, it follows that State statutes allowing suits on State penal statutes to be prosecuted after the death of the offender, can have no effect on suits in the courts of the United States for the recovery of penalties imposed by an act of Congress.

The rule is denied and petition dismissed.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (30 total)

  • Mich. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (U.S. 1913)
    …e the death of the injured employé, it does not pass to his representative, notwithstanding state legislation. The question of survival is not one of procedure, “but one which depends on the substance of the cause of action.” Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U. S. 76, 80; Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co., 151 U. S. 673. Nothing is better settled than that at common law the right of action for an injury to the person is extinguished by the death of the party injured. The rule ‘ ‘ Actio personalis moritur cum…
  • Martin's Administrator v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 151 U.S. 673 (U.S. 1894)
    …14.' But if the cause of'action dies with ’the pe'rSbii/'the suit abates and cannot be revived. Whether-'anaction survives depends on the substance of the cause of the action,' not oh the forms of proceeding' to enforce it.” ‘Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U. S. 76, 80. In'that case, the right in question being of qh action for a penalty under a statute of the United States, the question whether it survived was governed by the laws'of the United States. But in the case-at’bar, the question'whether the administ…
    1 / 2
  • Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608 (U.S. 1902)
    …absence of some special legislation the question in each case must' be settled by the common law or the law of the State in which the cause of action arose. United States v. Daniel, 6 How. 11; Henshaw v. Miller, 17 How. 212; Schreiber v. Sharpless, 110 U. S. 76; Martin v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, 151 U. S. 673 ; Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. Joy, 173 U. S. 226, 229. It matters not whether we consider the common law or the statute law of Virginia as controlling. By either the cause of action stated…
    1 / 2

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