BLOUNT

v.

WALKER

Me. Chiee Justice .Fullee,

after stating the-case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

The federal question relied on-to sustain our jurisdiction ,'that the Supreme Court of South Carolina did not-give i faith and credit to. the judgment of the Probate Court of Wilson County,-North Carolina,- admitting Mrs. Blount’s will to probate. .

We cannot see that any. such question is presented by this record! The Probate Court of Wilson County, North Caro•lina, had no jurisdiction to declare the will-duly executed “ according to the laws of South Carolina,” or that it-was a good exécution of the power of ‘ appointment, and did not undertake to. ad judge to that effect, and it is riot denied that Mrs. Blount’s will was' not executed áccording to those law;s, •The-Suprenie Court of-South parolina did not refuse to'the judgirient of the Probate Court of North Carolina fúll .faith and credit. It assumed that the will was properly admitted' to probate in North Carolina,, as well as in South Carolina, by an exemplification, thereof, under the statute to that effect in" the latter State, but it held that when Mrs. Harris prescribed, the mode in which the power of appointment should be exer-'ciséd, by the use of the words “by her last will and testament duly executed,” she intended-a will duly-executed according to the laws of South Carolina, and. not a will duly executed according to the laws of any. State or country in which the dónee'of the'power, Mrs.' Blount, might happen to be domiciled at the time of her death. The probate of Mrs. Blount’s will in North Carolina established that, the will was executed acb cording to the law of the State where she was domiciled, but it did not establish that the will was executed according. to the law of South Carolina, as it is conceded it was pot. "When, therefore, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, in construing • Mrs. Harris’ will, arrived at the conclusion that the estate of the latter would only pass to such person as might receive an appointment by a will duly executed according to the' laws of South Carolina, that was an end of. the case, and whether that conclusion was right -or wrong is a matter with which we are not concerned. If we were of a different opinion, and, entertaining jurisdiction, were to. reverse the judgment of the Supreme Court' of South .Carolina, we-should- do it upon -the' ground that that court erred in the. construction of Mrs. Harris’ will, and not upon any ground connected. with the judgment of the Probate Court of North Carolina, which could not arid did not determine that question. Counsel says that the position of the plaintiff-in error is, “ that the' decision of the state court necessarily involved the question, whether the will of Mrs. Blount was her ‘ last,will and-testament duly executecl; ’ that the judgment .of the Probate Court of North Carolina is conclusive of this; and whether in the decision the state court has given this judgment the same force and effect as it has in North Carolina, is the federal question.” -But the state court conceded that the judgment of the Probate Court of North Carolina established that the will of Mrs. Blount was her. last will and testament duly executed, and its decision did not in the slightest degree proceed upon the denial of that fact, but gave the judgment the same force and effect that it had in North Carolina, for in neither of. the States would the will, as such, dispose of property that did not belong to the testatrix.

N To give this court jurisdiction of a writ of error to a state' court, it must appear affirmatively, not only that a federal question was presented for decision to the.highest court of the State having jurisdiction, but that its decisioil was necessary to the detérmination' of the cause, and that it was actu-álly decided, or that the judgment as rendered could not have been given without deciding it. New Orleans Water Works Company v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Company, 125 U. S. 18, 29; Klinger v. Missouri, 18 Wall. 257, 263; DeSaussure v. Gaillard, 127 U. S. 216; Hopkins v. McLure, 133 U. S. 380.

The motion to dismiss the writ of error must be sustained.

Writ of error dismissed.