WILLIAMSPORT BANK
v.
KNAPP

U.S. | 1886-12-13
119 U.S. 357 Supreme Court of the United States (1886) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 30 L. Ed. 446 · 7 S. Ct. 274 · 1886 U.S. LEXIS 1999 · SCDB 1886-053
Cited by 9 cases

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Synopsis

Williamsport Bank sought review of a lower court judgment against it by certifying questions of law to the Supreme Court where two circuit judges had disagreed. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error because the certified questions did not meet the requirements for appellate jurisdiction—they improperly asked the Court to determine matters of fact or mixed questions of law and fact, such as whether the defendant was authorized under the evidence to charge interest at a certain rate, rather than presenting pure questions of law suitable for Supreme Court review. The Court reaffirmed that certified questions must be distinct points of law clearly stated and not inquiries about whether judgment should be rendered for one party or the other based on evidence.

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Opinion of the Court
Me. Justiob Geay,

Me. Justiob Geay,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

• Assuming, what does not appear in the record, that the evidence stated in the bills of exceptions was all the evidence introduced at the trial and referred to in the certificate of division, that certificate is clearly insufficient to support the jurisdiction of this court.

Under the acts of Congress, authorizing questions arising on a trial or hearing before two judges in the Circuit Court, and upon which they are divided in opinion, to be certified to this court for decision, it has always been held that each question certified must be one of law, .and not of fact, nor of mixed law and fact, and that it must be a distinct point or proposition, clearly stated, and not the whole case, nor the question whether upon the evidence the judgment should be for one party or for the other. Saunders v. Gould, 4 Pet. 392; United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 267; Weeth v. New England Mortgage Co., 106 U. S. 605; California Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U. S. 609, 615-617; Waterville v. Van Slyke, 116 U.S. 699-704.

Tested by these'rules, the first and second questions certified, each being whether “ under the evidence ” the defendant was authorized to receive interest at a certain rate, as well as the fourth question, “whether upon the whole evidence the plaintiff was entitled to recover,” are not questions which this ' court is required or authorized to answer. 'The third question is equally irregular and insufficient. Instead of being clearly and distinctly stated, it is quite obscure and ambiguous, for it does not show whether the supposéd decision of the Supremo Court of Pennsylvania, “that there are no banks, nor have there been any such banks in Pennsylvania, authorized to take and receive interest at a greater rate than six per cent.,” was based upon matter of law, or matter of fact, or both. The latest reported decision of that court, to which the learned counsel for the plaintiff in error referred to explain this question, affirmed a ruling of a lower court that, “ in-fact and in law, there is ho bank of issue in Pennsylvania , authorized to charge a rate of interest in excéss of the legal rate; ” and said nothing upon the question whether there ever had been any such banks. Lebanon National Bank v. Karmany, 98 Penn. St. 65, 73.

. Neither the ampunt of the judgment below, nor the certificate of division, being sufficient to give this court-jurisdiction, it necessarily follows, as was held in Weeth v. New England Mortgage Co. and Waterville v. Van Slyke, above cited, that the

Writ of error must be dismissed:

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Jewell v. Knight, 123 U.S. 426 (U.S. 1887)
    …Co., 1 Black, 582; Daniels v. Railroad Co., 3 Wall. 250; Brobst v. Brobst, 4 Wall. 2; Weeth v. New England Mortgage Co., 106 U.S. 605; California Paving Co. v. Molitor, 113 U.S. 609; Waterville v. Van Slyke, 116 U.S. 699; Williamsport Bank v. Knapp, 119 U.S. 357. The question of fraud or no [*433] fraud is one necessarily compounded of fact and of law, and the fact must be distinctly found before this court can decide the law upon a certificate of division of opinion. Ogilvie v. Knox Ins. Co., 18 How. 577,…
  • Allen v. ST. Louis Bank, 120 U.S. 20 (U.S. 1887)
    …iction in error. Act of February 16, 1875, c. 77, § 3, 18 Stat. 316. It is therefore unnecessary to consider whether those questions are duly stated in the certificate of division of' opinion,” within the rule affirmed in Williamsport Bank v. Knapp, 119 U. S. 357. The leading facts of the case, as found by the Circuit Court, are as follows:' The-original action was on a promissory note madé by the defendants, payable to the order of J. H. Dowell & Co., and by them indorsed to . the plaintiff blink. J. H. D…
  • Hosford v. Germania Fire Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 399 (U.S. 1888)
    …efendant in that court being less than $5000, this court has no jurisdiction of the case, except by reason of the certificate of division of opinion. Ex parte Phœnix Ins. Co., 117 U. S. 367; Dow v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 158; Williamsport Bank v. Knapp, 119 U. S. 357. The first question certified is too general to be answered, because it undertakes to refer the whole case to the decision of this court. Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426. Nothing is open for consideration, therefore, but the second and third questio…

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