MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY
v.
ALLEN
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In this insurance dispute, the Supreme Court determined that when an insured policyholder and an insurance company mutually agreed to terminate a life insurance policy after the insured failed to pay premiums and was informed of the default, the policy was validly forfeited and the company could not be held liable for benefits. The Court reversed the lower courts' decisions, holding that the demurrer to the company's answer should have been overruled because the mutual consent to the policy's lapse constituted a valid termination of the insurance contract.
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Mr. Justice Brewer delivered the opinion of the court.
This case is, in all material respects, similar to that of Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Bessie F. Sears, Executrix, just decided. The answer of the company, which was demurred to, and the demurrer sustained, contained these allegations:
“ That neither the said Samuel B. Stewart, nor any one on his behalf, ever paid, or offered to pay, any premium, or any part of any premium due, or to become due or payable oh said policy, save and except the first premium, which was paid upon the delivery of said policy, and which.covered the period from the date of' said policy until the eighteenth day of February, 1894. That the said Samuel B. Stewart was at all times advised and informed that default had been made by him in the payment of each and every premium, and the Avhole thereof, due on said policy, subsequent to the said first annual premium paid at the delivery of said policy ; and that the said Samuel B. Stewart in his lifetime never paid or offered to pay any premium , or any part of any premium, due upon said policy subsequent to that paid upon the delivery thereof as aforesaid. That it was expressly in said policy provided that the insurance thereon was payable to the insured, Samuel B. Stewart, or his assigns; that the said Samuel B. Stewart never made any transfer or assignment of said policy of insurance; that the said defendant entered and noted said policy of insurance upon its books as forfeited and lapsed for failure to pay the annual premium falling due on said policy on said eighteenth day of February, 1894. That the said Samuel B. Stewart was at all times advised that defendant had so treated said policy as lapsed and forfeited, and notwithstanding said notice, and notwithstanding the said Samuel B. Stewart was at all times advised, he had not paid the premium due on said policy February 18, 1894, consented to the forfeiture and termination of said policy of insurance ; and with a mutual knowlege and understanding on the part of defendant and said Samuel B. Stewart, the said policy was at all times by the said parties deemed terminated from and after the eighteenth day of February, 1894; and relying upon such knowledge and mutual understanding, the said defendant never subsequently mailed or served-any notice of the due date of premiums to or upon said Samuel B. Stewart during his lifetime, and the said Samuel B. Stewart, at all times knowing that the defendant was treating said policy as forfeited and lapsed, and at all times knowing that he had not paid or tendered payment of any premium upon said policy subsequent to the first annual premium paid as aforesaid on the delivery of said policy, acquiesced in and agreed to the said mutual understanding that the said policy was lapsed and forfeited, and. by mutual agreement and consent both the said defendant and said Samuel B. Stewart agreed and consented to the lapsing and forfeiture of said policy of insurance from and after the eighteenth day of February, 1894.”
From this answer it distinctly appears that Stewart, who was both the insured and the beneficiary, knew when the second annual premium became due, was informed of his default in the matter of payment, and both he and the company agreed to the ending of the contract. Under these circumstances, and without considering any other question,
The judgments of the Court of Appeals of the Ninth CwcvAt and of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Washington are reversed, and the case remanded to the latter court with instructions to overrule the demurrer to the answer of the defendant.
Mr. Justice Peckham did not sit in the hearing and took no part in the decision of this case.
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Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v. Cohen, 179 U.S. 262 (U.S. 1900)…rimary question of the applicability of a statute of the State of New York, but deemed it unnecessary to decide it. That decision was followed by the cases of the same company against Sears, 178 U. S. 345; against Hill, 178 U. S. 347; against Allen, 178 U. S. 351. All of which cases were disposed of in like manner. The primary question noticed but not decided in those cases is' distinctly and solely presented in this. The insurance policy contained a stipulation that it should not be binding until the first…
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Swayze v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. (D. Kan. 1929)…ns. Co. v. Phinney, 178 U. S. 327, 20 S. Ct. 906, 44 L. Ed. 1088; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Sears, 178 U. S. 345, 20 S. Ct. 912, 44 L. Ed. 1096; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Hill, 178 U. S. 347, 20 S. Ct. 914, 44 L. Ed. 1097; Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 178 U. S. 351, 20 S. Ct. 913, 44 L. Ed. 1098. Under the agreed facts in this ease I find that the parties abandoned the policy, and believing that the authorities last cited' are not in conflict with the Reynolds Case, supra, I am of the opinion that irrespectiv…1 / 2