YORK
v.
TEXAS

U.S. | 1890-11-03
No. 999
Mr. Justice Bradley and Mr. Justice Gray dissented.
137 U.S. 15 Supreme Court of the United States (1890) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 34 L. Ed. 604 · 11 S. Ct. 9 · SCDB 1890-002 · 1890 U.S. LEXIS 2057
Cited by 75 cases

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Synopsis

In York v. Texas, the Supreme Court addressed whether a Texas statute that required defendants to submit to full court jurisdiction when challenging the sufficiency of service violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause. The Court held that the statute was constitutional because, although it prevented defendants from obtaining a preliminary ruling on service before submitting to jurisdiction, it did not deprive them of due process since they retained the ability to challenge void judgments through subsequent enforcement proceedings or defensive pleas. The decision established that states have broad power over procedural rules in their courts provided that the substance of constitutional rights is preserved, even if such procedures are less convenient than those used elsewhere.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Brewer,

Mr. Justice Brewer,

after stating the case as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

I was conceded by the District and the Supreme Courts that the service upon the defendant in St. Louis was a nullity, and gave the District Court no jurisdiction; but it was held that, under the peculiar statutes of the State of Texas, the appearance for the purpose of pleading to the jurisdiction was a voluntary appearance, which brought the defendant, into court. Plaintiff in error questions this construction of the Texas statutes; but, inasmuch as the Supreme Court, the highest court of the State, has so construed, them, such construction must be accepted here as correct, and the only question we can consider is; as to the power of the State in respect thereto.

It must be conceded that such statutes contravene the estab fished rule elsewhere — a rule which also obtained in Texas at an earlier day, to wit, that an appearance which, as expressed, is solely to challenge the jurisdiction, is not a general appearance in the cause, and does not waive the illegality of the-service or submit the party to the jurisdiction of the court. Harkness v. Hyde, 98 U. S. 476; Raquet v. Nixon,, Dallam (Texas), 386; De Witt v. Monroe, 20 Texas, 289; Hagood v. Dial, 43 Texas, 625; Robinson v. Schmidt, 48 Texas, 19.

The difference between the present rule in Texas and elsewhere, is simply this: Elsewhere the defendant may obtain the judgment of the court upon the sufficiency of the service, without submitting himself to its jurisdiction. In Texas, by its statute, if he asks the court to determine any question, even that of service, he submits himself' wholly to its jurisdiction. Elsewhere, he gets an opinion .of the court before deciding on his own action. In Texas, he takes all the risk himself. If the service be in fact insufficient, all subsequent proceedings, including the formal entry of judgment, are void; if sufficient, they are valid. And the question is, whether under the Constitution of the United States the defendant has an inviolable right to have this question of the sufficiency of the, service decided in the first instance and alone.

The Fourteenth Amendment is relied upon as invalidating such legislation. That forbids a State to “ deprive any person of life,* liberty or property, without due process of law.” And the proposition is, that the denial of a right to be heard before judgment simply as to the sufficiency of the service operates to deprive the defendant of liberty: or property. But the mere entry of a judgment for money, which is void for want of proper service, touches neither. It is. only when process is issued thereon or the judgment is sought to be enforced that liberty or property'is in present danger. If at that time of immediate attack protection is afforded, the substantial guarantee of the amendment is preserved, and there is no just cause of complaint.. The State has full power over remedies and procedure in its own courts, and can make any ordér it pleases in respect thereto, provided that substance of right is secured without unreasonable burden to parties and litigants. Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U. S.

769. It certainly is more convenient that á defendant be permitted to object to the service, and raise the question of jurisdiction, in the first instance, in the court in which suit is pending. But mere convenience is not substance of right. If the defendant had taken no notice of this suit, and judgment had been formally entered upon such insufficient service, and under process thereon his property, real or personal, had been seized or threatened with seizure, he could by original action have enjoined the process and protected the possession of his property. If the judgment had been pleaded as defensive to any action brought by him, he would have been free to deny its validity. There is nothing in the opinion of the Supreme Court or in any of the statutes of the State, of which we have been advised, gainsaying this right. Can it be held, therefore, that legislation simply forbidding the defendant to come into court and challenge the validity of service upon him in a personal action, without surrendering himself to • the jurisdiction of the court, but which does not attempt to restrain him from fully protecting his person, his property and his rights against any attempt to enforce a judgment rendered without due service of process, and therefore void, deprives him of liberty or property, within the prohibition of the Fourteenth Amendment ? We think not.

The judgment is affirmed.

Mr. Justice Bradley and Mr. Justice Gray dissented.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (34 total)

  • Evans v. Kloeppel, 72 Fla. 267 (Fla. 1916)
    …he court for the purpose of contesting or aiding his principal in contesting a question in an action pending in the court and1 is thus deemed, to* have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court for all purposes of the action. York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 9; Western Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235 U. S. 261, 35 Sup. Ct. Rep. 37. While there were errors in the trial of this cause, and in the pleading's, they were rendered harmless by the verdict and judgment so far as the plaintiff in er…
  • Rorick v. Chancey, 142 Fla. 290 (Fla. 1938)
    …60 U. S. 26809; Hassler v. Shaw, 271 U. S. 195. There is also a suggestion that the motion to quash the summons made by the Railroad, in the state court after the remand, operated, under the Missouri practice, as a general appearance, York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15; and that this precluded it from objecting to a trial of the cause within that State. We have no occasion to enquire into the local practice. The constitutional claim sustained in Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Co., 262 U. S. 312, was not that under…
  • …ave availed themselves of the opportunity to petition for review of the Board’s order in the Court of Appeals, and that due process does not require an opportunity to be heard before judgment, if defenses may be presented upon appeal. York v. Texas, 137 U. S. 15, 20, 21; American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U. S. 156, 168; Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 289 U. S. 373, 384. But this rule assumes that the appellate review does afford opportunity to present all available defenses, including lack of proper notice,…

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