DRURY
v.
HAYDEN

U.S. | 1884-04-07
111 U.S. 223 Supreme Court of the United States (1884) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 28 L. Ed. 408 · 4 S. Ct. 405 · 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1778 · SCDB 1883-213
Cited by 20 cases

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Synopsis

In a dispute over whether a grantee's agreement to assume and pay a mortgage, inserted into a deed by scrivener's mistake without the parties' knowledge or intent, could be enforced against the grantee, the Supreme Court held that the agreement was unenforceable and that a subsequent purchaser of the secured notes acquired no greater rights than the original mortgagee. The Court reversed the lower court's decree, finding that equity would have permitted reformation of the deed to remove the erroneous clause and that payment of mortgage interest, made to prevent foreclosure, did not constitute affirmation of an agreement of which the grantee had no actual knowledge.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Gray

Mr. Justice Gray delivered the opinion of the court. He stated the facts in the foregoing language, and continued: The case presented by the pleadings and proofs appears to us a plain one.

It is unnecessary, for the purpose of deciding it, to consider any of those questions, suggested at the argument, upon which there have been varying decisions in different States; such as, whether an agreement of the grantee, in a deed poll of land, to assume and pay an existing mortgage, is in the nature of an assumpsit, implied from the acceptance of the deed, or is in the nature of a covenant, being in an instrument sealed by the other party ; whether a suit upon such an agreement must be brought by the grantor, from whom alone the consideration moves, or may be brought by the mortgagee, as a person to whose benefit the agreement inures; how far the mortgagee is entitled, by way of subrogation, to avail himself in equity of the rights of the grantor; and whether or not the mortgagee has any rights under such an agreement in a deed from one who is not himself personally liable to pay the mortgage debt.

The appellee, by her purchase of the notes-secured by the second mortgage, doubtless acquired all the rights of the mortgagee. New Orleans Canal Company v. Montgomery, 95 U. S. 16; Swift v. Smith, 102 U. S. 442. But having purchased in ignorance of the supposed agreement of Drury in the deed of conveyance from Daggett to him, and having done nothing upon the faith of that agreement, she has no greater right by estoppel against Drury than the mortgagee had. The mortgagee had no part in obtaining, and paid no consideration for, that agreement, and, upon the most favorable construction, had no greater right under it than Daggett, with whom it purported to have been made.

On the facts of this case, Daggett, in a court of equity at least, never had any right to enforce that agreement against Drury. The payment of interest on the mortgage notes would naturally be made by Drury to prevent a foreclosure of the mortgage on his land, and cannot be held to be an affirmance of an agreement of which he had no actual knowledge. The clause containing the agreement being conclusively proved to have been inserted in the deed by mistake of the scrivener, without the knowledge and against the intention of the parties, a court of equity, upon a bill filed by Drury for the purpose, •would have decreed a reformation of the deed by striking out that clause. Elliott v. Sackett, 108 U. S. 133. The release executed by Daggett to Drury has the same' effect, and no more.

It follows that' the appellee has no equity against the appellant, and

The decree of the Circuit Court must ~be reversed,, and the case remcmded with directions to dismiss the hill.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Grace v. Hendricks, 103 Fla. 1158 (Fla. 1932)
    …has become impossible, the property having become exhausted by a prior mortgage. It may in such case even establish legal rights and grant legal remedies. Edwards v. Meyer, 100 Fla. 235, 130 Sou. Rep. 57; Hayden v. Snow, 14 Fed. 70; Drury v. Hayden, 111 U. S. 223, 4 Sup. Ct. 405; 28 L. Ed. 408; Beecher v. Lewis, 84 Va. 630, 6 S. E. 367; Walters v. Farmers Bank, 76 Va. 12; Parker v. Dee, 2 Ch. Cas. 200; 22 Eng. Rep. (Full Reprint) 910; 3 Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.), Sec. 2210, page 726. But such power of th…
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  • Bradberry v. Atl. Bank OF ST. Augustine, 336 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)
    …become impossible, the property having become exhausted by a prior mortgage. It may in such case even establish legal rights and grant legal remedies. Edwards v. Meyer, 100 Fla. 235, 130 So. 57; Hayden v. Snow (C.C.[Ill.]) 14 F. 70; Drury v. Hayden, 111 U.S. 223, 4 S.Ct. 405, 28 L.Ed. 408; Beecher v. Lewis, 84 Va. 630, 6 S.E. 367; Walters v. Farmer’s Bank, 76 Va. 12; Parker v. Dee, 2 Ch.Cas. 200, 22 Eng.Rep. (Full Reprint) 910; 3 Jones on Mortgages (8th Ed.) § 2210, page 726.” In Grace the Supreme Court al…
  • Keller v. Ashford, 133 U.S. 610 (U.S. 1890)
    …rtgagor has against the grantee, and therefore cannot object to the striking out by a court of equity, or to the release by the mortgagor, of such an agreement when inserted in the deed by mistake; Elliott v. Sackett, 108 U. S. 132; Drury v. Hayden, 111 U. S. 223;, and, on-the other. hand, that such ' an agreement does not,, without the mortgagee’s assent, put the grantee and the mortgagor..in the relation of principal and surety towards the mortgagee, so that the Tatter, by giving time to the grantee, will…

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