CRESCENT MINING COMPANY
v.
WASATCH MINING COMPANY

U.S. | 1894-01-22
No. 180
151 U.S. 317 Supreme Court of the United States (1894) Negative Treatment
Also reported at: 38 L. Ed. 177 · 14 S. Ct. 348 · 1894 U.S. LEXIS 2059 · SCDB 1893-109
Cited by 26 cases

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Synopsis

Crescent Mining Company mortgaged mining property to Wasatch Mining Company and failed to pay the purchase money when due, leading Wasatch to enforce the mortgage in Utah territorial court. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's decree, holding that Crescent's failure to signify readiness to pay and cooperate with Wasatch in obtaining a court order to deposit funds into court gave rise to Wasatch's right to enforce the mortgage, and that Crescent could not resist enforcement by raising defenses about the deed's contents when it had already pursued a separate action to reform the deed.


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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Shiras,

Mr. Justice Shiras,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

Our examination of this record fails to disclose any error in the decree appealed from.

The' proceedings in the District Court of the Territory of Utah, to enforce the mortgage given by the Crescent Mining Company to the "Wasatch'Mining Company, were certainly in pursuance of the terms of that instrument. The defence raised by demurrer, that the Crescent Company could not pay the purchase money into the court until an order of the court permitting such payment had been procured, and that the Crescent Company, not being a party of record, could not procure such order, was not sound, because that reason, namely, that the Crescent Company was not a party of record, equally prevented the Wasatch Company from procuring such order. It is true that the Wasatch Company was a party of record; but, of course, the court could not, on the application of that company, have granted an order on the Crescent Company, not a party and not represented in court, to pay money into court.

It is obvious that the contract, in that particular, required the. cooperation of the parties. Hence, when, by the terms of the mortgage, the time had arrived for the payment of the money, it was the duty of the Crescent Company to have signified its readiness to pay and to unite with the Wasatch Company in procuring the necessary order of the court. Not having so done, a right to enforce the mortgage at once arose.

Nor do we think that the defence set up in the answer, that the deed executed by the Wasatch Company and deposited, as provided for in the agreement, in the Deseret National Bank, did not contain all the parcels of land to which the Crescent Company was entitled, was sufficient, because the answer itself disclosed that the Crescent Company had availed itself of its remedy by direct proceedings against the Wasatch Company to reform the deed. Such proceedings would necessarily result in a decision that the deed in question was correct, or else in a reformation of it.

An election to pursue a remedy by an independent action would not seem to have left the Orescent Company free to resist an enforcement of its express contract in the mortgage by resorting to the same matter. However this inay be, it is satisfactory to know that this view of the subject worked jro injury to the Crescent Company when we learn from our own records that the result of that independent proceeding-was a decree in favor of the company compelling a -reformation of the deed, so as to include all of the lands purchased. Wasatch Mining Co. v. Crescent Mining Co., 148 U. S. 293.

Further objection is urged to the decree of the court below in that it called for the payment of interest on the principal sum from the time fixed for payment until the same shall have been paid into court. It is said that the mortgage does not itself provide for interest, and that if the money had been paid into court it would have there remained without interest. Hut this is not necessarily so. The court would, doubtless, if so requested by the parties in interest, have ordered so large a sum invested. At all events, it is no hardship that the Crescent Company, which had both the use of the money and the receipt of the issues and profits of the mines, should be charged with interest for the period between the maturity of the mortgage and the payment into court.

Another complaint urged to the decree below is because it' directs that the money should be paid into the District Court of the Territory in the case between the two mining companies instead of in the case between the Wasatch Company aid Jennings. But the decree discloses that this disposition of the money is only temporary, to await the obtaining of an order in the latter case. Such an order, as the case now stands, is a matter of course, and doubtless can be obtained forthwith, so as to dispense with the intermediate payment.

The decree of the court below is

Affirmed.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Spalding v. Mason, 161 U.S. 375 (U.S. 1896)
    …s the implied. contract of the parties.” It is no hardship for one who has had the use of money owing to another to be required to pay interest thereon from the time when the payment should have been made. Crescent Mining Co. v. Wasatch Mining Co., 151 U. S. 317, 323. The circumstance that the complainant may have considered himself entitled to an account and to receive a greater sum than was actually found to be due, does not affect complainant’s right to the interest upon what was really due. Sturm v. Bo…
  • Dexter & Carpenter, Inc. v. Houston, 20 F.2d 647 (4th Cir. 1927)
    …commencement of the suit. “It is no hardship for one who has had the nse of money owing to another to be required to pay interest thereon. * * * ” Spalding v. Mason, 161 U. S. 375, 16 S. Ct. 592, 40 L. Ed. 738; Crescent Min. Co. v. Wasatch Min. Co., 151 U. S. 317, 14 S. Ct. 348, 38 L. Ed. 177. If the judge erred at all in the matter, it was in favor of the defendant, by not allowing interest from the time of the closing of the transaction. Therefore the decree of the District Court will be modified, to the…
    1 / 2
  • Kishi v. Humble OIL & Ref. Co., 10 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1925)
    …, and thus be liable for interest, they could have deposited it in the registry of the court. [3] A stakeholder who retains money is liable for interest. Templeman v. Fauntleroy, 3 Rand. (Va.) 434, 447; Crescent Mining Co. v. Wasatch Mining Co., 151 U. S. 317, 14 S. Ct. 348, 38 L. Ed. 177. For the same reasons Japhet and Coon, the other appellants, are entitled to interest from the Gulf Production Company. The decree appealed from is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to allow interest a…
    1 / 2

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