DADE COUNTY, A POLITICAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
J. C. RAY, ELIZABETH M. RAY, CLARENCE W. NORWOOD, RAY REALTY CORPORATION, A FLORIDA CORPORATION, AND TEXACO, INC., A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLEES
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The Florida District Court of Appeal affirmed a lower court's order denying a motion to dismiss and a motion for summary judgment. The appellate court found that the complaint stated a cause of action and that the appellant failed to demonstrate the absence of material facts or entitlement to judgment as a matter of law.
No, the chancellor did not err in denying the motion to dismiss because the complaint stated a cause of action. The chancellor also did not err in denying the motion for summary judgment because the appellant failed to demonstrate that there were no issues of material fact and that it was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
“From an examination of the record on appeal, it appears that the complaint states a cause of action.”
Establishes the basis for affirming the denial of the motion to dismiss.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDade County (appellant) filed motions to dismiss and for summary judgment in the trial court. The appellees (plaintiffs) had filed a complaint against…
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By this interlocutory appeal, the appellant [defendant in the trial court] seeks review of a combined order of a chancellor denying its motion to dismiss and its motion for summary judgment [or decree].
From an examination of the record on appeal, it appears that the complaint states a cause of action. See: Harris v. Goff, Fla.App.1963, 151 So.2d 642. Therefore, the action of the chancellor in denying the motion to dismiss was correct. To determine if the chancellor erred in the denial of the motion for summary judgment [or decree], it is incumbent upon the appellant to demonstrate that there were no issues of material fact and that it was entitled to a summary judgment [or decree] as a matter *476of law. See: Palov v. Florida Power & Light Company, Fla.App.1958, 107 So.2d 780; Majeske v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, Fla.App.1959, 117 So.2d 531; Rule 1.36(c), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 31 F.S.A. Examining the record on appeal in light of this principle, we do not find that the chancellor committed error in this regard. Therefore, the combined order denying the motion to dismiss and the motion for summary judgment [or decree] be and the same is hereby affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Citator
Cited By
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RAY v. Dade Cnty., 26 Fla. Supp. 7 (Dade Cty. Cir. Ct. 1965)…ion of the board of county commissioners. This court denied those motions by order of April 17, 1964, and the county took an interlocutory appeal to the Third District Court of Appeal, and that court by order of July 24, 1964, in Dade County v. Ray, 166 So. 2d. 475 (Fla. App. 1964), affirmed, citing Harris v. Goff, 151 So. 2d. 642 (Fla. App. 1963). The matter then came back to this court for trial on the merits and was tried October 7, 1964 for approximately three days. At the commencement of the trial the co…
Authorities Cited
- Majeske v. Palm Beach Kennel Club, 117 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 2d DCA 1959)
- Harris v. H.A. Goff, 151 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1963)
- Palov v. Fla. Power & Light Co., 107 So. 2d 780 (Fla. 3d DCA 1958)