UNITED STATES
v.
GOLDENBERG

U.S. | 1897-10-25
No. 35
168 U.S. 95 Supreme Court of the United States (1897) Caution
Also reported at: 42 L. Ed. 394 · 18 S. Ct. 3 · SCDB 1897-005 · 1897 U.S. LEXIS 1709
Cited by 110 cases

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Synopsis

In United States v. Goldenberg, the Supreme Court addressed whether a statute imposing a ten-day requirement for protesting customs duties also imposed a ten-day requirement for paying those duties. The Court held that it did not, finding that the statute's language imposed the time requirement only on the notice of protest, not on payment, and that courts may not read unstated conditions into statutory language absent cogent reasons to believe the literal text fails to disclose the legislature's intent. The decision reaffirmed the principle that statutory interpretation must begin with the plain meaning of the words used, and omissions from a statute do not justify judicial addition to its language.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Bee wee,

Mr. Justice Bee wee,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question must be answered in the negative. Such am swer is demanded by the obvious and natural import of the language, giving to it the ordinary grammatical construction. This is practically conceded by counsel for the Government, for he says in his brief “ a literal interpretation of the statute favors the importers ” ; and again, referring to the opinion of District Judge Townsend, he adds, “strictly speaking, Judge Townsend is correct in saying that this .statute contains no ambiguity.” There are two separate clauses, each prescribing a condition. One is, “shall within ten days after ‘but not before’ . . . give notice,” etc., and the other, “shall pay the full amount of the duties,” etc. In the latter no time is mentioned, and, the clauses being independent, there is no grammatical warrant for taking the specification of time from the one and incorporating it in the other. The primary and general rule of statutory construction is that the intent' of the lawmaker is to be found in the langunge that he bas used. He is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar. The courts have no-function of legislation, and simply seek to ascertain the will of the legislator. It is true there are cases in which the letter of the statute is not deemed controlling, but the cases are few and exceptional, and only arise when there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not fully and accurately disclose the intent. No mere omission, no mere failure to provide for contingencies, which it may seem wise to have specifically provided for,-justify any judicial addition to' the language of the statute. In the case at bar the omission to make specific provision for the time of payment does not offend the moral sense; Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U. S. 457; it involves. no injustice, oppression or absurdity, United States v. Kirby, 7 Wall. 482; McKee v. United States, 164 U. S. 287; there is no overwhelming necessity for applying in the one clause the same limitation of time which is provided in the other. Hon constat but that Congress believed it had sufficiently provided for payment by other legislation in reference to retaining possession until payment or security therefor; or that it failed to appreciate the advantages which counsel insists will inure to the importer in case payment does not equally with protest follow within ten days from the action of the collector; or that, appreciating fully those advantages, it was not unwilling that he should enjoy them. Certainly, there is nothing which imperatively requires the court to supply an omission in the statute, or to hold that Congress must have intended to do that which it has failed to do. Under these circumstances, all that can be determined is that Congress has not specifically provided that payment shall be made within-ten days as one of the conditions of challenging the action of the collector, and hence there is no warrant for enforcing any such condition.

An answer in the negative must be certified to the Circuit Court of Appeals.

Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus

Citator

Cited By (44 total)

  • Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 417 (Fla. 1917)
    …ute in its native form does not evidence. See Alexaxnder v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, text 485. The legislator is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar, said the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Goldberg, 168 U. S. 95, 42 L. Ed. 394, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3, cited in 2 Lewis’ Sutherland Statutory Construction, Sec. 366. In the case of State ex rel. Jordan v. Buckman, 18 Fla. 267, Mr. Justice Westcott, speak ing for the court, said that when the language of a constitut…
  • State v. Tunnicliffe, 98 Fla. 731 (Fla. 1929)
    …. Lehman, 55 Fla. 847, 41 So. R. 18. Such eases are few and exceptional. Such a construction is sanctioned by the courts only when there are cogent reasons for believing that the letter does not accurately disclose the intent. U. S. v. Goldenberg, 168 U. S. 95, 42 L. Ed. 394; Osborne v. Simpson, 114 So. R. 543; Fine v. Moran, 74 Fla. 47, 77 So. R. 533; State ex rel. Jordan v. Buckman, 18 Fla. 267. The word “failure” when used in the commercial pursuits, including the conduct of the affairs of a bank, usu…
  • State v. Swope, 159 Fla. 18 (Fla. 1947)
    …tute in its native form does not evidence. See Alexander v. Worthington, 5 Md. 471, text 485. The legislator is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rules of grammar, said the Supreme Court of the United States in United States v. Goldberg, 168 U.S. 95. 42 L. ed. 394, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 3, cited in 2 Lewis' Sutherland Statutory Construction, Sec. 366. In the case of State ex rel Jordan v. Buckman, 18 Fla. 267 , Mr. Justice Westcott, speaking for the court, said that when the language of a constituti…

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