RICE
v.
SIOUX CITY & ST. PAUL RAILROAD COMPANY

U.S. | 1884-03-03
110 U.S. 695 Supreme Court of the United States (1884) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 28 L. Ed. 289 · 4 S. Ct. 177 · 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1730 · SCDB 1883-178
Cited by 13 cases

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Synopsis

The Supreme Court resolved a dispute over ownership of Minnesota swamp and railroad lands, deciding that a railroad company's grant under an 1857 act took precedence over a subsequent swamp-land grant certificate held by Rice. The Court held that the swamp-land act of 1850 was a present grant only to states then existing and did not automatically extend to territories or states admitted later; Minnesota could claim swamp lands only through an explicit 1860 congressional act extending those benefits, which occurred after the railroad grant had already fixed its claims to the same lands. By affirming the circuit court's judgment for the railroad company, the Court established that when a territorial land grant predates a subsequent swamp-land extension to a newly admitted state, the earlier grant prevails if the lands were not reserved at the time of the original grant.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Chief Justice'Waite

Mr. Chief Justice'Waite delivered the opinion of the court.

This case briefly stated js as follows:

On the 28th of September, 1850, what is now known as the swamp-land act, c. 8, 9-Stat. 519, was passed by Congress. By sections 1, 2, and 3 swamp lands were defined and a special grant made to the State of Arkansas. Section 4 is in these words:
“ That the provisions of this act be extended to, and their benefits conferred upon, each of the other States of the Union, in which such swamp and overflowed lands, known or designated as aforesaid, may-be situated.”

Minnesota was then a Territory, and on the 3d of March, 185 Y, an act of Congress, c. 99,11 Stat. 195, was passed, granting to that Territory, for the purpose of aiding in the construction of certain railroads, “ every alternate section of land, designated by odd numbers, for six sections in Avidth on each side of each of said roads.” If when the lines of a road were definitely fixed it should appear that any of the sections included in the terms of the grant had been sold or otherAvise appropriated by the United States, authority Avas given for the selection of others in lieu within fifteen miles of the line. All lands before reserved to the United States for the purpose of. aiding in any object of internal improvement or for any other purpose Ayhatever were excluded from the operation of the act, except for the right of way.

On the 11th of May, 1858, Minnesota was admitted into the Union as a State. 11 Stat. 285, c. 31. By the act of admission (sec. 3) “all the laAvs of the United States,” “not locally inapplicable,” were “ to have the same force and effect Avithin that State as in other States of the Union.”

The line of what is noAV the Sioux City & St. Paul Railroad, built by a company entitled to the privileges of the act of March 3d, 185Y, c. 99, was located in April, 1859, and the lands involved in this suit are odd numbered sections within the six mile limits according to that line.

On the 12th of March, 1860, Congress passed an act, c. 5, 12 Stat. 3, extending the provisions of the act of September 28th, 1850, c. 84, to the States of Minnesota and Oregon, subject to a proviso, as folloAvs:

“ That the grant hereby made shall not include any lands Avhich the government of the United States may have reserved, sold, or disposed of (in pursuance of any law heretofore enacted) prior to the confirmation of title to be made under the authority of the said act.”

The lands now in disputé were certified to the State under this act, and conVfeyed'by the governor to Rice, the appellant. This suit was brought by the railroad company to establish its title under the railroad grant by the act of March 3d, 1857, c. 99, as against the swamp-land certificate. The Circuit Court sustained the claim of the railroad company and decreed accordingly. To reverse that decree Rice took this appeal. The single question presented is, whether the lands passed under the railroad or the swamp-land grant.

That the swamp-land-act of 1850 • operated as a grant in prcesenti to the States then in existence of all the swamp lands in their respective jurisdictions is well settled. Railroad Company v. Smith, 9 Wall. 95; French v. Fyan, 93 U. S. 169; Martin v. Marks, 97 U.S. 345. As Minnesota was a Territory in 1850, it is conceded that the title to the swamp lands within its territorial limits did not pass out of the United States at that time, because there was then no grantee in existence. It is contended, however, that on the admission of the State into the Union in 1858, the grant, which had before rested in compact only, became absolute, and carried the title to the State, as against the United States and subsequent grantees, from the date of the original act, September 28th, 1850, or at least from the date of the admission of the State.

In French v. Fyan, supra, it was said in the opinion, at dine place, “ that this court has decided more than once that the swamp-land act was a grant in prcesenti by which the title to those lands passed at once to the State in which they lay, .except to States admitted to the Union after its passage; ” and at another, “ for while the title under the swamp-land act, being a present grant, takes effect as of the date of that act, or of the admission of the State into the Union, whep this occurred after-wards.” From these expressions it is argued that the question of the right of new States to claim the benefits conferred by tbe provisions of tbe act bas been settled. Tbe case which was then before the court related only to tbe operation of tbe act in a State which was in existence at tbe time of its passage, and called for no consideration of its effect on new States. All that was said as to new States was merely incidental to tbe main question, and by no means intended as an authoritative declaration of the. law applicable to that class of cases. We feel quite at liberty, therefore, to consider that question an open one and to treat it accordingly.

Donations of the public domain for any purpose are never to be presumed. Those who claim against the government under legislative grants must show a clear title. The grant under the act of 1850 was to Arkansas and “the other States of the Union.” Arkansas was an existing State, and the grant was to all the States in prmsénti. It was to operate upon existing things, and 'with reference to an existing state of facts. It granted “ the whole of those swamp and overflowed lands made unfit thereby for cultivation, Avhich shall remain unsold at the passage of this act.” The Secretary of the Interior was required to make out, “ as soon as.practicable,” lists and plats of lands, the greater part of which were “ wet and unfit for cultivation,” and to transmit the lists, &c., to the governor of the proper State. There is not a word in the act to show that the grant was to be a. continuing one. It was to take effect at once, between an existing grantor and several separate existing grantees. There were undoubtedly at that time lands “ wet and unfit for cultivation ” in the Territories as well as in the States. Confessedly no grant was made to the Territories or any of them. This shows clearly the intention of Congress not to dispose of any moré swamp lands, at that time and in that way, than those in the States. It was clearly within the power of Congress to make the same grants to Territories if it had been considered desirable. Cases are numerous in which grants were made to Territories to aid in building railroads. The act of March 3d, 1857, making the grant to the Territory of Minnesota is one instance of that kind. The swamp-land grants were made to enable the States to construct the necessary levees and drains for the reclamation of the lands. They were, therefore, in aid of public improvements, and Qould as well be made to the Territories as to the States.

At the time of the original grant it was not known when another State would be admitted into the Union, nor what would then be the wants of the United States or the condition of the swamp lands. Events might happen that would render such a grant at that time entirely inappropriate. Seven St,ates have been admitted since, three before the late civil war began and four afterwards, and in six of them there must have been public lands which were, in part wet and unfit for cultivation, Minnesota was the first and Oregon the second State admitted. None were admitted until nearly, eight years after the act was passed, and the last did not come in until .nearly twenty-five years had elapsed. If the interpretation which has been put on the act by the appellant is the true one, every parcel of public land in the Territories, as subdivided under the law for sale, the greater part of which Avas “ wet and unfit for cultivation ” on the 28th of September, 1850, was from that date reserved to and set apart by the United States for donation to any new State that might thereafter be admitted to the Union, Avithm AArhose boundaries it should fall. • Nothing Was reserved from the railroad grant to the Territory of Minnesota on the 3d of, March, 1857, except lands theretofore reserved by the United States for some purpose; and if these lands were reserved at all, they were for the purposes of this donation. If reserved, they could neither be sold to purchasers nor settled upon for pre-emption, for the reservation is of lands unsold at the date of the passage of the act.

Such a reservation was clearly not in the mind of Congress, and the subsequent legislation as well as the language of the act shows it. Of the language of the act enough has already been said. We, therefore, turn to the subsequent legislation. As has been seen, Minnesota Avas admitted into the Union as a State on the 11th of May, 1858. Oregon was admitted on the 14th of February, 1859. 11 Stat. 383, c. 33. In the acts of admission there were specific grants of land to each State for certain purposes, but no reference was made directly or indirectly to the sAvamp lands. All the grants made were in consideration, among other things, of an undertaking on the part of the State, irrevocable without the consent of the United States, that the State should neyer interfere with the primary disposal of the soil within the same by the United States, or with any regulations Congress might find necessary for securing the title in the soil to bona fide purchasers. It is of some significance also that the act of Congress authorizing the people of the Territory of Minnesota to form a State government preparatory to their admission into the Union, c. 6,11 Stat. 166, in which the propositions for grants of lands were contained, was passed on the same day with the act making the railroad grant under which the appellee now claims. Following this, on the 12th of March, 1860, nearly two years after Minnesota was admitted, and one year after the admission of Oregon, the act extending in express terms the provisions of the swamp-land act to these States was passed. In this way, as we think, for the first time the swamp lands falling with: ,i the description of the act of 1850,' and then unsold or' otherwise disposed of, were granted. No similar laws have been passed in favor of States which have since been admitted into the Union. In 1873, .when the statutes of the United States were revised, the swampland acts were re-enacted in sections 2479 -and some others which followed. § 2479 is as follows:

“ To enable the several States (but not including the States of Kansas, Nebraska and Nevada) to construct the necessary levees and drain's to . redeem the swamp and. overflowed lands therein, the whole of the swamp and overflowed lands made unfit thereby for cultivation and remaining unsold on or after the 28th day of September, a. d. 1850, are granted and belong to the several States respectively in which such lands are situated : Provided, however, That said grant of swamp and overflowed lands, as to the States of California, Minnesota and Oregon, is subject to the limitations, restrictions and conditions hereinafter named and specified as applicable to said three last States respectively.”

Then follows, § 2490, continuing in force the specific provisions in the act of March 12th,;1860, extending the benefits of the act to Minnesota atíd Oregon. Mucli stress was laid in the argument on the provision in the act admitting Minnesota into the Union, to the effect that “ all the laws of the United States which are not locally inapplicable shall have the same force and effect within that State as in the other States of the Union.” This is disposed of by what has' already been said. As the act of 1850 related only to States in existence when it whs passed, it was locally inapplicable to Minnesota until its provisions were actually extended to that State by the act of March 12th, 1860. It follows that the title of the railroad company under the act of 1857 is superior to that of the appellant. The lands were not at the time of the passage of that act reserved to the United States for any purpose} and they were not," therefore, excepted from its operation.

The decree of the Circuit Court is affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (U.S. 1926)
    …v. Fyan, 93 U. S. 169, 170; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488, 500, et seq.; Rogers Locomotive Works v. Emigrant Co., 164 U. S. 559, 570; Work v. Louisiana, 269 U. S. 250. A case of special interest here is Rice v. Sioux City & St. Paul R. R. Co., 110 U. S. 695. The question there was whether the Act of 1850 operated, when Minnesota became a State in 1858, to grant to her the swamp lands therein. The Court answered in the negative, saying that the Act of 1850 “ operated as a grant in praesenti to the State…
  • Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U.S. 488 (U.S. 1887)
    …entire grai^t of the State might be defeated by this neglect or refusal of the Secretary to do his duty.” This view of the character of the grant was recognized in Rice v. Sioux City and St. Paul Railroad Company, decided at the October term, 1883, 110 U. S. 695, 697, 698. The question there was, whether the - swamp land act extended to territories upon their subsequent admission as states into the Union. It was held that it did not. Said the court, speaking by the Chief Justice: “ That the swamp land act o…
  • Mich. Land & Lumber Co. v. Rust, 168 U.S. 589 (U.S. 1897)
    …t that date were swamp lands, and the only matters thereafter to be considered were those of identification. Railroad Company v. Smith, 9 Wall. 95; French v. Fyan, 93 U. S. 169; Martin v. Marks, 97 U. S. 345 ; Rice v. Sioux City & St. Paul Railroad, 110 U. S. 695; Wright v. Roseberry, 121 U. S. 488; Tubbs v. Wilhoit, 138 U. S. 134. But while the act operated as a grant in prcesenti, the determination of what lands were swamp lands was entrusted to the Secretary of the Interior. Section 2 contains this provis…

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