CARTER
v.
HAWAII

U.S. | 1906-01-08
No. 144
200 U.S. 255 Supreme Court of the United States (1906) Positive Treatment
Also reported at: 50 L. Ed. 470 · 26 S. Ct. 248 · SCDB 1905-067 · 1906 U.S. LEXIS 1474
Cited by 4 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this dispute over fishing rights in Hawaii, the Supreme Court held that Hawaiian statutes granting fishery rights to landowners created vested property rights even though the statutes neither identified specific grantees nor established precise boundaries, and the Court reversed a judgment that had excluded evidence of the plaintiffs' predecessor's long-standing possession and enjoyment of the fishery rights prior to 1839. The Court established that statutory grants of fishery rights were sufficiently definite when they provided means of identification and allowed boundaries to be fixed by reference to existing facts or analogous legal principles.


© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.

Opinion of the Court
Mr. Justice Holmes

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a proceeding to establish the plaintiffs’ rights to a several fishery of the kind described in Damon v. Hawaii, 194 U. S. 154, and comes here under the same circumstances as that case did. The fishery in question is a sea fishery within the reef in Waiaíae Iki, island of Oahu, and is claimed by metes and bounds in the complaint. The plaintiffs are owners of the adjacent land under a royal patent following upon an award of the Land Commission, and the only difference between this case and the former one is that in this the fishery is -not described in the royal patent, and that, apart from the question of prescription, upon which we shall say nothing, the plaintiffs have to rely upon the statutes alone. They offered evidence at the trial that, before the action of the king in 1839, those under whom the plaintiffs claim title had enjoyed from time immemorial rights similar to those set out in the statutes, and also that they had been in continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the konohiki right for sixty years. They offered in shortrio prove that their predecessor in title was within the statutes ancT therefore owned the fishery, it not being disputed that if he did, the plaintiffs own it now. The judge rejected the evidence and entered judgment for the defendant, and on exceptions this judgment and that in Damon v. Hawaii were sustained at the same time in one opinion by the Supreme Court. 14 Hawaiian, 465.

We deem it unnecessary to repeat the ground of our intimation in the former case, that the statutes there referred to created vested rights. We simply repeat that in our opinion such was their effect. The fact that they neither identified the specific grantees nor established the boundaries, is immaterial when their purport as a grant or confirmation is decided. It is enough that they afforded the means of identification, and that presumably the boundaries can be fixed by reference to existing facts, or the application of principles which have been laid down in cases of more or less similar kind.

. The omission of the plaintiffs’ predecessor in title to establish his right to the fishery before the Land Commission does not prejudice their case. See Kenoa v. Meek, 6 Hawaiian, 63. That commission was established to determine the title to lands as against the Hawaiian Government. . In practice it treated the fisheries as not within its jurisdiction, and it would seem to have been right in its view. See Akeni v. Wong Ka Mau, 5 Hawaiian, 91.

' Judgment-reversed.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349 (U.S. 1907)
    …liken the Territory to the District of Columbia, Metropolitan [*353] R. R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1, and point out that it has been a party to suits that have been before this court. Damon v. Hawaii, 194 U. S. 154; Carter v. Hawaii, 200 U. S. 255. The Territory, of course, could waive its exemption, Smith v. Reeves, 178 U. S. 436, and it took no objection to the proceedings in the cases cited if it could have done so. See Act of April 30, 1900, c. 339, § 96; 31 Stat. 141, 160. But in the ca…
  • Maynard v. Sutherland, 313 F.2d 560 (D.C. Cir. 1962)
    …N.E. 86S, 872, 873 (1925). . Of course she had no authority to sell or bind the interest of her mother. Lipscomb v. Watrous, 3 App.D.C. 1, 5 (1894). . Wood v. Grayson, 22 App.D.C. 432, 445, 446 (1903), appeal dismissed, 200 U.S. 257, 26 S.Ct. 240, 50 L.Ed. 470 (1906). . Id.; and see W. A. H. Church, Inc. v. Holmes, supra note 17; D.C.Code § 45-603 (1961), supra note 13. . But see, Swenson & Degnan, Severance-of Joint Tenancies, 38 Minn.L.Rev. 466, [*567] 488-492 (1954); Sturges & Clark, Legal Theory and…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw