HENNESSY

v.

BACON

Mr. Justice Harlan,

after stating the facts as above reported, delivered the opinion of the court.

It may be assumed, for the purposes of the present case, that upon the tender to Chittenden’s agent, on the 27th of June, 1882,.of the full amount Bacon had agreed to pay for the lands in controversy,- Hennessy, as the assignee of Bacon, became entitled to a sufficient deed of general warranty from Chittenden; and that the conveyance from Chittenden to Eogers was so far in derogation of Hennessy’s rights as such assignee, that a court of equity, in view of the relations between Bacon and Hennessy and of the knowledge Eogers had of the written agreement between them, would have compelled Eogers, at any time prior to March 18, 1886, (the date of the settlement between him and Hennessy,) to convey the title to Hennessy, upon the payment by the latter of the balance due Bacon under the contract of June 27, 1882, as well as of the amount Bacon had agreed to pay to Chittenden. As Hennessy rightfully demanded a clear, unencumbered title to the lands, and as Chittenden did not, personally, or by his agent, distinctly announce his purpose to rescind altogether the contract of March 27. 1882, unless Hennessy, within a' given time, would take such title as appeared of record, it may be that Chittenden was not at liberty, consistently with Hennessy’s rights and without previous notice to him, to treat that contract as abandoned, and to make the sale to Rogers; the general rule being that if a party means to rescind a contract because of the failure of the other party to perform it, he should give a clear notice of his. intention to do so, unless the contract itself dispenses with such notice, or unless notice becomes unnecessary by reason of the conduct of the parties. 1 Sugden on Vendors, c. 5, § 5.

But Chittenden assumed to treat his contract with Bacon as forfeited or annulled, and executed a deed to Rogers. Of these facts Hennessy was informed. He knew that Rogers claimed the lands absolutely as his property under the purchase from Chittenden, and that the deed under which Rogers asserted title was recorded. And he had accurate knowledge of the title to the lands so far as it appeared of record. He also knew, at the time of the agreement of 1886, of Rogers’ contention that the contract of 1882 had been forfeited by reason of Bacon’s, failure to comply with its provisions. Hé, nevertheless, disputed Rogers’ claim to the property. But Rogers, with equal distinctness, disputed his claim. And this dispute was settled by the agreement of March 18, 1886, under which Hennessy consented to take an undivided interest of one-half at the price of $2750, and let Rogers have the other half.

He now contends that he was induced to make this settlement by false representations upon the part of Rogers, and because of the suppression of facts that ought to have been, but were not, communicated to him by Rogers. The evidence upon this point is quite conflicting; and does not justify the conclusion that Rogers made any false representations whatever, or that he withheld any facts' he was under a legal obligan tion to disclose. Hennessy says that if he had known, when conferring with Rogers, that the latter had agreed to let Bacon have an interest, in the lands, he would not have made the settlement; for that fact, he contends, would have indicated collusion between Rogers and Bacon. We do not see that ignorance of such fact affects the validity of the settlement of T886, or that it would have prevented its consummation . If Hennessy had been informed of Rogers’ promise to give Bacon an interest in the lands, he would have known that such promise could not, under the circumstances, have been enforced. The money that Rogers paid Chittenden was his own, and in the title acquired by him Bacon had no legal interest. Rogers moved in the matter of the purchase from Chittenden entirely upon his own responsibility. With full knowledge of the title that Rogers had acquired, Hennessy deliberately chose to compromise the dispute between them, as shown by the agreement of 1886, and by the deeds executed in pursuance of its provisions. No fraud was practised by Rogers. He was guilty of no unfairness. He concealed nothing that he was under legal obligation to state. His information in respect to the title was no greater than Hennessy had, or than Hennessy could easily have obtained. It is the case of the compromise of a disputed claim, the parties dealing with each other upon terms of perfect equality, holding no relations of trust or confidence to each other, and each having knowledge, or having the opportunity to acquire knowledge, of every fact bearing upon the question of the validity of their respective claims. Cleaveland v. Richardson, 132 U. S. 318, 329. Such a settlement ought not to be overthrown, even if the court should now be of opinion that the party complaining of it surrendered rights that the law, if appealed to, would have sustained. After this settlement was made, Rogers was at liberty, for any reasons deemed by him sufficient, to give Bacon an interest in the one-half acquired by him under the settlement of 1886, and the interest thus acquired by Bacon did not inure to Hennessy by reason of the relations created between them by the original contract of 1882. As between Rogers and Bacon the lands became the absolute property of the former under his purchase from Chittenden, and, under the settlement of 1886, and, so far as Hennessy was concerned, an undivided one-half interest was confirmed to Rogers, as his property, to dispose of as he deemed best.

Decree affirmed.