NEWHALL
v.
LE BRETON
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In this case involving a deed of trust executed in 1870, the Supreme Court affirmed that the $49,000 claimed by attorneys for legal services was included within the total $446,849 secured by the deed, but that such legal fees were subordinate to the trustee's right to reimbursement for all advances, payments, and expenses incurred. The Court held that because the proceeds from the sale of the trust property fell substantially short of satisfying the trustee's claims for principal, interest, advances, and expenses, nothing remained available to pay the attorneys' fees.
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Me. Justioe HaelaN delivered the opinion of the court.
The amount secured to be paid by the deed of trust executed on the 1st day of October, 1870, by Juana M. Estudillo and others to Theodore Le Hoy, was $446,849 in gold coin of the United States. Whether that sum included the- $49,000 which is alleged to be due to Patterson, Wilson, Crittenden, and Felton for legal services rendered, cannot be determined by anything in the deed itself. The plaintiff, who sues as assignee of the claims of said attorneys, is compelled to resort to parol evidence to show that the parties to the deed intended to provide for the payment of the $49,000 out of the proceeds of the sale of the trust property, and to that end included it in the aggregate-of $446,849. If that evidence was competent, it-was the right of the defendant to show by parol evidence that the intention of the parties was to apply .the proceeds of sale to the reimbursement of Le Koy, for all advances and payments made and expenses incurred by him, before anything was paid on the claims of the attorneys. Looking at all the evidence, we are satisfied that these propositions are sustained, namely : 1. That the $49,000 was embraced in the $446,849; '2. Tbe former sum was not to be paid until Le Roy was reimbursed tbe entire amount dub. and to become due to bim on account of principal, interest, advances, and expenses. That tbe sales of tbe trust property fell short of meeting these latter demands by a large amount, is clearly established by the record of tbe suit in which tbe accounts of the trustee were audited and settled, and by other evidence in this cause. Upon tbe whole case we think the decree was right, and it is
Affirmed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Nat'l Bank v. Ins. Co., 104 U.S. 54 (U.S. 1881)
- Rothwell v. Dewees, 2 Black 613 (U.S. 1862)