ROBERT R. WHITE AND LEONORA P. BARUCH, APPELLANTS,
v.
THE EXCHANGE CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1964-01-07
No. 63-350
Before BARKDULL, C. J., and TILLMAN PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.
167 So. 2d 324 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1964) Positive Treatment
Cited by 14 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Exchange Corporation sued Robert White and Leonora Baruch for breach of a letter agreement that extended a mortgage grace period, but the court reversed and dismissed because The Exchange Corporation was not a party to the agreement and therefore lacked standing to sue for its breach.


Holding

The court held that The Exchange Corporation lacked standing to sue because it was neither a party to nor in privity with the letter agreement, and the mere fact that it drew the check did not confer upon it any right of action for breach.


Key Quotes

“The Exchange Corporation was never a party to the letter agreement, which extended the grace period of the mortgage.”

Establishes that the Exchange Corporation had no contractual relationship with the parties to the agreement

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Facts & Procedural History

Key Marble, Inc. was in default on a mortgage held by the Baruchs. White, representing the Baruchs, and Jackman, representing Key Marble, executed a l…

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Opinion of the Court
BARKDULL, Chief Judge.

BARKDULL, Chief Judge.

Appellants, defendants in the trial court, appeal a declaratory decree rendered against them adjudicating them liable to the appellee in the sum of $6,000.00.

It appears, from the record, that this controversy arose out of a letter dated May 17, 1962, which reads as follows:

“Mr. George L. Jackman
3300 N. W. North River Dr.,
Miami, Florida
Re: Mortgage from Key Marble, Inc to Mr and Mrs. Baruch
Dear Mr. Jackman:
Receipt is hereby acknowledged of the sum of Six Thousand ($6,000.00) dollars, by check subject to collection, to apply against the principal and interest payment on the above captioned mortgage that was due at the end of the grace period after April 22, 1962.
It is hereby agreed that if Key Marble fails to pay the balance ($7,000.00), plus Five Hundred ($500.00) on [signed] R. White or before June 6, 1962, then Mr. and Mrs. Baruch are to retain the Six Thousand ($6,000.00) Dollars this day paid. The purpose of the $500.00 is to cover additional interest accrued and for attorneys fees incurred when this matter was turned over to this office for collection.
Very truly yours,
[s] Robert R. White
Robert R. White
the terms of the above are accepted for Key Marble, Inc., by the undersigned as its attorney.
[s] George L. Jackman George L. Jackman”

*326Accompanying this letter was a check for $6,000.00, made payable to Robert R. White and drawn by The Exchange Corporation. At the time the letter was executed, Key Marble, Inc. [represented by Jackman] was in default on a note secured by a mortgage given to parties named Baruch [who were represented by White]. Subsequent to the June 6, 1962 date referred to in the above-quoted letter, the Baruchs foreclosed their mortgage against Key Marble, Inc., which resulted in a foreclosure decree without any credit being given to Key Marble, Inc., for the payment of the $6,000.00. Thereafter, The Exchange Corporation brought the instant action, based upon a breach of the letter agreement because of the failure of the Baruchs to give a credit for the $6,000.00 in the foreclosure proceeding. We reverse.

The Exchange Corporation was never a party to the letter agreement, which extended the grace period of the mortgage. Its funds were delivered to White [the agent for the mortgagee] by Jackman [the agent for the mortgagors]. Key Marble, Inc., had a right in the foreclosure of the mortgage to urge that the $6,000.00 be credited, which it declined to do. The appellee is not in a position to urge a default in the letter agreement, since it had never been a party to it. The mere fact that it may have drawn a check which was delivered by the mortgagors’ attorney does not give it any more standing in this cause, than would a bank have been given a right of action had the mortgagors’ attorney delivered a cashier’s check drawn on a local bank. It is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to sue for its breach. See: Woodbury v. Tampa Water Works Co., 57 Fla. 249, 40 So. 556, 21 L.R.A.,N.S., 1034; Seaboard Airline Ry. Co. v. Tampa Southern R. Co., 97 Fla. 340, 121 So. 477; 18 F.L.P., Parties, § 4. Therefore, the decree is reversed with directions to dismiss the complaint.

Reversed with directions.


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Citator

Cited By

  • McKINNEY-Green, Inc. v. Davis, 606 So. 2d 393 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …uirements for preciseness and sufficiency, or otherwise showed, through the attached “proposed mortgage” and mortgage note, an agreement in which M-G and Oaks of Ka-napaha, Inc., but not Davis individually, were parties. See White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA [*396] 1964) (person not a party to, or in privity with, a contract lacks the right to sue for its breach). Davis alleged alternatively that he was a beneficiary of the agreement. However, he did not allege facts showing him to be…
  • Gallagher v. Dupont, 918 So. 2d 342 (Fla. 5th DCA 2005)
    …agreement or course of dealing.” Id. at 382. Moreover, the Fund, as a non-party to the settlement agreement; has no standing to enforce it. A person not a party to nor in privity with a contract has no right to enforce it. White v. Exchange Corp., 167 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964). When a contract is designed solely for the benefit of the contracting parties, a third party cannot enforce its provisions even though the third party may derive some incidental or consequential benefit from the enforcement.…
  • Gables Ins. Recovery, Inc. v. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., 261 So. 3d 613 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018)
    …company could have standing to sue on behalf of the homeowners was if the assignments were valid. If the assignments were not valid, then as a non-party to the insurance contracts Gables Recovery would have no right to sue. See White v. Exch. Corp., 167 So. 2d 324, 326 (Fla. 3d DCA 1964) ("It is elementary that a person not a party to nor in privy with a contract does not have the right to sue for [*619] its breach."). The issue, then, is whether the Matusow and Difilippi assignments were valid to give Gables…

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