FIRE INSURANCE ASSOCIATION (LIMITED)
v.
WICKHAM

U.S. | 1888-11-26
No. 1032
128 U.S. 426 Supreme Court of the United States (1888) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 32 L. Ed. 503 · 9 S. Ct. 113 · 1888 U.S. LEXIS 2232 · SCDB 1888-046
Cited by 18 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Fire Insurance Association challenged whether certain questions certified to the Supreme Court were proper subjects for review, arguing that at least one question required the Court to decide factual matters and the entire case rather than a pure question of law. The Court held that while the second certified question improperly asked the Court to determine what verdict was warranted based on the evidence and thus violated the requirement that certified questions concern only pure law, the first question was properly certified because it presented a single, discrete legal issue—whether parol evidence could be used to explain certain documents—independent of the case's factual circumstances.

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Bradley,

Mr. Justice Bradley,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

This subject has been so often and so recently discussed by this court, that it is hardly necessary to do more than to state the conclusion that must be drawn from the case as presented. The law is so clearly stated, and the cases are so fully cited by Mr. Justice Gray in the recent case of Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426, 432, that nothing further need be said. It is-there laid down, first that the question certified “must be a distinct point or proposition of law, clearly stated, so that it can be definitely answered, without,,regard to other issues of law or fact in the case ;” secondly, it must be a “question of law only, and not a question of fact, or pf mixed law and fact; ” hence it must not involve, or imply a conclusion or judgment upon the weight or effect of testimony or facts adduced in the cause — as, for example, a question of fraud, which is necessarily compounded of fact and of law * thirdly, it must not embrace “ the whole case, even when its decision turns upon matter of law only ; ” and even though it be split up into the form, of questions. These propositions are illustrated by examples, -which need not be repeated here. Applying them to the ease in hand, we can have but little difficulty in disposingof the present motion. The second question1 certified , is clearly ob noxious to the second and third rules; it asks us to decide whether, upon all the evidence in the case, the defendant was entitled to a verdict. This would require us to decide upon the weight of the evidence and the conclusions to be drawn from the facts. It would also require us to decide the whole case.

The first question is not open to these objections. It presents a single point of law, namely, whether parol evidence may or may not be introduced to explain such documents as those which were given in evidence by the defendant. We are not now asked to decide whether such evidence should have been allowed in this case. That will be the question for consideration when the case is argued on its merits. On the present motion we are only required to decide whether the question is one of pure law, and one that presents but a single point for consideration. We think it is of that character. If only a single writing had been offered in evidence by the defendant, the question whether parol evidence could have been given to alter or explain it would clearly have been a single question of law. The fact that many writings were offered, all of the same general character, and offered to prove the same fact, does not make the case to differ. The motion to dismiss the writ must be denied.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Fire Ins. Ass'n v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 564 (U.S. 1891)
    …Mr. Justice Brown delivered the opinion of the court. As we held in this case on the motion to dismiss, (Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham, 128 U. S. 426,) that the second question, was improperly certified and could not be answered, the only question now presented for decision is the first, namely: “ On the facts stated in the foregoing record, was the parol testimony offered in evidence by the plai…
  • Maynard v. Hecht, 151 U.S. 324 (U.S. 1894)
    …effect of testimony or facts adduced in the case; and could not embrace [*327] the whole case, even where its decision turned upon matter of law only, and even though it were split up in the form of questions. Fire Insurance Association v. Wickham, 128 U. S. 426; Dublin Township v. Milford Savings Institution, 128 U. S. 510. The same rules were applicable to the certificate of points on division of opinion on the hearing or trial of criminal proceedings under sections 651 and 697. United States v. Hall, 131…
  • Graver v. Faurot, 162 U.S. 435 (U.S. 1896)
    …adduced in the 'cause; • and could not embrace the whole case, even where its decision turned upon matter of law only, and even though it were split up in the form of questions. Jewell v. Knight, 123 U. S. 426, 432; Fire Ins. Association v. Wickham, 128 U. S. 426. By the sixth section of the Judiciary Act, the Circuit Court of Appeals is not permitted to certify the whole case to us, though we may require that to be done when questions are certified, or may bring up by certiorari any case in which the decis…

Previewing 3 of 9 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited (13 total)

View all 13 cited authorities →

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw