JONES'S ADMINISTRATOR
v.
CRAIG

U.S. | 1888-04-30
No. 235
127 U.S. 213 Supreme Court of the United States (1888) Caution
Also reported at: 32 L. Ed. 147 · 8 S. Ct. 1175 · 1888 U.S. LEXIS 1983 · SCDB 1887-238
Cited by 18 cases

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Synopsis

In a dispute over land title, the circuit court issued an interlocutory order conditioning an injunction against an ejectment action upon the complainants depositing mortgage principal, interest, and taxes into court within fifteen days, but failed to enter a final decree. The Supreme Court held that it lacked jurisdiction over the appeal because the order was not a final decree, as further proceedings and factual determinations regarding compliance with the deposit requirement remained necessary before a final judgment could be entered, and remanded the case for further proceedings in the circuit court.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Miller

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court.

The appellants here, Henry 0. Jones and John Jort, brought their bill in chancery against "Walter Craig, the defendant, in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Nebraska.

The object of the bill was to remove a cloud upon the title to certain lands. The defendant had brought an action of ejectment to recover the possession, and, having a grima facie title of record upon which he could recover, this bill was filed for the purpose of setting up an equitable defence. Thereupon a temporary injunction ivas allowed, restraining Craig from prosecuting his action of ejectment until the chancery suit was decided.

The allegation of the bill was, that a deed under which the plaintiff in the ejectment suit asserted title was executed as a mortgage, with a written contract of defeasance when the money loaned should be repaid. To this bill a demurrer -was filed, upon which the court made an order in the following language:

“ If the plaintiff will amend bill and bring into court proper amount of money to redeem and pay taxes, all of same to bear interest from time money was due, and interest on taxes from date of payment at present rate of interest, then perpetual injunction can be allowed. Costs of both suits to abide further order.”

Afterwards the plaintiffs did file an amended bill, to which likewise there was a general demurrer. Upon the hearing of that demurrer the court made the following order:

“ Henry O. Jones et al. ) v. V Walter Craig. ) 193 — H.

“ This cause coming on to be heard upon the demurrer of the defendant to the amended bill of complaint filed herein, and the court being fully advised in the-premises, it is ordered that if within fifteen days the plaintiff bring into court the amount of the note and mortgage set forth in the bill of complaint, with interest thereon from the time the note became due, with interest thereon at ten per cent per annum until November 1, 1879, and from November 1, 1879, to date of this order, at seven per cent per annum, together with all taxes paid by defendant upon the land described in said bill, with interest thereon at ten per cent per annum, then the defendant be restrained from the further prosecution of the cause in ejectment set forth in said bill of complaint, and entitled Walter Craig v. Henry O. Jones ; but if the plaintiff shall fail so to do within the time mentioned, the said-demurrer 'to said bill be sustained and the said bill of complaint be dismissed, and the defendant herein be allowed to proceed with the prosecution of his said action at law. To the ruling and decision of the court the plaintiffs except.”

This order, made upon the hearing of the demurrer, to a bill in chancery, is wholly irregular. This court, however, has no jurisdiction of the case as it stands, because; the order just cited is not a final decree. Something yet remains to be done in order to make it such, and that action depends upon whether or not the complainants will comply with the order to bring in the ,sum due on the mortgage. If that order is complied with, then a decree should be made, upon the hypothesis on which the order was made, in favor of the complainants in the bill, and quieting their title. If, however, the money is hot brought into court, then, according to the theory of the order, the bill of complaint should be dismissed. But, even assuming the right of the court to make the order, as well as its validity, the circumstances under which the bill of complaint is to be dismissed or the relief granted to the complainants named therein, and the sum to be paid, are matters which are yet to be determined, which may turn out either one way or the other, and which, when ascertained, will be the foundation for a final decree. There is no final decree as the matter now stands.

The appeal is therefore dismissed, cmd the case rema/nded to the Circuit Court for further proceedings.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62 (U.S. 1948)
    …ollins v. Miller, 252 U. S. 364, 371. This makes it unnecessary to consider whether the mere fact that the decree gave alternative commands precluded it from being final. Cf. Paducah v. East Tennessee Tel. Co., 229 U. S. 476; Jones’s Adm’r v. Craig, 127 U. S. 213; Note, 48 Harv. L. Rev. 302, 305-306. Since the judgment now appealed from lacks the necessary finality, we cannot consider the merits. All of Republic’s constitutional objections are of course saved. Appeal dismissed. L. 1913, e. 198, §§ 1-3 (Okl…
  • …d,” unless an amendment be filed (Robertson v. Montgomery Baseball Ass’n, 140 Ala. 320, 37 So. 241; Lide v. Park, 132 Ala. 222, 31 So. 360), and to other decrees conditional upon some action to be taken by a party to the suit (Jones’ Adm’r v. Craig, 127 U. S. 213, 8 S. Ct. 1175, 32 L. Ed. 147; City of Paducah, Ky., v. East Tenn. Tel. Co., 229 U. S. 476, 33 S. Ct. 816, 57 L. Ed. 1286). So construed, it is like an order sustaining a demurrer, and is nonappealable. City and County of San Francisco v. McLaughlin…
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  • Brownson v. United States, 32 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1929)
    …as an order of commitment for contempt its finality may well he doubted. Its character might be called conditional, alternative, or anticipatory nisi. Such orders are generally held not appealable. 13 C. J. § 156, pp. 99, 100; Jones’ Adm’r v. Craig, 127 U. S. 213, 8 S. Ct. 1175, 32 L. Ed. 147; City of Paducah v. East Tenn., etc., Co., 229 U. S. 476, 33 S. Ct. 816, 57 L. Ed. 1286. And this is especially true if the order involves possible punishment for contempt. Semrow v. Semrow, 26 Minn. 9, 46 [*846] N. W.…
    1 / 2

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