EMBLEN
v.
LINCOLN LAND COMPANY
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Emblen sought to challenge a patent issued by the Secretary of the Interior to Lincoln Land Company (through George F. Weed) for a Colorado land quarter section, claiming he had a superior preemption right that should have been decided in his favor before the patent issued. The Supreme Court affirmed that Emblen never acquired a vested right in the land because he never made an entry and perfected his claim before Congress passed the Act of December 29, 1894, which directed issuance of the patent to Weed, and therefore Congress retained plenary power over the public land disposition. The Court established that once a patent is issued, the land department's jurisdiction ceases and the patent conveys legal title that cannot be revoked except through judicial proceedings brought by the United States, leaving Emblen's only remedy as an equity suit to impose a trust.
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Mr. Chief Justice Fullee delivered the opinion of the court.
At October term, 1895, appellant filed his petition in this court for a writ of mandamus to the ‘ Secretary of the Interior to hear and decide the contest between himself and George F. Weed as to the quarter section of land in Colorado in. question. The petition alleged in substance the same matters set up in the bill in this case. The writ of mandamus was denied, and Mr. Justice Gray, speaking for the court, said: “Such being the state of the case, it is quite clear that (even if the act of Congress was unconstitutional, -which we do not intimate) the writ of mandamus prayed for should not be granted. The determination of the contest between the claimants of conflicting rights of preemption, as well as the issue of a patent to either, was within the general jurisdiction and authority of the land department, and cannot be controlled or restrained-by mandamus pr injunction.,- After the patent has once been issued, the original contest is no longer within the jurisdiction of the land department. The patent conveys the legal title to the patentee; and cannot be revoked or set aside, except upon judicial proceedings instituted on behalf of the United States. The only remedy of Emblen is by bill in equity to charge Weed with a trust in. his favor.” In re Emblen, Petitioner, 161 U. S. 52.
The bill before us is such a bill, and the question arises whether it was within the power of Congress to exercise control over the land, and direct, as it did, the issue of the patent to Weed; and that depends on whether Emblen had obtained a vested right in the land before the passage of the act of December 29, 1894, as otherwise the power of Congress over its disposition as public land was plenary. Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 187; Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U. S. 330; Buxton v. Traver, 130 U. S. 232 ; Gonzales v. French, 164 U. S. 345.
The Weed entry had not been cancelled when the act of 1894 took effect, so that Emblen had-no right to make entry under the act of May 14, 1880. The jurisdiction of the land department ceased with the issue of the patent, and the power, of Congress to direct the patent to jssue was unaffected by the possibility that Emblen, if he had been permitted to prosecute his contest, might have succeeded. As Mr. Justice Miller said in Frisbie v. Whitney, supra, the rights of a claimant are to be measured by the acts of Congress, and if they show “ that he acquired no vested intérest in the land, then, as his rights are created by the statutes, they must be governed by their provisions, whether they be hard or lenient.”
As Emblen never made an entry on th'e land, nor perfected a right to do so, it results that he had no vested right or interest which could defeat the operation of the act of 1894.
Decree affirmed.
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Springer v. Gov't of the Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189 (U.S. 1928)
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Putnam v. Ickes, 78 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir. 1935)…unassailable by any title commenced after its emanation.” This rule has been affirmed in many cases. Hosmer v. Wallace, 97 U. S. 575, 579, 24 L. Ed. 1130; In re Emblen, 161 U. S. 52, 54, 56, 16 S. Ct. 487, 40 L. Ed. 613; Emblen v. Lincoln Land Co., 184 U. S. 660, 664, 22 S. Ct. 523, 46 L. Ed. 736; Hodges v. Colcord, 193 U. S. 192, 24 S. Ct. 433, 48 L. Ed. 677; McMichael v. Murphy, 197 U. S. 304, 25 S. Ct. 460, 49 L. Ed. 766. It is contended by counsel for appellants that, by the motions to dismiss, materia…1 / 2
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Sw. Petroleum Corp. v. Udall, 361 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1966)…e directed a patent to issue to the party who had made the prior entry, the United States Supreme Court held that the second party’s preference right was not a vested interest, and was cut off by the Congressional action. Emblen v. Lincoln Land Co., 184 U.S. 660, 22 S.Ct. 523, 46 L.Ed. 736 (1902). It should be noted that in Emblen, third parties, who were dependent upon the title of the prior entryman, had intervened in the administrative proceedings to protect their interests. The right of Southwestern…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Shepley v. Cowan, 91 U.S. 330 (U.S. 1875)
- Frisbie v. Whitney, 9 Wall. 187 (U.S. 1869)
- Buxton v. Traver, 130 U.S. 232 (U.S. 1889)
- In re Emblen, 161 U.S. 52 (U.S. 1896)