KNOX COUNTY
v.
HARSHMAN

U.S. | 1889-10-28
No. 1212
132 U.S. 14 Supreme Court of the United States (1889) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 33 L. Ed. 249 · 10 S. Ct. 8 · 1889 U.S. LEXIS 1835 · SCDB 1889-002
Cited by 25 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Knox County sought to restrain collection of a judgment against it through an equity bill, but the lower court dismissed the bill and granted the county costs. The Supreme Court held that an appeal from a decree dismissing an injunction does not operate to supersede the underlying judgment or stay its execution, and that a mere appeal cannot revive a dissolved injunction or create one where none existed. The Court established that a supersedeas on the equity decree does not supersede process on the original judgment at law.

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Chief Justice Í'uller,

Mr. Chief Justice Í'uller,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellant’s counsel contends that the appeal taken and perfected from the decree dismissing his client’s bill of complaint operated, or should be made to operate, to supersede the judgment, in collection of which the peremptory writ of mandamus was awarded. That judgment was recovered on the 28th day of Maroh, 1881, and no proceedings in error have ever been taken, and no bond given to supersede its operation. An alternative writ of mandamus was sued out, the cause shown by the county court and its judges against granting the peremptory writ was disposed of by this court on writ of error, and the peremptory writ was directed to be issued. The county of Knox then filed its bill in equity to restrain the collection of the judgment as commanded, No preliminary injunction was granted, and upon final hearing the bill was dismissed, and a decree passed against the county for costs,

The'general rule is well settled that an appeal from a decree granting, refusing, • or dissolving an injunction, does not disturb its operative effect. Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 161; Slaughter-House Cases, 10 Wall. 273, 297; Leonard v. Ozark Land Co., 115 U. S. 465, 468.

When an injunction has been dissolved, it cannot be revived except by a new exercise of judicial power; and fio'appeal by ’ the dissatisfied party can of itself revive it. A' fortiori, the mere prosecution of an appeal cannot operate as an injunction where none has been granted.

As stated by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, in Spraul v. Louisiana, 123 U. S. 516, 518, “The supersedeas provided for in § 1007 of the Revised Statutes stays process for the execution of the judgment or decree brought under revi iw by the writ of error or appeal to which it belongs.”

The supersedure of process on the decree dismissing the bill' could not supersede process on the judgment at law, and this is so, notwithstanding a bill to impeach a judgment is regarded as an auxiliary or dependent and no' as an original bill.

The record presents no ground for the interference sought, and

The motion n ,ust be overruled.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By

  • Virginian Ry. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1926)
    …a federal court dismissing a bill and dissolving an interlocutory injunction are not suspended [*669] as á mere consequence of an appeal to this Court, even if a supersedeas is allowed. Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 161; Knox County v. Harshman, 132 U. S. 14. An injunction which was in terms dissolved by the decree, or which expired by limitation, cannot be revived to take effect during the pendency of an appeal except by a new exercise of power by a court having the authority. Ordinarily such authority…
  • Merrimack River Sav. Bank v. City of Clay Ctr., 219 U.S. 527 (U.S. 1911)
    …nded nor annulled as a mere consequence of an appeal to this court, even if a supersedeas is allowed. Slaughter-House Cases, 10 Wall. 273, 297; Hovey v. McDonald, 109 U. S. 150, 161; Leonard v. Ozark Land Co., 115 U. S. 465; Knox County v. Harshman, 132 U. S. 14. That the Circuit Court, to the end that-the status quo might be preserved pending such appeal, had the power to continue an injunction in force by virtue of its inherent equity power is not doubtful. In Hovey v. McDonald, cited abr 'e, Mr. Justice…
  • Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. La. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 212 (U.S. 1922)
    …ould not continue the injunction or maintain the status quo ante of restraint upon the defendant. Slaughter-House Cases, 10 Wall. 273, 297; Hovey v. McDonald, supra, 161; Leonard v. Ozark Land Co., 115 U. S. 465, 468; Knox [*216] County v. Harshman, 132 U. S. 14, 16; Merrimack River Savings Bank v. Clay Center, 219 U. S. 527. The effective pa£t of the order of Judge Foster, if valid, was the continuance of the restraining order, which is called in the motion and argument the injunction. The motion to set th…

Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw