WINONA AND ST. PETER RAILROAD COMPANY
v.
UNITED STATES
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The Winona and St. Peter Railroad Company sought to enforce land it received through an allegedly erroneous federal land certification, but the Supreme Court affirmed that the land company purchasing from the railroad did not qualify for statutory protection as a good faith purchaser because it had notice of a preemption claimant's recorded claim and continued possession of the property. The Court held that the protective statutes enacted in 1887 and 1896 only shield purchasers without notice of defects in title existing before certification, and do not protect those who purchase with knowledge of prior claims remaining on the records or evidenced by actual possession.
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Mr. Justice Brewer,
after stating. the case, delivered the opinion of the court.
The differences between this case and that -referred to in the foregoing statement are these: Anterior to any claim of right by the railroad company, by virtue either of filing its map of definite location or of surveying and staking' upon the ground its line, a preemption filing was placed upon the land which was never cancelled. There remained, therefore, on the recoi’ds until after the certificatioh to the-State a, claim of a right to preempt.' The party making this claim continued in possession by himself or tenant until not only the construction of the railroad, but until after the conveyance by the railroad company to the land company, and so remained in possession until a suit of ejectment-was brought by-the land company, in 1877.
On the strength of these facts the Court of Appeals-was of opinion that the land company could not be considered one purchasing in good faith from the railroad companj^; that it took its conveyance with notice, from possession, of all the rights and claims of the-party so in possession, and therefore that it did, not bring itself within the protecting clauses of the act of March 3, 1887, c. 376, 24 Stat. 556, and there was nothing to stay the right of the government • to have-this certificatioh so.erroneously issued-cancelled. With that conclusion we coiicur. • That the land was erroneously certified is, under the .prior decisions of this coiirt,-not open to question; and the.acts of 1887 and 1896 have; as indicated in the opinion in the prior case,, the purpose of -protecting only that party whose purchase from the railroad'company must b.e. considered one in good faith. It is .essential to the ¿protection of these statutes that the party purchasing from the railroad company has no notice by any fact subsequent, to and independent of the certification or patent of any defect in title. Such a purchaser cannot claim to be one in good faith if he has notice of facts outside the’ records of the land department disclosing a prior right. The protection goes only tó matters anterior to the certification and patent. The statute was not intended to cut off the rights of parties continuing after, the certification, and of which at the time of his purchase the purchaser had notice. Only the purely technical claims of the government were waived..
Here the claimant Marshall was in possession; had' been in possession for twenty years; .the land was not wild and vacant land. His-possession' was-under a recorded claim of title, and. under such a claim as forbade the issue-of a patent. In other words,, the.land was erroneously certified. There was, and continued'to be,' an individual claimant for the land. There was no cancellation, on the -records -of-the land départment of-his claim. He continued in possession,, and was in possession, not only when-the certification was made but when the land company purchased. Its purchase,. therefore, was not one made in good faith, and there is nothing disclosed to stay the mandate of the statute for the. adjustment, of the land grant, and. a suit to set aside th& certificate erroneously issued. The ' decree of the Court. of Appeals is - •
Affirmed*-
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S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1897)…s title to all the lands described in its pleadings, except those, if any, that are protected, in the hands of claimants, by acts of Congress. United States v. Winona & St. Peter Railroad, 165 U. S. 463; Winona & St. Peter Railroad v. United States, 165 U. S. 483. But as the Government has not appealed, the decree cannot be reversed for the error of the Circuit Court in not finally disposing of the issues between the United States and the individual defendants who claim under the Southern Pacific Eailroad Co…
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United States v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 184 U.S. 49 (U.S. 1902)…railroad companies lands, which though supposed to be part of their grants, proved not to be so. This legislation was fully considered in United States v. Winona &c. Railroad Company, 165 U. S. 463, and Winona &c. Railroad Company v. United States, 165 U. S. 483, and any further discussion of its scope is unnecessary. In respect to it we said: “ The act of 1896, confirming the right and title of a bona fide purchaser, and providing that the patent to his lands should not be vacated or annulled, must be hel…