HAROLD ARCHER, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Harold Archer appeals from the denial of his second motion for relief under Florida Criminal Procedure Rule 1, challenging his 1960 guilty plea to burglary entered without counsel. The court reverses, holding that successive motions cannot be dismissed based on prior denials without a hearing unless the motion is conclusively without merit on its face.
The court reversed the denial of the second motion, holding that successive motions for relief cannot be dismissed based merely on a prior denial unless the motion and case records conclusively show the prisoner is not entitled to relief. A prior denial without a hearing and without a determination on the merits does not bar consideration of a subsequent motion raising substantially the same grounds.
“the court could properly deny the second motion on the ground that the matter had been previously adjudicated”
States the central issue the court must resolve regarding whether successive motions can be dismissed based on prior denials
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceIn 1960, Archer was arraigned on a burglary charge and entered a guilty plea without counsel after the court asked if he desired an attorney and he st…
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Harold Archer appeals from an order denying his motion for relief pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 F.S.A. ch. 924 Appendix. We reverse.
In 1960 Archer was arraigned on a charge of burglary to which he entered a plea of guilty without benefit of counsel, after which the record shows: “Whereupon, the court asked the defendant if he desired to consult an attorney before entering a plea and the defendant stated that he did not desire counsel and that he was guilty of the charge.” The court then entered judgment and sentence. In May 1963 Archer filed a motion for relief under Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1. This motion was denied on July 8, 1963 without a hearing. Archer filed a second motion in July 1963 which was denied October 30, 1963 without a hearing upon the ground that the matter had been previously adjudged. By this appeal we review the latter order.
In the second motion Archer alleges he lacked funds to employ an attorney when he entered his plea of guilty and he was not made aware of the existence of any right to representation absent such funds; that he entered his guilty plea without the aid of counsel and that there was no waiver of his right to have counsel furnished since he had no knowledge of such a right, the court having failed to advise him of its existence. This second motion also set forth allegations of fact which, if true, would entitle the movant to have the judgment and sentence vacated and set aside. See King v. State, Fla.App.1963, 157 So.2d 440.
There remains for our determination, therefore, only the question as to whether *164or -not the court could properly deny the second motion on the ground that the matter had been previously adjudicated.
The Florida Supreme Court has said that the decisions of .the federal courts should be used “as a guide to the proper application * * * of the Florida Rule” since Florida Criminal Procedure Rule No. 1 is adopted almost verbatim from Title 28 U.S.C.A. § 225S, of the federal statutes. Roy v. Wainwright, Fla.1963, 151 So.2d 825. Pursuant to this directive this court notes that the United States Supreme Court in Sanders v. United States, 1963, 373 U.S. 1, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148, has set out guidelines in dealing with “successive motions on grounds previously heard and determined.”
The Sanders case, supra, stresses the point that a prisoner invoking § 2255 enjoys the same rights as does an applicant for habeas corpus and that any substantial procedural hurdles making his § 2255 remedy any less swift or effective than that of habeas corpus would engender grave constitutional doubts.
The court goes on to point out that for the purpose of considering successive motions the motion procedure and habeas corpus are substantially equivalent and that the principles governing successive applications for habeas corpus should be applied, with one exception. In cases where the second or successive application is shown to be conclusively without merit on the basis of the motion and files and records of the case, such motion should be denied without a hearing. Absent the above-noted exception a second or successive motion should be denied on the ground of a prior denial only if (1) the same ground presented in the subsequent motion was determined adversely to the prisoner on the prior application, (2) the prior determination was on the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reaching the merits of the subsequent application.1 Sanders v. United States, supra.
In view of the foregoing principles, we find that the court erred in its denial of the second motion for the reason that the motion, files and records of the case do not conclusively show that' the prisoner is not entitled to relief, coupled with the fact that the prior denial was entered without a hearing, was based upon the insufficiency of the motion and therefore was not a determination on the merits. The order denying relief is reversed for further proceedings in accordance with the principles announced in King, supra.
ALLEN and ANDREWS, JJ., concur.
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McCRAE v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1983)…Rule 3.850 motion. See Palmer v. State, 273 So. 2d 135 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973); Roberts v. State, 250 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1971); Piehl v. State, 173 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1965), quashed on other grounds, 184 So. 2d 417 (Fla.1966); Archer v. State, 166 So. 2d 163 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, if the summary denial in the instant [*1391] case was based upon a determination that the issues raised by the motion either were or could have been presented by direct appeal, or that t…
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State v. Bolyea, 520 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 1988)…and we plainly have given the rule the same broad scope as its federal counterpart. Moreover, we explicitly have recognized federal precedent interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 2255 as persuasive authority in construing Rule 3.850. Id. Accord Archer v. State, 166 So. 2d 163, 164 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964). The United States Supreme Court prior to Roy clearly had ruled that the remedy afforded by 28 U.S.C. § 2255 was at least as broad as that afforded by the common law writ of habeas corpus: [I]t conclusively appears from the…
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Mason v. State, 176 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1965)…440; Beadles v. State, Fla.App., 162 So. 2d 4; Sams v. [*80] State, Fla.App., 163 So. 2d 10; Stewart v. State, Fla.App. 163 So. 2d 527; Phillips v. State, Fla.App. 164 So. 2d 858; Holmes v. State, Fla.App., 165 So. 2d 433; Archer v. State, Fla.App., 166 So. 2d 163; Carver v. State, Fla.App., 171 So. 2d 898. See also the opinion of the Third District Court of Appeal in Furman v. State, 162 So. 2d 308. We approve the views on the subject announced by the Courts of Appeal of the Second and Third Districts in the…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1963)
- King v. State, 157 So. 2d 440 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963)
- Jetson ROY v. Louie L. Wainwright, 151 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 1963)
- Morgan Simpson v. State, 165 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 2d DCA 1964)