HARLEY
v.
UNITED STATES

U.S. | 1905-05-08
No. 195
Mr. Justice Peckham dissents.
198 U.S. 229 Supreme Court of the United States (1905) Caution
Also reported at: 49 L. Ed. 1029 · 25 S. Ct. 634 · 1905 U.S. LEXIS 1123 · SCDB 1904-084
Cited by 39 cases

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Synopsis

Harley sued the United States in the Court of Claims for compensation for allowing the government to use his patented device in the Treasury Department's Bureau of Engraving and Printing for over fourteen years. The Supreme Court affirmed judgment for the United States, holding that no enforceable contract arose between the parties because there was no "coming together of minds"—the government officials understood that Harley, as a Treasury employee, would not expect or demand payment, while Harley believed he would be compensated, and his failure to make an explicit demand for fourteen years undermined any claim of implied contract. The Court established that jurisdiction in the Court of Claims requires a genuine meeting of the minds on contract terms, and that obligations implied by law from tortious conduct do not satisfy this requirement.

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Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice McKenna,

Mr. Justice McKenna,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of thé court.

The question in the case is whether, on these facts, a contract arose between the United States and the appellant, whereby the United States promised to pay him for the use of his device.

We held in Russell v. United States, 182 U. S. 516, 530, that in order to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction, under the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 505, c. 359, defining claims of which the Court of Claims had jurisdiction, the demand sued on must be founded on “a convention between the parties — ‘a coming together of minds.’ ” And we excluded, as not meeting this condition, those contracts or obligations that the law is said to imply from á tort. Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163; United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U. S. 552.

In the case at bar the Court of Claims finds that the appellant “supposed and understood that he would be entitled to compensation, and that it would be allowed and paid by the Secretary of the Treasury;” but it also finds that "on the part of the Secretary and Chief of Bureau (Engraving and Printing) it' was supposed and. understood that the claimant (appellant) being an employe of the Treasury Department would neither expect nor demand remuneration.” That there was “a coming together of minds” is therefore excluded by the findings. And. the use of the device cannot give a right independent of the understanding under which it was used. The appellant should have been explicit in his demand. He con tends that he was, but manifestly he was not, or the curious opposition between his expectation and that of the Secretary of the Treasury and Chief of Bureau could not have occurred. And we cannot assent to the suggestion that he “was by coercion prevented” from making a demand “in terms” by his subordinate' position. How long must we suppose such coercion lasted and that he could have permitted a misunderstanding of his purpose? Six years passed, and the Chief of Bureau with whom the negotiations were made went out of office; another succeeded. . No demand was made of either for compensation. Further time passed, and other Chiefs of Bureau succeeded. There was a succession of Secretaries of the Treasury; no demand was made of any of them. His first demand was the petition in this case, over fourteen years from his first interview with the Secretary of the Treasury. This delay cannot be overlooked or interpreted favorably to appellant’s contention. He sues for $102,600, and this does not include the royalties that he contends he was entitled to for the first six yéars the device was used. He claims a royalty of twenty-five cents a day oh an average of two hundred machines — that is, $50.a day. He was an employé of the Government at a modest salary, and we cannot conceive there was no inducement in $50 a day to an explicit demand of his rights, or that he was willing to wait, or felt himself coerced to wait, for their realization for fourteen years, and even to lose compensation for six years by the operation of the statute of limitations. The rights of the Government are obvious. The-contention of the appellant forces on it a liability that it might not have taken. It was given no election of the terms upon which it would use the register, or whether it would use it at all. Of course, this argument is based on the fact that there was no coming together of the minds of the parties, or, as expressed by the findings of the Court of Claims, that “it was súpposed and understood” by the officers of the Government that appellant “would neither expect nor demand remuneration.” And this fact distinguishes the case from MeKeener v. United States, 14 C. Cl. 396, affirmed by this court; also from United States v. Lynah, 188 U. S. 445, and the other cases cited by appellant.

Judgment affirmed-.

Mr. Justice Peckham dissents.

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Cited By (17 total)

  • Larson v. Dom. & Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (U.S. 1949)
    …the United States could not be had today unless a whole series of cases is to be overruled. See, e. g., Tempel v. United States, 248 U. S. 121, 130, and the cases cited therein; Russell v. United States, 182 U. S. 516, 535; Harley v. United States, 198 U. S. 229, 235; Hill v. United States, 149 U. S. 593; United States v. North American Trans. & Trading Co., 253 U. S. 330, 335; Juragua Iron Co. v. United States, 212 U. S. 297. And there is nothing in the Federal Torts Claim Act which would indicate that und…
  • Crozier v. Fried. Krupp Aktiengesellschaft, 224 U.S. 290 (U.S. 1912)
    …ted by repeated decisions of this court. United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 62; Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163; United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U. S. 552; Russell v. United States, 182 U. S. 516; Harley v. United States, 198 U. S. 229. The effect of the statute was thus pointed out in the last cited case. (198 U. S. p. 234.) “We held in Russell v. United States, 182 U. S. 516, 530, that in order to give the Court of Claims jurisdiction, under the act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 5…
  • Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 592 (U.S. 1923)
    …cumstances, their tacit understanding. See, by analogy, as to the construction of similar jurisdictional statutes, United States v. Berdan Fire-Arms Mfg. Co., 156 U. S. 552, 566; Russell v. United States, 182 U. S. 516, 530; Harley v. United States, 198 U. S. 229, 234; United States v. Anciens Etablissements, 224 U. S. 309, 311, 320; United States v. Buffalo Pitts Co., 234 U. S. 228, 232; Tempel v. United States, 248 U. S. 121, 129; and Sutton v. United States, 256 U. S. 575, 581; and, generally, Railway Co.…

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