DUNPHY
v.
SULLIVAN
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The Supreme Court affirmed a judgment in favor of Mrs. Sullivan in a dispute over property ownership, holding that Sullivan had acquired legal title to the property through adverse possession before Dunphy claimed an interest in it. The Court determined that Sullivan's actual possession of the property under a claim of title for the requisite statutory period under Montana law—three years at the time her possession began—was sufficient to perfect her title to the land.
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'Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
This judgment is affirmed. The jury has found as a fact that Mrs. Sullivan, the defendant in error, was in the actual possession of the property, under á claim of title, from August 2, 1870, until October 4, 1877. This, of course, 'includes the time from the 22d of February, 1873, when it is claimed the adverse, title of Dunphy began, to October 4, 1877. It sufficiently appears that the court directed the jury to find upon the special issues submitted, and no complaint is made of the charge as to what was necessary to create a title by adverse possession. We are not permitted to inquire whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. From a time prior to February 22, 1873, until August 1,1877, a title could be acquired, under the statutes of Montana, by three years’ adverse •possession. After that it required five years. It follows that Mrs. Sullivan’s title to the property was perfected by her adverse possession before Dunphy entered into actual possession, and that the judgment in her favor on the special findings, as vrell as on the general verdict, was right.
Affirmed.
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