CALDWELL
v.
TEXAS

U.S. | 1891-01-12
No. 1541
137 U.S. 692 Supreme Court of the United States (1891) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 34 L. Ed. 816 · 11 S. Ct. 224 · 1891 U.S. LEXIS 2059 · SCDB 1890-086
Cited by 74 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Caldwell challenged his Texas state criminal conviction on federal constitutional grounds, arguing that the indictment against him violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due process and equal protection. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error, holding that Caldwell had not been denied equal protection or due process because Texas law applied equally to all persons and the state court properly determined that the indictment satisfied constitutional requirements, and further holding that Caldwell's objections were merely technical challenges to the indictment form rather than claims of unequal or arbitrary treatment.


© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Chief Justice Fuller,

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

By the Fourteenth Amendment the powers of the States in dealing with crime within their borders are not limited, but no State can deprive particular persons or classes of persons of equal and impartial justice under the law. Law, in its regular course of administration through courts of justice, is due process, and when secured by the law of the State, the constitutional requisition is satisfied. 2 Kent Comm.

13. And due process is so secured by laws operating on all alike, and not subjecting the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the powers of government, unrestrained by the established principles of private right and distributive justice. Bank of Columbia v. Okely, 4 Wheat. 235, 244. The power of the State must be exerted within, the limits of those principles, and its exertion cannot be sustained when special, partial and arbitrary. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 535. No question of repugnancy to the Federal Constitution can be fairly said to arise when the inquiry of the State courts is directed to the .sufficiency of an indictment in the ordinary administration of criminal law, and the statutes authorizing the form of indictment pursued are not obviously violative of the fundamental principles above adverted to.

The case before us is destitute of the elements of a Federal question, since there was nothing special,’ partial or arbitrary, or in violation of fundamental principles, in the law of the State in accordance with which the indictment was found, and as applied in passing upon its sufficiency. The plaintiff in error was not denied the equal protection of the laws, nor deprived of the process due by the law of the land. The constitution of Texas secured to him the right to demand the nature and cause of the-accusation against him, and. the State court determined, as was its province, that this demand was satisfied by the indictment in question. His objections were in effect to the technical sufficiency of the indictment, but not that his rights had been determined by any other rules than those applied to the rest of the community, nor that the court had done more than commit errors in the disposition of a subject within its jurisdiction.

No title, right, privilege or immunity under the Constitution of the United States was specially set up or claimed in the trial court, or in the Court of Appeals, except as the petition for rehearing may be held to have constituted such claim. The validity of the existence of the court and itá jurisdiction over the crime named in the indictment and over the person of the defendant were not drawn in question, nor was the validity of the laws of the State, except after judgment and upon the petition for a rehearing. The usual rule is that a contention thus delayed comes too late, but if this should be treated as an exception, on the ground that the Court of Appeals permitted argument on the question and delivered a decision and opinion upon it, yet, where the misconception of the application of the Fourteenth Amendment is so obvious, we are unwilling to retain the cause for further argument, and may avail ourselves of the rule ordinarily applicable to the afterthoughts of counsel.

The writ of error is

Dismissed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By (40 total)

  • Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (U.S. 1934)
    …Craft, 182 U.S. 427, 436; Holmes v. Conway, 241 U.S. 624. Hagar v. Reclamation District No. 108, 111 U.S. 701, 708; Hooker v. Los Angeles, 188 U.S. 314, 318; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 111. Hurtado v. California, supra; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U.S. 692; Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83; Barrington v. Missouri, 205 U.S. 483. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90; Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581; Jordan v. Massachusetts, 225 U.S. 167. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172; Howard v. Kentucky, 200 U.S. 164; Rawlin…
  • Twining v. State of N.J., 211 U.S. 78 (U.S. 1908)
    …sustained all state laws, statutory or judicially declared, regulating procedure, evidence and methods of trial, and held them to be consistent with due process of law.* Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90; Re Converse, 137 U. S. 624; Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692; Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462; Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U. S. 314; McNulty v. California, 149 U. S. 645; McKane v. Durston, 153 U. S. 684; Iowa Central v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389; Lowe v. Kansas, 163 U. S. 81; Allen v. Georgia, 166 U. S. 138; Hodgson v…
  • Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Tr. Co., 157 U.S. 429 (U.S. 1895)

Previewing 3 of 40 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw