BOGLE
v.
MAGONE
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In a tariff classification dispute, the Supreme Court held that anchovy and bloater pastes should not be classified as "sauces" under the 1883 Tariff Act but rather as "prepared or preserved fish," resulting in a lower duty rate. The Court ruled that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for the defendant without allowing the jury to consider evidence about the articles' nature, use, and commercial designation, and remanded the case for a new trial.
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Mr. Justice Gray,
after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The word “sauce,” as commonly used, designates a condiment, generally but not always of liquid form, eaten as an addition to and together with a dish of food, to give it flavor and make it more palatable; and is not applied to anything which is eaten, alone or with a bit of bread, .either for.its own sake only, or to stimulate the appetite for other food to be eaten afterwards. For instance, cheese eaten with bread, or ham or chicken eaten in a sandwich, or anchovies or herrings, caviare or shreds of salt fish, eaten, whether with or without bread, as an appetizer before a meal, would hardly be called a sauce.
In the dictionary of Webster, referred to at the trial, the primary definition of “sauce” is accordingly given as “A mixture or composition to be eaten with food for improving its relish; a relishing condiment; appetizing additidn to the principal material of a dish.” In a later edition, there is given, ,• by way of additional definition, “ Stewed or preserved fruit, eaten with other food as a relish; as apple sauce, cranberry sauce, etc.”
In the tariff act of 1883, the clause relating to “ sauces of all kinds,” (unless affected by other clauses-in the act, or by commercial usage,) may well be held to include all substances, whether solid or liquid, fairly coming within either of these two definitions. But the second definition has no application to the present case.
The three clauses, mentioned in argument as possibly applicable to the goods in question, are arranged in the act in, a natural order, beginning with the most specific and restrictive, and ending with the most general; first, “anchovies,” “imported in any other form” than “packed in oil or otherwise ” in small tin boxes, forty per cent ad valorem; then, “all other fish, prepared qr preserved,” “not specially enumerated or provided for in. this act,” twenty-five per cent ad valorem; and lastly, “sauces, of all kinds, not otherwise specially enumerated or provided for in this act,” thirty-five per cent ad valorem. 22 Stat. 503, 504. Any article which comes within two or more of these.descriptions must therefore be assigned to the earlier one. Homer v. The Collector, 1 Wall. 486; Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162; Seeberger v. Cahn, 137 U. S. 95; American Net & Twine, Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468.
At the trial, the' plaintiffs introduced evidence' that the goods in question were manufactured out of anchovies or bloaters, groundup and spiced; were.used as food, in a distinct form, or as an appetizer, principally in a sandwich, or sometimes with a cracker, and not as a condiment; and were specifically known as “ anchovy paste ” and “ bloater paste; ” and that, in trade and commerce in 1883 and previously, the word “ sauces ” was applied to liquids only, and not to these pastes.
The Circuit Court, in directing a verdict for the defendant, ruled, in substance, that as matter of law, and without regard to commercial usage, these articles came within the words “sauces of all kinds” in the tariff act. ¥e are unable to concur in that view; or to say, either of our judicial knowledge, or in view of the evidence introduced, that these articles are necessarily “ sauces ” of any kind; still less, that this is so clear as to exclude the usual test of commercial designation. Cadwalader v. Zeh, 151 U. S. 171, 176.
On the contrary, we are of opinion that the evidence of the nature and the use Of these articles, and of their commercial designation, would have warranted a jury in finding that they were not “sauces,” and were “fish, preserved or prepared.” If that fact were proved, it would follow that, as such, the bloater paste, at least, was subject to the duty of only twenty-five per cent ad valorem; but a question might arise, which does not appear to have been considered at the trial, whether the anchovy paste was not subject to a duty of forty per cent ad valorem, under the earlier and more specific clause of the act, as “anchovies” “imported in any other form” than packed, in oil or otherwise, in small tin boxes.
Judgment reversed, and case rema/nded to the Circuit Court with directions to set aside the verdict a/nd to order a new trial.
Mr. Justice Jackson did not hear the argument, and took no part in the decision of this case.
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Authorities Cited
- Am. Net & Twine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U.S. 468 (U.S. 1891)
- Reiche v. Smythe, 13 Wall. 162 (U.S. 1871)
- Cadwalader v. ZEH, 151 U.S. 171 (U.S. 1894)
- Homer v. The Collector, 1 Wall. 486 (U.S. 1863)
- Seeberger v. Cahn, 137 U.S. 95 (U.S. 1890)