EARLE
v.
CONWAY
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A state court issued a writ of attachment against a judgment debtor's assets held by a receiver of a national bank, and the receiver challenged the state court's jurisdiction to serve the attachment upon him. The Supreme Court held that while a state court may serve an attachment on a national bank receiver to notify him of the plaintiff's interest in the debtor's assets, the attachment cannot create a lien on specific bank assets or disturb the receiver's custody; instead, the receiver must report the attachment to the Comptroller of the Currency, who holds any recovered funds subject to the plaintiff's legally acquired interest under the attachment.
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Mr. Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the court.
This case differs somewhat in its facts, from those in Earle v. Pennsylvania, ante, 449. It appears that on February 24, 1898, the appellee Conway, in an action of assumpsit in the Court of Common Pleas of the.county of Philadelphia, obtained a judgment against one John G. Sehall for $1012.43. Upon that judgment á writ of attachment was issued and served May 24 and 25,189S, upon the Chestnut Street National Bank of Philadelphia and upon Earle, receiver, as garnishees— the receiver having been appointed January 29, 1898 — commanding’ them to show cause on a day named why the judgment against Sehall, with costs of writ, should not be levied of his effects in their hands.
The bank and the receiver entered their appearance as defendants and garnishees “ for the purpose only of moving said court to set aside the writ of summons in attachment sur-judgment against him and them, and to dismiss and vacate all proceedings in attachment therein against him or them.” That motion was made upon the ground that the Court of Common Pleas was without jurisdiction under section 5242 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The motion was denied, and the order of the Court of Common Pleas was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
We are of opinion that it was not error to deny the motion to set aside the service of the writ of attachment on the bank and the. receiver. No sound reason can be given why the receiver of a national bank may not be notified by service upon him of an attachment issued from a state court of the nature and extent of the interest asserted or sought to be acquired by the plaintiff in the attachment in the assets in his custody. But for the reasons stated in Earle v. Pennsylvania, such an attachment cannot create any lien upon specific assets of the bank in .the hands of the receiver, nor disturb his custody of those assets, nor prevent him from páying to the Treasurer of the United States, subject to the order of the Comptroller of the Currency, all moneys coming to biis hands or realized by him as receiver from the sale of the property and assets of the bank. After the service of the attachment upon the receiver it became his duty to report the facts to the Comptroller, and it then became the duty of the. latter to hold any funds coming to his ' hands through the Treasurer of the United-States as the proceeds of the sale of the bank’s assets subject to any interest which the plaintiff may have legally acquired therein as against his debtor under the attachment issued on the judgment in his favor in the state court. •
As the judgment of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania goes no further than to sustain the right of the plaintiff to have the attachment served upon the receiver as garnishee, it is
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice White dissented.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
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Van Reed v. People's Nat'l Bank of Lebanon, 198 U.S. 554 (U.S. 1905)
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Steele v. Randall, 19 F.2d 40 (8th Cir. 1927)…f. Section 5242 is a legislative declaration that the ratable distribution shall be protected from voluntary disruption before the appointment of a. receiver. Bank of Bethel v. Pahquioque Bank, 14 Wall. 383, 402, 20 L. Ed. 840, and Earle v. Conway, 178 U. S. 456, 20 S. Ct. 918, 44 L. Ed. 1149, adjudged that no involuntary lien can be secured by proceedings begun after appointment of a receiver. Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U. S. 449, 20 S. Ct. 915, 44 L. Ed. 1146, establishes that no such lien can be secured…1 / 2
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Robinson v. First Nat. Bank of Plainview (N.D. Tex. 1930)…s held by the hank for others. It is therefore thought not to interfere with the immunity of the national institution from any sort of supervision by state courts. Earle v. Pennsylvania, 178 U. S. 449, 20 S. Ct. 915, 44 L. Ed. 1146; Earle v. Conway, 178 U. S. 456, 20 S. Ct. 918, 44 L. Ed. 1149. The motion to dismiss is sustained.…1 / 2