UNITED STATES
v.
SAMPSON
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In a prize case arising from a naval engagement off Santiago de Cuba in 1898, the Supreme Court addressed the procedural question of party substitution after the death of the original plaintiff, Rear Admiral Sampson, who had sued on behalf of himself and all naval officers and enlisted men involved in the battle. The Court held that while some party must be substituted to continue the proceedings in the interest of all parties, it is not necessary to substitute the personal representatives of deceased participants, and designated Rear Admiral Taylor as the substitute party to carry forward the litigation. The decision established that substitution of parties in such cases is a matter of procedural convenience rather than legal necessity.
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The Chief Justice.
This libel in prize was filed by Eear Admiral Sampson in his own behalf and also in behalf of all of the officers and enlisted men of the United States Navy, who took part in the engagement off Santiago de Cuba on July 3, 1898, in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, and went to a decree of condemnation from which this appeal was prosecuted.
On May 19, 1902, the death of Rear Admiral Sampson was suggested by the Attorney General, and a motion made that the cause proceed under its then caption and without the substitution of any other individual as a party, which was postponed to the hearing of thé case on its merits.
That hearing has been had, and counsel, in aid of the court, have made application for the substitution of the adminis-tratrix of Admiral Sampson, and submitted considerations in respect of the substitution also of one or more officers, as, and if, deemed necessary.
We think some one to carry on the proceedings in the interest of all should be substituted, but that it is not necessary that the personal representatives of those who may have deceased should come in, or that any person should ex officio be designated. The matter is merely one of convenience and without significance in itself.
Bear Admiral Evans, Bear Admiral Taylor, Captain French E. Chadwick, and others are represented in the litigation by counsel; but Bear Admiral Schley and others are not. Of those so represented, Bear Admiral Evans is absent on a foreign station, while Bear Admiral Taylor is within the jurisdiction. It seems to us that the substitution of Bear Admiral Taylor will satisfactorily meet the exigency, and it will be
Ordered accordingly.
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