PIM
v.
ST. LOUIS
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A woman sought to recover real estate in St. Louis from which she claimed the city had wrongfully deprived her, but the city prevailed by asserting a ten-year adverse possession under Missouri law. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error for lack of jurisdiction, holding that a party cannot raise a federal constitutional claim for the first time in a petition for rehearing after the state court's final decision—federal rights must be specially set up or claimed in the state proceedings to preserve this Court's review authority.
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Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.
This was an action for the recovery of certain real estate in the city of St. Louis of the possession of which the plaintiff' in error, who was the plaintiff below, alleged that she was illegally and wrongfully deprived by the defendants. The city denied the plaintiff's' claim, and relied upon continuous adverse possession for ten years prior to the accruing of the plaintiff’s cause of action.
We held at the present term in Chicago & Northwestern Railway v. Chicago, 164 U. S. 454, 457, as had frequently before been adjudged, that this court-could not review the final judgment of the highest court of the State, alleged to have denied a right protected by the Constitution of the United States, unless such right was specially set up or claimed in the state court by the party against whom the judgment was rendered. Rev. Stat. § 709.
It is contended on this writ of error that the judgment below deprived the plaintiff in error of her property without due process of law, and that this result was accomplished by applying to the case a certain statute of limitations of Missouri as construed and enforced by the. highest court of that State. , '
Upon inspecting the record, we find that no Federal right was set up or claimed, in any form, until after the final decision of the case by the' Supreme Court of Missouri, and then by a petition for rehearing. That petition was overruled by that court without any determination of the alleged Federal question, indeed without any allusion to it. The claim of a Federal right came too late, so far as the revisory power of this court is concerned. Loeber v. Schroeder, 149 U. S. 580, 585; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 183.
It is contended that the cases of Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U. S. 657, Merchant v. Pennsylvania Railroad, 153 U. S. 380, and Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34, recognized some exceptions to this general rule. But an examination of the first and last named of those cases, as reported, will show that a Federal right was specially claimed in and was passed upon by the state court. In Marchant v. Pennsylvania. Railroad it does not distinctly appear from the opinion of the court that the Federal right alleged to have been. violated was specially claimed in the state court. But the record of that case shows not only that such was the fact, but that, the jurisdiction of this court in that case was beyond question.
The writ of error must he dismissed for want of jurisdiction.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (11 total)
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Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589 (U.S. 1901)…that it is too late to raise a Federal question by a petition for a rehearing in the Supreme Cfourt of a State after that court has pronouncedits final decision. Loeber v. Schroeder. 149 U. S. 580; Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180; Pim v. St. Louis, 165 U. S. 273. But those were cases in' which the Supreme Court of the State refused the petition for a rehearing,' and dismissed the petition without passing upon the Federal questions. In the present case, as already stated, the Supreme Court of North Carolina…
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Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (U.S. 1903)
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Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan, 263 U.S. 444 (U.S. 1924)…tc. Ry. Co., 228 U. S. 326, 334; Forbes v. State Council of Virginia, 216 U. S. 396, 399; McCorquodale v. Texas, 211 U. S. 432, 437; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McGrew, 188 U. S. 291, 308; Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U. S. 589, 592; Pim v. St. Louis, 165 U. S. 273. • It was the purpose of the Act of 1,922 to change the rule established by this formidable array of authorities as to the class of cases therein described. The question in such cases could not well be raised until the handing down of ' the opinio…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657 (U.S. 1892)
- Scott v. McNEAL, 154 U.S. 34 (U.S. 1894)
- Sayward v. Denny, 158 U.S. 180 (U.S. 1895)
- Loeber v. Schroeder, 149 U.S. 580 (U.S. 1893)
- Marchant v. Pennsylyania R.R. Co., 153 U.S. 380 (U.S. 1894)
- Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Chicago, 164 U.S. 454 (U.S. 1896)