WILLIAMS
v.
UNITED STATES
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Williams was an appeal of a claim by Dr. Taylor for compensation under Congressional Resolutions requiring continued service until the end of the American Revolutionary War. The Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Claims' judgment that Dr. Taylor did not qualify for the benefit because his service was interrupted when he transferred from a supernumerary position in the Virginia line to a newly created regiment of guards, which was later discharged when its enlistment term expired, taking him out of active service before the war ended.
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Mr. Chief Justice Waite delivered the opinion of the court.
From the finding of facts sent up with this appeal we are clearly of the opinion that Dr. Taylor did not “ continue in service until the end of the war,” within the meaning of the Resolutions of Congress of October 21, 1780, and of March 22, 1783, under which the claim in this case is made. When he accepted his appointment in the regiment of guards, January 9, 1779, he' ceased to be a supernumerary surgeon’s mate and became an active officer in the new regiment.
Consequently when that regiment was discharged, because its term of enlistment had expired, he was out of service. When the new regiment was raised the Governor and Council of Virginia were authorized by Congress to appoint its officers out of those in the Virginia line who were then supernumerary. Although it is said in one of the additional findings, that Dr. Taylor was “ assigned to active duty, ” this is to he construed in connection with the resolution to which reference is made, and that being done it is apparent there was no intention by that language to modify the previous finding that “he was appointed surgeon’s mate of the regiment of guards authorized by the resolution of January 9, 1779, of the Continental Congress.” By the resolution Congress permitted the supernumerary officers in the line to accept appointments in the new regiment. Such an acceptance took them out of their former position in the line and put them into the new organization. The judgment of the Court of Claim's is affirmed.
Mr. P. E. Dye for appellant.
Mr. Attorney General, Mr. Solicitor General and Mr. Assistant Attorney General Smith for appellee.
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