WHITSITT
v.
UNION DEPOT AND RAILROAD COMPANY
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Emma C. Whitsitt sought to appeal a lower court decree dismissing an equity suit to quiet possession of property in Denver, Colorado, which had originally been filed by her deceased husband Richard E. Whitsitt and James Meskew. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal because it was filed nearly four years after the original decree was entered on October 6, 1880, exceeding the two-year limitation period prescribed by Section 1008 of the Revised Statutes, and no disability exception applied to extend the deadline.
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Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
This was a suit in equity begun by Richard E. Whitsitt, then in life, and James Meskew, to quiet their possession of certain lots in Denver, Colorado. A decree was entered October 6, 1880, dismissing the bill. From that decree the complainants took an appeal to this court, which whs dismissed at October Term, 1880, because it did not appear that the value of the matter in dispute exceeded $5000. Whitsitt v. Railroad Company, 103 U. S.
770. On the 20th of July, 1881, Emma C. Whitsitt appeared in the Circuit Court, and, suggesting the death of Richard E. Whitsitt, asked to be anade a. party to the suit in his stead, as sole heir and devisee. An order to this effect was made, and she, on. the 30th of August, 1881, filed in the Circuit Court an affidavit showing that the value of the matter in dispute did exceed $5000. On the same day, she took another appeal, which was docketed in this court September 24, 1881, and dismissed, under Rule 16, April 5, 1884, for want of prosecution. The mandate from this court under this appeal was filed in the Circuit Court September 9, 1884, and the next day, September 10, Mrs. Whitsitt presented to the district judge for the District of Colorado another appeal bond in the suit, which he accepted, and he also signed a citation that was duly served on the same day. This last appeal was docketed in this court September 22, 1884. When the case was reached in its regular order on the docket at the present term, it was submitted by the appellant on printed • brief, no one appearing for the appellee.
Section 1008 of the Revised Statutes provides that “.no judgment, decree, or order of a circuit or district court, in any civil action, at law or in equity, shall be reviewed in the Supreme Court on "writ of error or appeal, unless the writ of error is brought, or the appeal is taken, within two years after the entry of . such judgment, decree, or order : Provided, That where a party entitled to prosecute a writ of error or take an appeal is an infant, insane person, or imprisoned, such writ of error may be' prosecuted, or such appeal may be taken, within two years after the judgment, decree, or order, exclusive of the term of such disability.” This decree was rendered October 6, 1880, and the present. appeal was not taken until September 24, 1884, nearly four years afterwards. There is no suggestion of disability such as would bring the appellant within the proviso. The appeal should, therefore, be dismissed, Scarborough v. Pargoud, 108 U. S. 567, and it is so ordered.
Appeal dismissed.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Scarborough v. Pargoud, 108 U.S. 567 (U.S. 1883)
- Cnty. of Wilson v. Nat'l Bank, 103 U.S. 770 (U.S. 1880)
- Whitsitt v. R.R. Co., 103 U.S. 770 (U.S. 1880)