KETLAND, QUI TAM. VERSUS THE CASSIUS

Peters, Justice:

:—The language of the act of Congress is so forcible, to vest an exclusive jurisdiction in the District Court, that the impression on my mind can never be obviated, but by something equally authoritative, direct, and conclusive. The argument which has been opposed to this language, merely consists of slight analogies, doubtful implications, and unsatisfactory deductions, from a comparative view of different sections of the law. To take jurisdiction, however, in any cafe, the court ought to be clearly of opinion, that the constitution and the law intended to give it; but here, the words will hardly admit a doubt upon the intention of the legislature, to exclude the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court; and, therefore, We can have no presence whatever to sustain the present information.

■ I have, uniformly affixed this coriftruction to the law. In the cafe of the United States, v. Guinet, for being concerned in illegally fitting out a French privateer, the party was arrefted, and fome cannon and other articles were feized. I then; upon full con(kleration, diredled that the information in rem, to in-force the. forfeiture of the cannon, íhould be inftituted in the Diftridl Court ; but I bound the defendant over to the Circuit Court, to anfwer personally for the offence. *The pradlice has, I believe, been conformable to this precedent: Forfeitúres under the Excife laws have certainly been fued' for, without exception, in the Diftri<ft Court, upon the general jurifdidlion given by the judicial adl, and not upon any fpecial jurifdidlion created for that purpofe.

Wilson, Justice.

:—The Court is bound to take notice of a question of jurisdiction, whenever it may occur, and however, it may be proposed: For, if we are satisfied, that we have not legal cognizance of any cause;—or, in terms less direct, if we are not satisfied, that we have cognizance; we ought not to proceed to a decision, or an investigation, upon its merits.

In the present instance, it is a question of great importance, and, perhaps, of some difficulty; but the strong bias, of my mind, (which encreases, indeed, with every moment’s reflection upon the subject) is opposed to the alledged jurisdiction of the court. It is supposed by the counsel for the informant, that,the jurisdiction is maintainable on the positive words of the 11th section, and on a fair implication resulting from a view of the 21th and 22d sections of the judicial act: For, it is said, if the Court has not original jurisdiction, by the 11th section, it can have no jurisdiction at all; since its appellate jurisdiction, established by the 21st and 22d sections, is confined to civil causes. But the jurisdiction, in the case of crimes and offences, obviously relates to prosecutions against persons ; and when viewed in that light, neither the positive words of the 11th section, nor any implication resulting from the 21st and 22d sections, can be applicable to the present cause, which is not described by the former, nor affected by the latter: to take cognizance of a proceeding merely in rem, cannot be considered as taking cognizance of a crime or offence.

■ When, however, we advert to the jurifdiction givén to the Diftridl Court, every ihadow of doubt.feems to vaniih. The 9⅛ feciion of the adt declares, that c‘ the Diftridl Court {ball have exclufive ■ original cognizance of all fuits for penalties and forfeitures, incurred under the laws of the United States.” The exclufion is exprefled in ftrong and unqualified terms ; nor can it, by any reafonable interpretation, be reftridted to a mere, exclufion of the State Courts. Wherever, indeed, a qualified exclufion is intended, the expreffion of the legiflature eotief- ■ ponds with-that intention. Thus, it is provided, in two diffe rent members of.the very fame fecftion, that the Diftriéf Court-{ball have, “ exclufively of the Courts of the feveral States,” cognizance of ail crimes and oífénces, committed upon the high feas, &c. and of fuits againft Confuís or Vice Confuís.- But, if the conftrudtion, which I have ftatedj is correft, no contradiction exifts, to call, for any {trained expofition of the law. The jurifdiction given to the Circuit Court, whether.exclufive, or concurrent, will be fupported by applying it to profecutions againft delinquents for crimes and offences; and the exclufive • jurifdidtion given to the Diftridt Court will be prefervedby allotting to it all fuits for penalties and forfeitures under the laws of the United States.' "Whether, therefore, this is a fuit for a forfeiture, appears, upon the whole, to be the only real object of enquiry. We think that it is a fuit of that denomination j and* confequently, cannot take cognizance of it.

But the subject is entitled to the most solemn consideration, and the most authoritative judgment. We shall be happy, therefore, to assist in putting it upon any proper footing, to obtain the opinion of the Supreme Court. In the meantime,

By the Court :—Let the information be dismissed.*

*

See ant, p. 321. United States v. Guinet.

*

Lewis doubted whether a Writ of Error would lie for want of parties, as the French Republic had refused to file a claim to the vessel and, he said, that he was prepared to contend, that the suggestion filed ex officio by the Attorney of the District, ought to be dismissed. The next day, he mentioned, that presuming the decision against the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, was, in effect, a recognition of the jurisdiction of the District Court, he should resort to that tribunal, without giving this Court (who had deferred, pronouncing their decision, in order that he might consider the matter) any further trouble.